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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Against a background of inconclusive evidence of the results of EU Cohesion policy since 
1989, the aim of this study has been to evaluate the main achievements of EU Cohesion 
policy programmes and projects and their effectiveness and utility over the longer term in 
15 selected regions of the EU15.  Specifically, the main objectives of the study were 
twofold: (i) to examine the achievements of all programmes co-financed by the ERDF and, 
where applicable, the Cohesion Fund, which have been implemented in the 15 selected 
regions from 1989 to 2012 (regional programmes and national programmes implemented in 
the regions); and (ii) to assess the relevance of programmes and the effectiveness and 
utility of programme achievements. The following section summarises the main findings of 
the study dealing, in turn, with the needs of the regions, the relevance of strategies, then 
effectiveness and utility of interventions, and the conclusions drawn and policy lessons 
identified. 
Regional needs and the relevance of strategies 
At the end of the 1980s, each of the 15 case study regions faced particular challenges, 
reflecting their geographical situation and historical background. The main types of needs 
can be categorised as: major underdevelopment and indicators of disadvantage ranging 
from a lack of basic infrastructure and services, to  skills deficits, often compounded by 
peripherality or significant internal disparities, in the regions of Dytiki Ellada, Campania, 
Norte, Andalucía, Basilicata, Algarve and Ireland; restructuring in regions facing either 
transition from a centrally planned economy (Sachsen-Anhalt) or from an economy 
dominated by large, declining traditional industries (Nordrhein-Westfalen, Nord-Pas-de-
Calais and North East England); and agricultural modernisation and economic 
diversification in predominantly rural or peripheral regions - mainly Aquitaine, Burgenland, 
Itä-Suomi and Galicia.  
All the case study regions were at a relative disadvantage at the start of the period, having 
significantly lower levels of development relative to either national or EU averages, but 
with significant differences within the group. Up to 2008, most regions performed worse 
than the EU average in GVA growth over the period. Only Ireland demonstrated a clear 
virtuous cycle of above-average performance for both output productivity and employment. 
Others saw some growth based on increased employment or improved productivity, but 
most struggled to outperform the EU average. Since 2008 many of the regions have seen 
poorer performance as a result of the recession. 
The early ERDF programmes of the case study regions had relatively basic, generic 
strategies, often with limited assessment of needs; they tried to encompass diverse 
stakeholder interests with objectives and priorities that were open to interpretation. 
Initially, there was little pressure to change, and many strategies were remarkably stable 
during the 1990s. However, programming for 2000-2006 saw substantial strategic 
reassessments in several regions and even more so for 2007-2013, driven by the Community 
Strategic Guidelines or changes in eligibility status.  
Evaluation of the main achievements of Cohesion policy programmes and projects over the longer term 
in 15 selected regions: Final Report 
EPRC viii LSE 
The conceptual basis for programmes has often been weak. Throughout the period since 
1989, strategies were not underpinned explicitly by theory or development models, but 
rather by prevailing assumptions of economic development. Nevertheless, this study found 
that all the programmes were at least partially relevant to regional needs (in certain 
periods or for parts of the programme), and almost half the programmes were relevant 
across the whole period from 1989 to 2012. The main thematic trends over time have 
involved a greater emphasis on R&D and innovation, more support for entrepreneurship and 
more sophisticated SME interventions, the mainstreaming of urban regeneration and a 
specific focus on community development.  
In the early periods, programme objectives were generally neither specific nor measurable 
due to a lack of quantified targets and non-existent or inadequate monitoring systems. The 
attainability of objectives was also questionable: strategies were mostly overambitious and 
did not recognise the limited potential contribution of the ERDF programmes in the wider 
economic and policy contexts. Even if quantified, programme targets often required 
adjustments during the programme period. However, the vagueness of objectives allowed 
managing authorities to report ‘success’ or interpret effectiveness in different ways. 
Programme objectives were usually not timely, in the sense that achievement of objectives 
was likely to take much longer than the programme period - a factor that was not always 
acknowledged. While the ‘SMART’ character of programme objectives improved over time, 
it is currently still some way from being fully achieved, either because of deficiencies in 
programme design or delays and difficulties with the operationalisation of monitoring 
systems. 
In the Convergence regions, the ERDF actions usually consisted of a combination of regional 
and national thematic OPs. Good integration and synergy were facilitated by several 
factors: the existence in each programme period of an overarching strategy; a dominant 
role of national government departments in designing the programmes; and/or a 
comprehensive planning system. However, this was not the case in all countries. Among 
Regional Competitiveness & Employment (RCE) regions, there was a lack of coordination in 
the earlier periods between Objective 2 and Objective 5b programmes in adjacent areas, as 
well as with Community Initiatives (e.g. Aquitaine). The latter did have an important role, 
though, in testing new concepts and types of project that were later mainstreamed in the 
core ERDF programmes.  
Synergies with domestic programmes were largely determined by the need for matching 
funding. Consequently, ERDF and domestic programmes co-funded projects or business aid 
schemes. The relationship between EU and domestic policies depended partly on the 
importance of ERDF funding for economic development. In several less-developed regions, 
Structural and Cohesion Funds were often the only significant policy support for regional 
development; domestic regional policies either did not exist or were fully subsumed into 
Cohesion policy (e.g. Norte). In some RCE regions, where EU funding was a minor part of 
economic development support, the relationship between EU and domestic regional policy 
was difficult, with tensions during programming because of different objectives, priorities 
or funding modalities and a lack of coherence. 
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Effectiveness  
Effectiveness is defined as the extent to which programme objectives were achieved. This 
was assessed by examining the achievements in relation to the overarching goals of 
programmes and the targets relating to specific measures and/or priorities.  
Over the period from 1989 to the present, more than €145 billion of ERDF are estimated to 
have been spent in the 15 regions.  Infrastructure spending predominated up to 2006 in the 
Convergence/Objective 1 regions, followed closely by enterprise support and a growing 
proportion of expenditure on social cohesion and labour market support from 2000 onwards. 
The situation was similar in the Transition regions at the outset, but with a more diversified 
profile over time, notably enterprise support, structural adjustment and innovation. The 
three RCE/Objective 2 regions focused heavily on enterprise support in the first three 
programme periods, but with a growing shift towards innovation and social cohesion.  
In 1989-93, the reporting of achievements was almost non-existent. Over time, programme 
authorities developed targets and indicators, both of outputs and results, although this not 
undertaken systematically or comprehensively across all regions. Monitoring processes 
improved, as did the sophistication of targeting, the attention paid to economic results and 
choice of output indicators. However, the reliability of indicator data remains problematic 
due to definitional, recording, aggregation and analytical flaws. 
Objectives were often over-optimistic in the early periods, reported achievements were 
sometimes only a fraction of the targets originally set. In the later programmes, objectives 
and targets were calibrated more realistically. The study’s aggregation of the qualitative 
assessments undertaken in each of the case study regions suggests that programmes were 
effective in meeting objectives, even if only defined in terms of outputs.  
However, the degree to which needs were met varied considerably across regions and 
programme periods. It is notable that those objectives which relied on public sector 
intervention – for example, the development of physical and business infrastructure and 
services, or environmental improvement – appear to have been more readily achieved. 
Regions were able to set targets for such spending and largely meet them, although some 
projects were so large as to run over more than one programme (e.g. Dytiki Ellada). 
Objectives dependent on entrepreneurial activity or funding by the private sector have a 
mixed record; there were common problems in achieving objectives relating to the business 
start-up rate, innovation and technology transfer, and employment creation. Success in 
promoting innovation depended on the development of a regional innovation system rather 
than just investment in public research (e.g. North East England), which some regions were 
slow to appreciate.  Regions also failed to recognise the need for a systemic approach to 
entrepreneurship, encompassing the promotion of an enterprise culture as well as training, 
finance and incubators.  
Utility 
Utility is  defined as the extent to which programmes led to impacts that are in line with 
‘society's needs and the socio-economic problems to be solved’, which may differ from the 
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goals explicitly stated in the programmes or which may not have been stated explicitly in 
the programmes. 
Four regions classed as undergoing transition/restructuring were able to counter the 
legacies of their industrial past, but achieved less in relation to social goals (Sachsen-
Anhalt, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Nord-Pas-de-Calais and North East England). In rural 
regions, there was undoubted improvement in connectivity within and between regions, but 
also tensions between agglomeration in urban centres and the continuing needs of rural 
areas (Aquitaine, Burgenland, Itä-Suomi and Galicia). There were more differences in the 
results among the regions that had followed broad-based strategies to deal with diverse 
needs, partly because of the exceptional performance of Ireland. In the other regions 
(Dytiki Ellada, Campania, Norte, Andalucía, Basilicata, and Algarve), a key finding is that 
the utility of interventions can often be fragile, emphasising the long time-scales involved 
in profound transformation and the need for perseverance. 
The case studies demonstrate that ERDF has made a significant contribution to regional 
development; quality of life is better, certainly in the regions which invested massively in 
basic infrastructure and services (e.g. Andalucía). However, in virtually all regions, the 
success in addressing certain needs and problems were only steps on a longer journey of 
transformation. Most commonly, the regional research found that restructuring was 
incomplete, and employment creation was insufficient. Also, specific problems remain, 
such as demographic challenges, low innovation, poverty and organised crime (e.g. 
Campania). Further, it should be noted that changes in regional needs and problems were 
sometimes territorially uneven. A major concern is that maintaining the capital investment 
and institutions established with Cohesion policy support is a challenge for some regions, 
and that the economic crisis and fiscal constraints are undoing some of gains. Finally, there 
is evidence that ERDF played a part in changing the culture and mentality of regions, 
particularly their internal and external image (e.g. Nord-Pas-de-Calais). 
Conclusions and lessons 
The research demonstrated improvements in the sophistication of strategies (evidence 
base, analysis and strategic focus) and programme management (project selection, 
monitoring, evaluation) over the study period, with considerable learning over time, albeit 
unevenly across the 15 regions. All of the regional case studies cited examples of successful 
interventions or projects, collectively spanning the spectrum of economic development 
support. However, there were also many examples of poor practices where regions were 
slow to learn from what was happening elsewhere. A major difficulty, reported in almost all 
regions, was the fragmentation of funding across too many interventions or small projects. 
Over time, there was greater recognition of the need to concentrate funding or fewer and 
larger projects. 
The most important lesson is the benefit of sound and rigorous strategic planning. The 
research also highlighted the importance of a development model which recognises that 
structural adjustment is a societal as well as an economic process, the need for realism 
about the long-term timescale required for structural change, and the need for strategies 
to be flexible.  
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A further important factor is an enabling domestic policy framework and the existence or 
development of institutional capacity and leadership, crucial to successful programming 
and implementation. Capacity deficits were particularly evident in project generation, 
appraisal and selection, the monitoring of physical outcomes and the development of an 
evaluation culture.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The context for this study is that, after more than 20 years of implementing EU Cohesion 
policy in the EU15, the evidence for the effectiveness of the policy is inconclusive. 
Academic research and evaluation studies have reached widely differing conclusions on the 
results of interventions through Structural and Cohesion Funds. At the same time, public 
debate on the performance of the policy has increased, most evidently in the discussions on 
the reforms of Cohesion policy in 2005-06 and 2012-13. Against this background, the aim of 
this study has been to evaluate the main achievements of Cohesion policy programmes and 
projects and their effectiveness and utility over the longer term in 15 selected regions of 
the EU15, from 1989 to 2012. For twelve of the regions, the research covers the three full 
programme periods following the 1988 reform of Cohesion policy (1989-1994, 1994-1999 and 
2000-2006) and much of the current (2007-2013) programme period. Of the three remaining 
regions, the time period for one (in East Germany) is from 1991, and for the other two (in 
Austria and Finland respectively) is from 1995.  
Specifically, the objectives of the study were twofold: 
 to examine the achievements of all programmes co-financed by the ERDF and, 
where applicable, the Cohesion Fund, which have been implemented in the 15 
selected regions from 1989 to 2012 (regional programmes and national programmes 
implemented in the regions); and 
 to assess the relevance of programmes and the effectiveness and utility of 
programme achievements.  
In line with the Terms of Reference, the study began with the development of a theoretical 
and methodological approach for the research, involving a literature review and stock-take 
on programme performance and the development of methodology to evaluate achievements 
from various programmes. The methodological approach adopted was a theory-based 
evaluation, the essence of which is to assess whether the programmes implemented by the 
regions achieved what they were designed to do and whether what they achieved dealt 
with the needs of the region (as identified at the start of the process). What is distinctive 
about this methodology is that it does not try to establish a direct causal link between the 
Cohesion policy interventions and changes in standard macroeconomic variables at regional 
level, such as GDP per head or the unemployment rate. Many previous econometric studies 
have attempted to evaluate regional policy in this way, but have typically been unable to 
arrive at unambiguous conclusions, because of the sheer difficulty of identifying both what 
would have happened in the absence of the regional policy intervention (the counter-
factual) and in disentangling the effects of Cohesion policy from other influences on 
regional performance.  
Whilst not denying the importance of knowing whether or not regional policy contributes to 
growth and employment, the focus of theory-based evaluation (as interpreted for this 
study) is on understanding what it was that policy-makers sought to change, and how what 
was done was expected to transform the region. It addresses the logic behind the policy 
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interventions, whether such logic was appropriate for regional circumstances, and how 
policy evolved as initial needs were met and new ones had to be confronted. The approach 
recognises that regional development theories have themselves evolved over the period 
studied, as has the wider context in which Cohesion policy is implemented, notably because 
of major EU strategies such as Lisbon/Europe 2020 (Nordregio, 2009; Begg, 2010; Mendez, 
2010). 
In the early years of the period under study, enhancement of infrastructure was regarded 
as a necessary condition for regional development and was a favoured policy, especially in 
many lagging regions (see, for example, Biehl, 1992; de la Fuente and Vives, 1995; Bachtler 
and Gorzelak, 2007). The logic behind these interventions was that unless regions had 
sufficient levels of physical capital, they would be systematically disadvantaged in 
comparison with more developed competitor regions, not least in attracting inward 
investment. Human capital investment and efforts to promote enterprise were also typical 
of this era. By the end of the 1990s, underlying theories of regional development were 
paying increasing attention to sources of endogenous growth, with innovation and research- 
led economic development stressed in policy packages (Malecki, 1997 – and many other 
publications; Cheshire and Magrini, 2000; Rodriguez-Pose, 2001). These orientations 
accorded with the Lisbon agenda and, to varying degrees, also gave greater prominence to 
social cohesion as a determinant of economic growth.  
The theory-based approach was explained in more detail in the Inception Report and the 
First Intermediate Interim Report of this study. Based on it, the core of the research was 15 
regional case studies conducted in three types of region: 
 regions eligible for Objective 1/Convergence support from 1989-1993 to the present 
(six regions); 
 regions eligible for Objective 1 or 6 at one time, but now have Phasing-in/out or 
Regional Competitiveness & Employment status (six regions); and  
 regions partially or wholly eligible for Objective 2 / RCE status from 1989-1993 to 
the present (three regions). 
The list of case study regions agreed with DG Regio is set out in Table 1. Two of these were 
nominated as ‘pilot regions’ – North East England and Basilicata – where a first phase of 
research was conducted to provide lessons and a model that could be incorporated into the 
other case studies. In practice, North East England was the main pilot case study that 
served this purpose. 
The case study research was carried out by 15 regional teams working in each of the 
regions, working to a methodology prepared by the EPRC-LSE core team. Using a mix of 
desk research and fieldwork interviews with a wide range of respondents and consultative 
workshops, each case study involved five main elements:  
 a context analysis of regional features and needs;  
 a programme analysis of the evolution of strategies and expenditure;  
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 an analysis of reported and actual achievements;  
 an assessment of achievements against objectives and needs; and  
 an assessment of complementarities and synergies of the funding and the lessons to 
be learnt.  
A central thread of the analysis was the use of ‘thematic axes’ (or themes) as a framework 
for understanding the programmes and their achievements. These were: innovation; 
enterprise; structural adjustment; infrastructure; environment; labour market; social 
cohesion; and territorial cohesion. The case study research was supported by central 
guidance on all aspects of the research, including an analysis for each case study of 
regional needs based on international data sources, and an online questionnaire survey of 
stakeholders. The outcome of the research has been brought together in case study reports 
for each region, published separately.  
Table 1: Case study regions 
Country Objective 1 / 
Convergence 
Phasing–in/out Objective 2 / RCE 
Austria  Burgenland  
Finland  Itä-Suomi  
France  Nord-Pas-de-Calais Aquitaine 
Germany Sachsen-Anhalt  Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Greece Dytiki Ellada   
Ireland  Ireland  
Italy Campania Basilicata  
Portugal  Norte Algarve  
Spain Andalucía, Galicia   
United Kingdom   North-East England 
 
The final task for the study has been a cross-case study assessment of the relevance of 
programme strategies and of the effectiveness and utility of programme achievements. This 
has been undertaken by the core team, principally through a synthesis of the findings of the 
15 case study reports but also a quantitative analysis of the expenditure data and 
Cambridge Econometrics data to assess the effectiveness and utility of the ERDF funding 
over the study period. 
This is the Final Report of the study draws together the findings from the case studies. As 
with the individual case studies, the structure begins with an overview of the evolution of 
regional needs, the programme strategies and expenditure. It then sets out the main 
achievements of the programmes, and – on the basis of the quantitative research, 
supplemented by qualitative findings – analyses their effectiveness and utility. 
Complementarities and synergies, assessment of critical success factors and weaknesses, 
and the lessons learnt - with detailed suggestions for the improvement of programme 
design, implementation, results-orientation and achievements - are also presented. The 
last section draws together the conclusions of the report.  
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A final cautionary point is that this report is a synthesis of the findings. For the most, it 
does not seek to aggregate data or information on the results of programmes across periods 
or countries. The range of different sources used to reconstruct the evolution of 
programmes from 1989 to 2012, and the questionable accuracy of some of the data, made 
this impossible. Instead, the report seeks to tell a story of how Structural and Cohesion 
Funds have been used and what they achieved in the different regions covered by the 
study. 
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2. EVOLUTION OF NEEDS IN THE 15 REGIONS 
Evaluation of the achievements of Cohesion policy must start with an assessment of the 
needs and problems of the regions assisted and how they evolved over time. This chapter 
draws together evidence from the case study research in each region, combined with EU-
level statistical data, to illustrate how regional needs or contexts have evolved since 1989.  
The chapter begins by reviewing regional development problems and needs in the mid/late 
1980s, grouping the problems under the headings of major underdevelopment, sparsity and 
peripherality, industrial decline and restructuring, and spatial and labour market 
disequilibria. The chapter then examines the development paths of the regions according to 
GDP per head and unemployment over the period 1989-2008. Growth performance is 
analysed according to a framework introduced by Camagni (1991) and developed by Affuso 
et al (2011) which identifies six patterns of regional growth; initial needs and their 
evolution are discussed according to these six patterns. Further insights are provided 
through a qualitative assessment of the evolution of regional needs under the eight 
thematic axes which are used throughout the study as a framework for evaluation. 
2.1 Initial Regional Development Problems and Needs 
At the start of the study period (mid/late 1980s), all the case study regions were relatively 
disadvantaged, as befits recipients of ERDF funding. They had significantly lower levels of 
development, as measured by GDP per capita for example, whether relative to their 
national averages (e.g. North-East England), relative to the EU average (e.g. Dytiki Ellada) 
or both. In the late 1980s, GDP per capita, measured in constant 2000 prices, ranged from 
less than €10,000 in the case study regions of Spain (Andalucía, Galicia), Portugal (Algarve, 
Norte) and Greece (Dytiki Ellada) to near or above €20,000 in Nordrhein-Westfalen, North 
East England and Aquitaine – against an average EU15 GDP per head in 1989 of €17,239 
(according to Cambridge Econometrics data). The principal explanation for these 
differences is the relative prosperity of the respective Member States, and these national 
differences mean that there is a degree of heterogeneity among the regions – both those 
initially designated as Objective 1 and those designated as Objective 2 in 1988. 
The nature of needs and the main economic-development problems facing these regions 
varied greatly. There were differences in fundamentals, such as accessibility, various forms 
of infrastructure, industrial composition/specialisation, as well as in the relative 
performances of national economies. Partly for the latter reason, the regions differed 
significantly in terms of the vibrancy of their labour market. Unemployment rates were 
significantly higher – and well above the national and European averages – in de-
industrialising North East England, in remote and sparsely populated Itä-Suomi, and in the 
more agricultural economy of Andalucía. However, they were significantly lower (and 
closer to the national averages) in regions such as Burgenland, Dytiki Ellada, Algarve and 
Norte. In some regions, unemployment (and employment loss) had started to become a 
more pressing issue because of long-term structural shifts. This was the case in Sachsen-
Anhalt (because of the post-communist transition), Basilicata (because of falling 
agricultural employment) and Campania (which under-performed relative to the national 
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average because of weak industrial development, but where the unemployment rate may 
have been overstated because of the size of the shadow economy). Although less 
pronounced, a rise in unemployment associated with structural change in the economy also 
characterised the two case study regions of France (especially Nord-Pas-de-Calais).  
Despite having, broadly speaking, similar initial conditions of relative underdevelopment (as 
measured by GDP per head) and/or unemployment, the case study regions represented a 
broad range of structural characteristics and associated needs. Drawing together the 
analyses undertaken, four main groups of problems and sets of development needs can be 
identified among the three groups of regions investigated:  
a) major underdevelopment characterised by shortfalls across all indicators; 
b) sparsity of population and peripherality (either geographical or in terms of 
connectivity), with the two often going together; 
c) a generally weak economic base, manifested in an over-specialisation in declining 
traditional heavy industries, agriculture or other low value-added traditional 
activities, coupled with an under-representation in high-growth, higher value-added 
sectors; and  
d) the presence of disequilibria in regional economies, such as problems of skill 
mismatch (typically due to deindustrialisation) or of inactivity and weak labour 
supply, or spatial disequilibria such as between urbanised coastlines and rural 
interiors.  
However, many of the regions exhibited more than one sort of problem or development 
need with, for example, interactions between weak connectivity and declining industries 
(Basilicata) or between the decline of a traditional industrial base, skills mismatch, 
environmental problems and weak entrepreneurship (Nord Pas de Calais). Some regions 
such as Campania, Andalucía or Norte fit into all four groups. In this sense, needs can 
cumulate in a manner which constitutes multiple deprivation. Hence the distinctions are 
less a typology of regions as such, but more an identification of the dimensions on which 
each of the regions can be assessed. 
2.1.1 Major underdevelopment 
The most fundamental challenges were faced by regions characterised by major 
underdevelopment and disadvantages ranging from a lack of basic infrastructure and 
services, to deficits in skills, often compounded by peripherality (national or European) or 
significant internal disparities. Regions in this category were Dytiki Ellada, Campania, 
Norte, Andalucía, Galicia, Basilicata, Algarve and Ireland, all classified in 1989 as 
Objective 1, as was Sachsen-Anhalt after German unification, in recognition of the breadth 
of their challenges. The regions experienced needs across almost all of the eight thematic 
axes, although the character of some of those needs may have been different to those in 
the other groups of regions. An example is a relative lack of entrepreneurial activity which 
was a problem for almost all regions, but which was typically very different in the 
underdeveloped regions compared with regions dominated by larger firms in declining 
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industries. By contrast, the problem in the underdeveloped regions was that the enterprise 
base not only consisted largely of small and micro businesses which were traditional in 
nature, but also lacked connections to large companies or to external networks.  
The breadth of problems results in difficulties in using analysis of needs to set priorities in 
the development of strategies, despite the relatively generous resources allocated to these 
Objective 1 regions in the earlier programmes. Regions had to make tough decisions about 
which needs were to be prioritised, often with the added constraint of conforming to 
Structural Funds regulations and navigating multiple Operational Programmes with 
objectives which could be difficult to reconcile. Inconsistent or incompatible domestic 
economic development policies also created complications. Prioritisation would also usually 
have consequences for the internal disparities or disequilibria due to the difficulty of 
raising performance on several thematic axes across the whole region simultaneously. A 
particularly hard choice lay in deciding between providing general social and infrastructure 
development across the whole region, and a focus on industrial development which could 
require agglomeration in selected urban centres or (for example in Campania) choosing 
between development models targeted at large or small firms. 
2.1.2 Sparsity and peripherality 
A second set of problems characterised regions with relatively low population densities, 
weak urban agglomerations (for some), rurality and depopulation. The regions concerned 
were Galicia, Algarve, Basilicata, Itä-Suomi, Dytiki Ellada, Burgenland and Aquitaine – all 
of which are relatively remote within their national setting. With the exception of 
Aquitaine, which was designated as Objective 2 and 5b, these were regions eligible for the 
highest levels of Cohesion policy funding because they were Objective 1 or Objective 6 
regions. For most of these, transport infrastructure and internal and/or external 
connectivity (to major markets) was also a significant problem. A major challenge for these 
regions was to develop new models of development able to boost employment opportunities 
in rural areas, often through tourism, but also through the development of localised centres 
for industry and services.  
Over the study period, most of these regions saw improvements in transport infrastructure, 
from modest to substantial. Nevertheless, the demographic patterns and the problems of 
connectivity have not been reversed in all cases; here, the very long-term nature of the 
investment need has to be taken into account, as major projects have spanned two or more 
programme periods. The problems of rurality, accessibility and population sparsity affecting 
regions such as Dytiki Ellada, Basilicata and Itä-Suomi are facts of life with which they are 
likely to have to contend indefinitely, given their geography. In contrast, the regions of 
Aquitaine, Galicia and Algarve (as well as those of Norte and Andalucía) have managed to 
combine improvements in transport infrastructure with a more general improvement in 
accessibility and geographical and functional connectivity. These regions also saw notable 
improvements in the technological content of their production base and – at least to an 
extent – improvements in their sectoral specialisations and extent of industrial 
diversification. A similar claim can be made for the semi-rural but generally speaking more 
developed regions of Aquitaine and Burgenland. The remoter rural parts of some other 
regions had some exposure to the problems of peripherality (North East England) or 
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accessibility difficulties (Basilicata, Campania and Andalucía). These trajectories suggest 
that among the regions exiting from Objective 1/Convergence status, some have 
substantially overcome connectivity problems (Algarve), but others have not (Basilicata). 
2.1.3 Industrial decline and restructuring 
The regions which faced problems relating to industrial decline and restructuring were 
North East England, Nordrhein-Westfalen Nord-Pas-de-Calais, and Campania as well as 
the region of Sachsen-Anhalt – although from the very different starting point of transition 
to a market economy. Elsewhere agricultural decline was a common problem, although 
regions such as Norte also suffered from the decline of traditional and craft-based 
industries. The regions subject to these sorts of restructuring challenges were not confined 
to the Objective 2/RCE group, making clear that there can be multiple causes of difficulties 
among the three groups of regions covered in this study. Industrial restructuring problems 
were perhaps more difficult to address, as they reflected skills mismatch in the labour 
market and, eventually, inactivity and structural unemployment. For the regions 
transitioning from traditional industry or centrally planned economies, the needs tended to 
be more focused around economic transformation (enterprise, innovation, skills) and the 
consequences of restructuring in terms of derelict land and replacing outdated 
infrastructure. Social needs were usually a secondary issue and consisted more of how to 
deal with the consequences of deindustrialisation (pockets of high unemployment) rather 
than widespread needs for hospitals and schools. The central issues were halting decline 
and rebuilding employment, and converting the often polluted sites of old industry (e.g. 
mines and steelworks) for new industries and incubators.  
The regions in this category all made substantial progress in improving the business 
environment, upgrading their technology content and diversifying their production base. 
For some, this was combined with improvements in transport infrastructure and functional 
connectivity (Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Sachsen-Anhalt, North East England). For these regions, 
the role of national economic performance was perhaps more central, as national  growth 
was necessary to assist the restructuring and opening-up of the economies of these regions. 
It appears that outcomes improved faster in cases where the public sector took a more 
active role in addressing problems of industrial decline, lack of diversification and 
unemployment (e.g. North East England). However, in the current context of crisis and 
associated austerity budgets, the sustainability of these supporting mechanisms is under 
strain and familiar economic problems may be resurfacing  
2.1.4 Spatial and labour market disequilibria 
Spatial imbalances or disequilibria in the labour market were, in some cases, particularly 
pressing in 1989 in some of the deindustrialising regions of the ‘north’ and in some of the 
more traditional economies of the ‘south’. Spatial asymmetries were evident in the regions 
of Galicia, Campania and Norte (coastal-inland dichotomy), in Dytiki Ellada (Peloponnese-
mainland dichotomy), as well as in Aquitaine, North East England, Basilicata and – 
especially – in Ireland (urban-rural dichotomy). Some of these regions sought to address 
these problems mainly through investment in internal transport infrastructure (e.g. Dytiki 
Ellada and Basilicata). In other cases, spatial imbalances were addressed not only through 
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transport infrastructure investment but also through industrial restructuring (e.g. through 
supply-chains between the more traditional and the more dynamic/high-tech segments of 
the local economies), economic diversification measures (e.g. to support tourism in rural 
areas), social infrastructure (e.g. nurseries, schools, hospitals) and regeneration of town 
centres. For some regions, industrial restructuring led to the emergence of supply side 
pressures and skill shortages (e.g. Galicia and Andalucía). Such skill mismatch pressures 
have also emerged, or persisted, in the ‘north’ regions of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Sachsen-Anhalt and North East England. 
2.2 Development paths in GDP and unemployment: 1989-2008 
The evolution of GDP per head and unemployment rates for the 15 regions relative to 
national trends and for the group as a whole is shown for each region in Figure 1 and Figure 
2.  Given the diversity of the regions examined, and the corresponding performances and 
needs, as well as the long time-frame of the analysis, it is difficult to establish a general 
trend, or classification. Although analysis of the comparative evolution of the case study 
regions reveals a notable degree of mobility, regional evolutions appear to be neither linear 
(e.g. towards general improvement) nor universal (in the sense of applying similarly to all 
regions). To the extent that a general pattern can be identified, it is that regional evolution 
has largely followed the wider national trends.  
In terms of economic indicators, the regions of Italy (Basilicata and Campania) and Greece 
(Dytiki Ellada) experienced substantially lower rates of economic growth compared both to 
the national and European averages and thus fell further behind, despite being amongst the 
top recipients of regional assistance (and despite the fact that episodes/periods of 
convergence can be observed – e.g. Basilicata for the period 1992-1999 and again in the 
mid-2000s). Other regions generally followed their national trends, including for example 
the regions of Spain (although here there was still some divergence), Nordrhein-Westfalen 
(which in specific years outpaced national growth rates) and Burgenland (which, while still 
below the Austrian average level of GDP per capita, has converged relative to the EU15). 
This suggests that whether or not a region is in the Convergence or RCE group has not been 
the critical issue. Divergence from the national average but with good growth performance 
characterised regions such as the North East England, Itä-Suomi and the two case study 
regions in France, while growth performance was much stronger, leading to fast 
convergence towards the European average, in Sachsen-Anhalt (especially in the 1990s 
after the ‘transition shock’) and in Ireland (especially since the mid-1990s).  
There is no easy link between the initial status of a region and its subsequent performance. 
By definition, the regions classed in 2007-13 as Phasing-in/out manifestly achieved more 
than some of their counterparts, because from similar starting points they had grown 
sufficiently to exit convergence status by mid-2000s. Yet as the most recent data show, 
these gains proved to be vulnerable to the crisis. For Itä-Suomi and Burgenland, relatively 
strong national performance was influential in their convergence with EU averages. Equally, 
a question that underlies much of the analysis which follows is why some of the regions that 
remain in the Objective 1/Convergence group did not break out of this category despite 
similar levels of support from Cohesion policy and similar initial positions. 
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Figure 1: Comparative evolution of GDP per capita (€’000, constant 2000 prices)  
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Figure 2: Comparative evolution of unemployment (%) 
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The relationship between growth performance and other indicators was surprisingly varied. 
In Itä-Suomi, Ireland and North-East England growth was accompanied by a strong and 
steady reduction in unemployment rates, which continued uninterrupted at least until the 
financial crisis of 2008-2009. By contrast, unemployment in Sachsen-Anhalt rose rapidly in 
the early 1990s and stayed high at least until the mid-2000s, as economic growth was driven 
much more by gains in labour productivity than in employment; while it followed an upward 
trend (but much more modestly so, until the recent crisis) also in Dytiki Ellada. 
Unemployment followed a rather cyclical path in most other regions. It rose 
disproportionately in the 1990s but started declining in the 2000s in the case study regions 
of France, Italy and Spain. The two Portuguese regions experienced similar, but less 
pronounced cyclical fluctuations during the 1990s, but after the launch of the euro both 
saw relatively rapid increases in unemployment rates. In Burgenland and Nordrhein-
Westfalen unemployment rates fluctuated around the historical mean, remaining close to 
the national average.  
2.3 Analysing growth performance 
Further insights into the dynamics of output and employment growth can be gleaned by 
examining changes over time relative to the EU average. Patterns of employment and 
productivity growth can be shown in a single chart1 by plotting productivity growth against 
employment growth. This decomposition can reveal whether change in the economy stems 
from productivity gains arising from new and efficient firms or by the ‘dropping off’ of 
inefficient production.  
This approach presents productivity and employment change relative to the EU27 over the 
period 1991 to 2008 (see Figure 3). A region may develop at the same rate as the EU Gross 
Value-Added either if both productivity and employment grow at the same rate as the EU 
average, or if productivity increases at a lower rate, but employment does so at a 
proportionally higher-than-average rate, and vice versa. This is shown by the diagonal line. 
If a region is above this line, it increases its total GVA more than the EU27 average; if it is 
below the line, the GVA growth rate is below average. 
                                                 
1 In a form introduced by Camagni (1991) for manufacturing and extended to the whole regional 
economy by Affuso et al. (2011). Relative employment growth is on the horizontal axis, and relative 
productivity growth is on the vertical axis. A 135° negatively sloped line passing through the origin 
denotes regional gross value added (GVA) growth equal to the average. For this analysis, productivity 
and employment data were used for the period 1991-2008. 1991 data rather than 1989 were used as 
the starting point as the 1989 data were not available for one of the regions. 2008 was used as the 
end point rather than 2010, which is the most recent year available, as the 2009 data shows dramatic 
drops in most of the regions as a result of the global financial crisis and hence the final year would 
have a dramatic and in some respects a random impact on the overall trend.  
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Figure 3: Relative productivity and employment growth, 1991-2008 
 
The performance of the 15 regions is assessed here over the majority of the study period. 
Analysis of performance in each of the programme periods can give quite varied results as 
some regions grew more rapidly in one period rather than another. As these outcomes are 
lagged from the spending, an analysis by programme period is likely to be misleading, so 
the general trend is the main focus of this discussion. 
Figure 3 indicates that most of the regions performed worse than the EU average in growth 
of GVA over the period (that is they lie below the diagonal line), although their distribution 
across the graph indicates different patterns of regional economic development. Plainly, 
there is no straightforward inference to be drawn about the three categories of regions 
studied. Phasing-in/out regions are to be found on both sides of both the dimensions of the 
chart, while the three RCE regions are close to the centre of the chart, albeit a little 
below. Aquitaine, which is more rural (with a preponderance of Objective 5b funding 
during the 1990s), does better than the other two RCE regions with regard to employment 
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growth. Among the group of Convergence regions, Andalucía stand out for its employment 
growth while Sachsen-Anhalt is the major exception to the underperformance in 
productivity for most of the others in this group. 
In this chart there are six analytically distinct segments, depending on whether the region 
is located above or below the EU average for each of the two main axes, and above or 
below the diagonal line. This gives rise to a terminology, developed by Affuso et al. (2011), 
which can be used to classify the development paths of the regions. The findings for the 15 
regions are as follows. Seven of the case study regions lay above the diagonal line of EU 
average productivity and employment performance, in segments termed ‘virtuous circle’, 
‘economic take-off’ and ‘restructuring’. 
 Virtuous cycle is used to describe a regional economy that exceeds EU average 
growth as a result of higher-than-average growth of both productivity and 
employment. In the period under review, which was before the onset of the 
sovereign debt crisis, only Ireland, which succeeded in exiting Objective 1 status, 
was able to show a consistently good performance in the virtuous cycle segment, 
with growth in both employment and productivity, although with a bigger emphasis 
on employment. Both Irish regions (Border, Midland, and Western; and Southern 
and Eastern) are shown here, and both performed similarly well. Galicia lies just 
inside this segment with a small average relative growth in productivity, but little 
relative growth in employment. 
 Economic take-off is when lower-than-average productivity performance is offset 
by very good employment performance, so that the effect on total value added is 
positive. Andalucía and the Algarve both show GVA growth slightly above the EU 
average and strong employment growth despite a reduction in relative productivity. 
As neighbours, albeit in different groups for the purposes of this study, they share 
some common features. In these regions, a rapid expansion of employment explains 
overall output growth, but the expansion has been in sectors that are performing 
worse than the EU average, and the evidence in both cases suggests that growth 
being driven by tourism. Aquitaine also has modest employment growth but a 
slightly better performance on productivity. 
 Restructuring, when higher-than-average productivity growth is associated with 
declining employment, leading nevertheless to good GVA performance due to the 
increases of productivity. Sachsen-Anhalt was the only region of the 15 in the 
restructuring segment, illustrating its dramatic increase in productivity alongside 
employment loss, suggesting new higher value activities as well as a reduction in 
low value sectors. Although classed as an Objective 1 region, the specific 
circumstances of the transition in eastern Germany probably outweigh the direct 
influence of Cohesion policy. 
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This leaves the other regions underperforming the EU in categories termed ‘dropping out’, 
‘relative decline’2 and ‘industrial conservatism’. 
 Dropping-out is when productivity growth is achieved alongside lower than average 
employment growth usually by the closure of inefficient production units, where 
the cutting of low productivity activities results in higher-than-average GVA growth. 
Itä-Suomi and Norte have recorded a relative reduction in employment as old 
declining sectors were closed down leaving a relative growth in productivity. Again 
these findings transcend the specific group to which they are allocated for the 
present study. 
 Industrial conservatism is when poor productivity growth is accompanied (and 
sometimes explained) by better-than-average employment growth, a pattern which 
is more likely to take place in the presence of public assistance and industrial 
rescues. Six regions fall into this segment - North-East England, Nordrhein-
Westfalen, and Basilicata (all close to the borderline with the ‘relative decline’ 
segment), Nord-Pas de Calais, Burgenland and Dytiki Ellada - meaning that 
although they have increased employment it has been accompanied by lower than 
average productivity growth, suggesting that growth has been in low productivity 
sectors, perhaps supported by interventions. The fact that there are 
respresentatives of all three groups of regions in this category signals that how a 
region is designated for Cohesion policy purposes may be of limited value as a 
predictor of its performance. 
 Relative decline is defined as a vicious cycle in which both productivity and 
employment perform poorer than the average and even the rationalisation of 
employment does not restore competitiveness. Only one region performed poorly 
on both productivity and employment (Campania), and appears to be locked into 
this vicious cycle of relative decline, although an argument might be made about 
special circumstances associated with implementation of Cohesion policy, rather 
than this being a reflection of Objective 1/Convergence status. 
This analysis is however limited to the period up to 2008 and the onset of the economic 
crisis. Since then, some of these regions have seen dramatic reductions in GVA and 
employment giving a different set of results that illustrates the short term effects of the 
crisis rather than the evolution of regional performance through the study period. The 
analysis shown here portrays how the regions performed over a period of relatively strong 
growth. 
2.4 Evolution of development needs 
It is important to note that the performance of the regions relative to national and EU 
averages has not been consistent across the whole period in the above analysis; analysis for 
individual programme periods shows that regions move between the segments shown in 
                                                 
2 In this context it is preferable to revise the definition used in Affuso et al. (1991), who called this 
segment ‘de-industrialisation’. 
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Figure 3 as different regions and countries vary in their experience of economic cycles. The 
analysis of the whole period removes the main effects of such annual variability in 
performance. The regions have also experienced considerable change in terms of their 
initial development needs. A summary overview of the main needs of each region at the 
beginning of the study period, and their evolution in relation to the eight thematic axes 
outlined earlier, is presented in Table 2. The table indicates how different areas of need 
are perceived to have changed over the period from when they first qualified for Cohesion 
policy funding since 1989.3  
The areas in which most improvement has been made are in the provision of basic 
infrastructure and essential public services as well as internal and external connectivity. 
This applies to all the regions where development needs were greatest – Andalucía, 
Campania, Dytiki Ellada, Galicia, Norte and Sachsen-Anhalt, and is what would be 
expected for Objective 1/Convergence regions. It also applies to infrastructure/services in 
Burgenland, Basilicata, Nord-Pas de Calais, Ireland, and to external connectivity in 
Algarve, Burgenland, North-East England and Nord-Pas de Calais.  
For other development needs, the picture is more mixed. Ireland is judged to have made 
the most progress in meeting a broad set of development needs, and a wide range of needs 
has been addressed at least some extent in Andalucía, Burgenland, Dytiki Ellada, Galicia, 
North-East England and Nord-Pas de Calais. Dealing with enterprise-related development 
needs seems to have been most difficult across all regions, particularly improving 
weaknesses in entrepreneurial culture and encouraging the growth of SMEs. The same 
applies to research, development and innovation (RDI) where little progress appears to have 
been made in all 15 regions promoting more private R&D investment. Lastly, the table 
suggests that some development needs have intensified in certain regions, especially in 
Sachsen-Anhalt (notwithstanding the progress made with restructuring noted above) with 
respect to long-term unemployment, R&D investment and some aspects of social exclusion 
(see Table 5 of the case study report). The severity of needs also appears to have worsened 
in the areas of low productivity in Dytiki Ellada, social exclusion in Basilicata and 
environmental problems in the Algarve. These patterns reflect important and persistent 
differences among the regions in terms of structural characteristics and corresponding 
needs. 
2.5 Conclusions 
In the late 1980s, all of the 15 regions had a complex set of problems and development 
needs at the end of the 1980s. Although there were common problems of low GDP, and high 
unemployment for some regions, the specific nature of development needs varied greatly. 
Convergence regions typically experienced under-development across all thematic axes, 
whilst problems tended to be more focused in regions facing industrial decline. Most regions 
                                                 
3 The table is based on qualitative assessments undertaken in the case study research. In representing 
the evolution of needs, the table does not make inferences in relation to the causal factors that might 
have driven the described change and, in particular, on whether the change is to be attributed to the 
intervention of Cohesion policy or other policy interventions. Also, the problems and weaknesses 
listed are often interrelated.  
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faced internal disparities, presenting particular challenges for the prioritisation of actions. 
Notwithstanding similarities in initial needs, the regions experienced different journeys 
over the study period reflecting a combination of national development trends and regional 
policy choices.  
Although the evidence presented above makes clear that the distinctions between the three 
classes of regions have shortcomings as a means of classifying needs, the discussion suggests 
that they nevertheless provide a credible basis for analysis. As a classification, it goes some 
way towards combining initial conditions and regional characteristics, and evolution of 
needs as a result of performance in the earlier programme periods. In the terms discussed 
above in Section 2.1, major underdevelopment and deficits in all indicators, from basic 
infrastructure and services, to human resource skills - often compounded by  peripherality 
(national or European) or significant internal disparities - characterised all the regions in 
the Convergence and Phasing-in/out groups, but with some obvious differences at the 
outset in the intensity of these problems. In these two groups, Sachsen-Anhalt was 
somewhat different because of the legacy of its centrally planned industrial economy, and 
thus has some common ground with the RCE group, while it can be argued that Burgenland 
and Itä-Suomi have some features in common with Aquitaine. Notwithstanding these 
caveats, the subsequent analysis retains the three groups based on Cohesion policy 
designation for analytical purposes. 
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Table 2: Evolution of regional needs 1989-present (from 1991/1995 for later accession countries) 
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S-Anhalt *                  
Dytiki Ellada                   
Campania                   
Norte                   
Andalucía  *                 
Galicia * *                 
                   
Burgenland *1                  
Itä-Suomi                   
NP de Calais                   
Ireland                   
Basilicata                   
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Aquitaine                   
NR Westfalen            2       
N.E. England                   
 
Key:  Major improvement ( indicates needs largely met)   Limited improvement   Situation has worsened 
 
Notes:            (1) Refers only to water supply and waste water infrastructure. (2) Ruhrgebiet only 
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3. STRATEGIES AND RELEVANCE 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to receive ERDF support, each of the regions in the study was required to develop 
multiannual programmes to identify interventions that addressed the perceived needs of 
the region. The nature of these programmes varied over time and, to varying degrees, 
there were multiple programmes for any one period, sometimes with a strategic framework 
document such as a Community Support Framework and, more recently, a National 
Strategic Reference Framework. This chapter examines the strategies which shaped these 
programmes and their evolution over the programme periods. It also examines the priorities 
and objectives of the programmes and assesses the extent to which they were specific, 
measureable, achievable, relevant and timely (‘SMART’). The chapter then discusses the 
relevance of the strategies and reviews the complementarities and synergies identified in 
the case study research. 
3.2 Strategies in Cohesion policy programmes 
A strategy can mean many different things, sometimes several different things 
simultaneously. At a simple level, it is a narrative associated with an individual plan, 
setting out objectives and how they will be achieved. This may be quite mechanistic as a 
formal planning statement where the steps towards a desired outcome are set out as a 
blueprint for specific policy actions. Alternatively, the strategy may be a loose framework 
indicating directions within which a range of participants can develop their own strategies 
and where the final strategy emerges from a process of experimentation and reflection. 
Regions typically pursue a spectrum of such strategies, often interacting in ways that can 
make it difficult to establish what the most important objectives are and the order in which 
they are to be achieved. 
In defining strategies there are a number of other issues to consider. At one level, a 
strategy might concern the mix of measures and interventions and how these relate to the 
objectives to be achieved: this is what is usually considered as the programme strategy. 
However, regions typically obtain support from multiple programmes, so that another level 
of strategy relates to how the region integrated these various programmes, and what their 
relationship was with any wider regional development strategy. In the latter interpretation, 
an overarching strategy may identify what is to be done across a variety of programmes, 
and may specify the contributions to be made by individual programmes. It may, though, be 
less prescriptive and could be limited, for example, to how much funding is allocated to 
different areas of public expenditure. 
Where there are multiple strategy documents, plans or programmes at different levels of 
governance, these may be in different forms. For example, a programme focused on 
infrastructure might have a planning style of strategy in which the actions are specified 
precisely at the outset in terms of the roads or railways to be constructed against a 
particular timetable, whilst a programme for business support may have very much looser 
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aims and objectives. In the latter it may be that the actual strategy itself evolves over the 
course of the programme and is, therefore, subject to considerable flexibility.  
A related issue is the potential for both explicit and implicit strategies. Each programme 
agreed under the Structural Funds programmes will have had a written strategy which 
stated explicitly what was to be done. However, the organisations implementing 
programmes may, individually or collectively, have had their own goals for economic 
development which may have differed from these explicit strategies, and may not be 
formally recorded. Such implicit strategies may influence the application of the funds in 
ways that lead to divergence from the explicit strategies. This is more likely where regions 
have underlying aims and objectives which differ from the guidance provided for the 
Structural Funds; for instance, where the Commission has proposed minimum levels of 
expenditure around particular objectives.  
Further, implicit strategies different to those spelt out in programme documents may 
emerge during implementation, as a result of a process of adapting programmes to meet 
practical constraints and unplanned difficulties. A seven-year timeframe is relatively long in 
public policy terms; reflecting this, Structural Funds regulations acknowledge the possibility 
of shifting resources between areas of spend, modifying the relative weight of instruments 
implemented, and introducing new instruments or refining criteria for selecting projects 
(with latitudes and modalities which can be changed from one programme period to 
another). These changes to the content of programmes, which may be introduced without 
altering the description of programme goals or priorities, mean that the strategies actually 
pursued may be different to those formally stated, but without explicit recognition of this. 
It follows from this discussion that regional strategies are likely to be complex and often 
contested, with different regional bodies prioritising different objectives according to their 
competences and responsibilities, and also with potential differences between national and 
regional bodies, as well as between the rationales behind national and regional 
programmes. A final overarching question is whether the region has an underlying, 
development strategy, likely to be implicit, which drives the strategies of the individual 
programmes, or whether the Cohesion policy strategies in the region drive regional 
strategies. In the latter case, especially if wider EU imperatives such as the Lisbon/Europe 
2020 strategies map out key policy orientations for which the ERDF is seen as an 
instrument, national and regional governments may need to develop regional strategies 
where they did not previously exist. In some cases, these top-down pressures require 
institutional adaptation because the regional scale of policy was not previously recognised. 
3.3 The Cohesion policy strategies of the 15 regions 
As observed by Casavola (2009), Cohesion policy is an active policy in which funding is 
disbursed in the form of conditional grants, with the European Commission playing ‘the role 
of the relevant agency’. For this reason, the strategies of Cohesion policy (the content of 
which is set in detail through EU-level regulations) are supposed to be fully-fledged, 
describing in detail: the objectives; intended results (the desired change); the interventions 
or sets of actions to be undertaken in order to realise such change; and even the targets to 
be achieved against initial baselines. The reality, however, is that even in 2007-2013: 
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‘…programme documents – despite the common outline depicted in the regulations – 
show a high variance with respect to the degree of unambiguousness or completeness 
of the proposed agenda’ (Casavola, 2009, p.7).  
This finding applies to the 15 regions evaluated in this study. Variation is linked to a 
number of factors, which include the varying institutional traditions and cultures in the 
regions investigated, the existence (or dominance) of wider domestic strategies, and the 
levels of institutional capacity available.    
Some of the 15 regions had a clear vision of how they wanted to use the resources from the 
Structural Funds in at least some periods, most obviously those in which a single regional 
Operational Programme was closely linked with a collective regional strategy. Others had 
multiple ERDF programmes at national and regional level being implemented in the region, 
alongside other domestic spending programmes, and hence an overall regional strategy, 
even for the Structural Funds, could only ever take the form of implicit assumptions about 
suitable responses to regional need and future development opportunities. There were 
national level overarching strategies for the coordination of programmes, notably the CSFs 
in earlier periods (multi-regional strategic frameworks) and, more recently, the NSRFs 
(national strategic reference frameworks covering all regions within the same country, 
irrespective of Cohesion policy status); however, these did not always comprise clear and 
visible strategies for individual regions. Consequently, it is unsurprising that within the 15 
regions were polarised between those with a single, dominant and holistic strategy for the 
ERDF programme and regions with multiple and complex overlapping programmes in which 
holistic strategies were lacking or were much less evident. 
Furthermore, strategies evolved over the period since 1989-2012 with changes in policy and 
eligibility, learning effects, and changes in domestic governance structures. Sometimes 
these changes led to a clarification of strategies and greater coherence, although not in all 
cases, as some developments were regressive. Looking at the three main sets of regions 
identified in the previous chapter, there are some commonalities that can be identified 
within the groups. 
The regions initially characterised by major underdevelopment and deficits on all indicators 
– notably the Objective 1/Convergence regions as well as Ireland, Basilicata, Algarve (all of 
which were classified as Objective 1 at the beginning of the study period) - were  in 
countries in which, at the outset, the structure of support involved national ERDF 
programmes with varying degrees of regionally specific programmes. Ireland was the 
outlier in this group, as prior to 2000 there were only national programmes integrated into 
a National Development Plan, with no separate regional ERDF programmes. Leaving aside 
the Irish case, the regions typically struggled to adopt coherent strategies across the many 
programmes at national and regional levels, with in some cases relatively weak capacity at 
the regional scale to develop complex strategies.  
National Operational Programmes were usually driven by the investment strategies of 
government departments, for example in the development of national transport and 
communications networks, and they were only weakly connected at either national or 
regional level. These national programmes then often failed to integrate with what were 
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sometimes weak regional Operational Programmes. However, Basilicata is an example of a 
region which, at least during the first two programme periods covered, had a comparatively 
clear vision for how it wanted to develop, based on a comprehensive Regional Development 
Plan that had initially been prepared during the 1980s. As regions also mainly lacked 
separate domestic regional strategies, the consequence was a series of parallel programmes 
with their own internal logic but poorly connected to each other.  
In Portugal and Greece, for instance, there was no tradition of regional-level government, 
and regional strategies were essentially driven by national policy objectives. In the case of 
the Algarve, a national acceptance of its role as the main tourism region was incorporated 
into programme strategies, whilst in Norte an initial focus on traditional industrial sectors 
later led to internal divisions, with some areas wishing to focus on high tech and services. 
Norte later developed an orientation towards transport and logistics. 
In Italy, Campania, despite having autonomous administrative experience as a self-
governing authority since the early 1970s, experienced great difficulties in establishing 
strategic orientation in the first two programme periods. Italian regions at this time 
received most of their support through many national programmes (MOPs) as ‘baskets’ for 
the allocation of expenditure, without an overarching underlying theory or inter-relations 
with the regional OPs. The situation only improved in the late 1990s when, in parallel with 
wider national-level developments which saw more weight being placed on economic 
theories as a basis for policy design, these regions gradually developed their own abilities 
to draft regional development strategies.4   
Galicia too had disconnected national Operational Programmes and weak regional 
coordination.  
The weakness of distinct regional voices in strategies in most of these regions meant that 
there national and regional programmes diverged considerably, although infrastructure 
tended to dominate in both cases, in line with a common assumption at the time that 
growth could be induced by enhancing the infrastructural endowment of regions.  Over 
time, strategies became less fragmented and more regionally specific. This was coupled 
with a reorientation away from basic public services infrastructure, but the latter was 
partly pushed by the Commission rather than a rethinking at the regional scale. In some 
regions, there was also a sense, never formally stated, that they had more or less 
exhausted their initial list of infrastructure projects.  
Ireland and Andalucía were outliers in this group. Ireland, as a small country, was initially 
treated as a single region by the ERDF, with a well-structured national strategy, and the 
country experienced rapid development culminating in its exit from Convergence region 
                                                 
4 This was a development favoured by a number of factors both exogenous (the constitutional 
reforms of 1999 and 2001 that assigned to the regions more powers and competences) and 
endogenous to the policy (the higher share of resources to be channelled through the regional OPs – c. 
70 percent in 2000-2006, compared to c. 30 percent in 1994-1999 – and the support provided by the 
national coordinating body to the regional authorities for programme design). Indeed, the 2000-2006 
CSF, through the ROPs, encouraged the creation of regional-level sectoral domestic strategies and 
plans (e.g. in the field of social policies).  
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status. Because Ireland is relatively small, a national-level strategy was appropriate, and 
the National Development Plan sought to promote development across the whole country 
through local delivery mechanisms. The NDP also provided a more balanced and 
coordinated strategy than was the case in other regions, and even when ERDF support was 
reduced in later programmes, it simply became a smaller contribution to a continuing 
national strategy. Andalucía had a regional development plan which was jointly written by 
national and regional governments. One of its key aims was to overcome backwardness and 
facilitate growth, with an implicit goal of unifying the eastern and western parts of the 
region. Infrastructure was central to this strategy, especially road and rail networks. The 
ensuing overall strategy therefore emphasised infrastructure and public investment, rather 
than industrial development. 
Sachsen-Anhalt differed somewhat from other Objective 1/Convergence regions in that it 
was undergoing transition to a market economy as part of a unified Germany, as well as 
having  Objective 1 status for most of the period (in the 2007-13 period, part of the Land is 
Phasing-out). Its strategic emphasis was on industrial renewal and development. For most 
of the period, Sachsen-Anhalt received ERDF principally from a regional Operational 
Programme rather than the mix of national and regional programmes found in other 
Objective 1/Convergence regions, although there was a national transport OP after 2000. 
Thus, with a strong regional government and a strategy dominated by a single ROP, the 
ERDF strategy was coherent and focused, and tied tightly into the wider regional 
development strategy, with the programmes being used to support existing domestic 
regional objectives and programmes – such as subsidies for the modernisation of industry. 
The Objective 2/RCE regions, and also the Phasing-in/out or Convergence regions facing 
transition or restructuring of traditional industries (Nord-Pas-de-Calais), were usually 
supported mainly or exclusively through region-specific programmes. This immediately 
provided more opportunity for stronger strategic coherence. This was reinforced by the 
existence (at least for part of the period in some cases) of strong regional strategic 
leadership. Nonetheless, in all three declining traditional industrial regions – Nord-Pas-de-
Calais, North East England and Nordrhein-Westfalen - there were initial strategy 
integration difficulties caused by the existence of sub-regional programmes, particularly 
with regard to different levels of eligibility for support. Nord-Pas-de-Calais included both 
Objective 1 and Objective 2 areas, North East England was initially two Objective 2 
programmes but then also had Objective 5b areas, whilst Nordrhein-Westfalen had only 
small areas eligible for ERDF. In the 1990s, North-East England lacked a separate regional 
strategy, and the need to develop a strategy for the ERDF drove thinking on regional needs 
and hence strategy, even influencing national policies for the region. Subsequently, the 
development of a formal Regional Economic Strategy reversed the roles insofar as it 
provided a context that shaped later ERDF programmes from 2000 onwards.  
Typically these strategies, at least for the ERDF programmes, were more tightly focused on 
the conversion the regional industrial structure rather than wider development needs and 
infrastructures. Some infrastructure was still supported, especially in the early period, but 
this was typically associated with diversification, such as derelict land reclamation, new 
industrial parks and related transport connections. 
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Finally, the two Phasing-in/out regions and the one Objective 2/RCE region affected mainly 
by issues of rurality or peripherality (Aquitaine, Itä-Suomi and Burgenland) had more 
diverse  strategic approaches.  
Burgenland was an Objective 1 region in 1995 but with a single regional programme (i.e. no 
overarching CSF or national programme). Regarded as a one-off chance for a ‘leap forward’ 
in economic development, the ERDF programme was developed at a time when the region 
shifted from being on the eastern border of western Europe to a central location in a 
larger, integrating Europe. Led by a programme group consisting of national and regional 
representatives – and ring-fenced from the political influence which characterised other 
interventions - there was an initial emphasis on removing supply-side bottlenecks, later on 
followed by a shift towards stimulating demand.  
Aquitaine had a more complex situation with two Objective 5b areas and a small Objective 
2 area initially in 1989, although with increasing coverage of the territory in subsequent 
programmes. Here, the fragmented map of territorial eligibility resulted in differentiated 
approaches – targeting investment in companies in the Objective 2 area and agricultural 
and rural development in the Objective 5b areas, although with shifts over time towards 
the Lisbon agenda. The difficulties of finding single solutions led to generic programmes 
within which local actors were able to use the ERDF to support their own local strategies. 
Under a single RCE programme in the 2007-13 period, the focus has shifted to 
competitiveness and more targeted objectives, but with a greater emphasis on the 
opportunities in the more urbanised areas. 
Itä-Suomi has also been through a number of changes in eligibility from 1995 onwards as it 
evolved from a mix of Objective 6 and 5b, to Objective 1, and then Phasing-in 2007-13. 
These changes coincided with the creation of new regional councils and organisational 
change in the state organisations involved in regional development. A characteristic of the 
region over time has heterogeneous interests and thus objectives, with programmes being 
designed to be flexibly interpreted by different stakeholders. A shift can nevertheless be 
discerned, from broad renewal of the industrial structure, to an emphasis on growth 
sectors, then to an innovation driven strategy. 
3.4 Explicit v. implicit strategies and theoretical underpinnings 
From the above, it is clear that there were sometimes differences between the explicit 
strategies as stated in programme documents and what regions were really trying to 
achieve, or what might be called implicit strategies. However the explicit and implicit 
strategies tended to become more aligned in later programme periods. In cases such as 
Ireland, strategies reflected objective analyses and ex ante evaluations from the start, 
which helped to ensure that the strategies were clearly formulated and implemented in line 
with objectives. They commanded a reasonable degree of political consensus and within 
the different branches of the state administration (with some exceptions in relation to 
specific themes). 
For most of the 15 regions, however, the strategies set out in programme documents during 
the 1990s tended to be general, mono-thematic or generic, lacking evaluation evidence and 
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sound needs analyses. This tendency, which was by no means a peculiarity of the case study 
regions (see, for example, the review of Objective 2 strategies in Bachtler and Taylor, 
1999), had two main implications. First, the explicit strategies could hide a reality of 
diverse interests and assumptions on the part of stakeholders. In Algarve, for example, the 
programmes were underpinned by an implicit assumption that tourism would increase 
through investments in transport and environmental infrastructure, although this was not 
stated clearly in the programmes. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, in the first two periods, the 
explicit focus on reconversion/transition hid a continued preference for supporting 
traditional sectors, which were an important source of employment and had a strong 
symbolic value for workers and local authorities (particularly in 1989-1993). Local 
authorities in many regions were also a favoured beneficiary of ERDF spending because of 
domestic financial constraints.  
Second, the limited sophistication of early strategies also meant that the explicit strategies 
could be open to interpretation, leaving extensive scope for flexibility during 
implementation, sometimes leading to discrepancies between the explicit strategy and 
what was actually pursued. As an example, in Aquitaine, the divergence between explicit 
and implicit strategies up to 2006 was because regional-level managing authorities were 
unable to dictate what local authorities did. Thus, support to urban areas was implemented 
mainly through the redevelopment of public spaces rather than the other forms of support 
foreseen by the programme, such as social and cultural innovation. Similar issues were 
reported in Basilicata and Norte, where the loose specification of objectives allowed local 
priorities to be pursued. In North East England, the early programmes were essentially 
‘containers’ that the partnerships implemented with selection criteria which could be quite 
different from the overall thrust of the programmes. In 1989-1993, this meant a significant 
discrepancy between the stated strategy for enterprise support and sectoral development 
and the actual allocation of resources to local authorities for property-based projects. 
The generality of explicit strategies was not necessarily due to inexperience or lack of 
capacity: in Itä-Suomi it was a strategy in itself. The general objectives, in successive 
programmes, were attributable to the difficulty of having to accommodate four, quite 
different NUTS 3 sub-regional strategies which inhibited specific goals and targets for the 
region as a whole.   
Over time, explicit strategies were adjusted in response to different assessments of needs 
and development paradigms, although this did not always result in a real change in actual 
strategies. For example, in Burgenland, the changes to programme strategies were 
formulated in much stronger terms in the programme documents than actually occurred in 
practice. Although the interventions set out in the programme documents were ambitious 
and wide-ranging, most financial resources continued to be allocated to grants to 
companies and other forms of business aid. During the 2007-2013 period, the focus has 
more-or-less exclusively been on aid to individual companies – contrary to what was 
declared in the explicit strategy. Similarly, while R&D and technology transfer capabilities 
were strategic objectives in all three programme periods, actual implementation focused 
more on attracting FDI (including R&D and investments in technology parks). 
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Lastly, few strategies were clearly underpinned by specific theories of economic 
development, with the exception of the Italian programmes (Basilicata, Campania) in the 
2000-2006 period (endogenous development), North East England in the 2000s (regional 
innovation system) and the domestic regional policy focus of Nordrhein-Westfalen and 
Sachsen-Anhalt (the local development concepts devised at sub-Land level as part of the 
so-called Regionalised Structural Policy). Especially in the  programmes during the 1990s, 
strategies were generally drafted as compilations of interventions which would be used to 
draw down funding. Attempts to reconstruct ex post the underlying theories, as part of the 
case study research, indicated multifaceted, muddled and contradictory development 
models. In fairness, however, the strategies were often drawn up according to the 
prevailing domestic or EU economic thinking of the time, such as the view in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s that (for Objective 1 regions) infrastructure development was a main 
source of economic growth, and similarly in later periods, cluster policies began to be 
introduced in line with the emerging academic evidence. 
3.5 Evolution of objectives and priorities 
The early ERDF programmes of the 15 case study regions had relatively simple objectives, 
often with limited assessment of needs. In the first programme period (1989-93),5 the main 
orientations fell into the following categories: 
a) programmes from the Objective 1/Convergence group focused primarily 
a. on infrastructure (Algarve, Andalucía, Dytiki Ellada, Norte), 
complemented by ESF investments in human resources; or 
b. on diversified, wide-ranging objectives, combining varying levels of  support 
for infrastructure endowment and basic services, with structural 
adjustment/entrepreneurial support measures aimed at developing 
industry, entrepreneurship, conversion, skills, competitiveness and wider 
quality of life (Ireland, Campania, Basilicata, Galicia); 
b) programmes from Phasing-in/out or Objective 2/Competitiveness regions focused 
mainly on the challenges of structural adjustment and dealing with their industrial 
legacies (including cleaning-up brownfield sites), often together with external 
accessibility, the pursuit of intra-regional territorial balance and/or support of 
marginalised groups (Nordrhein-Westfalen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 
North East England); 
c) programmes geared towards rural development and the economic diversification of 
rural or sparsely populated areas (Aquitaine, Itä-Suomi from 1995); and 
d) a predominant focus on enterprise development and the modernisation of the 
industrial base (Burgenland, also only from 1995). 
                                                 
5 For Burgenland and Itä-Suomi, the first programme period was 1995-1999 following the accession of 
Austria and Finland to the EU in 1995.  
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For the most part, the regional objectives were remarkably stable over time, tending to 
evolve incrementally rather than being radically overhauled at the beginning of each 
programme period (a trend which was also true in other EU regions - see Bachtler et al., 
2000 and Taylor et al., 2004). This applied in particular to the 1990s, although Basilicata 
was an example of a region where four strategic axes persisted over the entire period from 
1989 to 2012, despite shifts of emphasis. More substantial changes were undertaken at the 
start of the 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 periods, driven mainly by compliance with EU 
objectives and the influence of the Lisbon strategy (the Community Strategic Guidelines in 
2007-2013). Changes in the eligibility status of regions (e.g. Ireland in 2000, Basilicata in 
2007) or in territorial eligibility (e.g. in Nordrhein-Westfalen, North East England, Nord-
Pas-de-Calais, Aquitaine) also prompted strategic re-assessments. This involved a certain 
homogenisation of approach, at least in terms of stated strategic objectives, and a general 
shift towards funding more private sector beneficiaries and projects after 2000. 
Nordrhein-Westfalen was the only region which undertook a strategic review during the 
1990s; in 1997 the main strategic orientation of the Objective 2 programme on structural 
adjustment was retained, but with a shift in focus towards employment creation and major 
projects. Programming for 2000-2006 saw substantial strategic reassessments in Ireland, 
Itä-Suomi, North-East England, Campania and Basilicata – generally driven by domestic 
policy developments. The North East England strategic review was influenced by the 
realisation that attracting FDI could not solve the region's development problems unless 
complemented by a change in the endogenous entrepreneurial culture. In Sachsen-Anhalt, 
the programme’s scope was extended in 2000, following changes to the regulatory 
framework of domestic regional policy (GRW)6, while in Itä-Suomi, a change in national 
domestic policy thinking led to a shift from support to firms and agriculture to promotion of 
the ‘knowledge ‘economy.  
The new orientation of the EU Community Strategic Guidelines in 2007 emphasised 
innovation, and often tallied with domestic paradigm shifts within the regions. In 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, for instance, the 2007-2013 programme has entailed a fundamental 
shift in objectives, whereby support for structural adjustment and employment has been 
superseded by competitiveness and adaptability, and the territorial focus on the Ruhrgebiet 
has been discontinued. As explained above, the shift in objectives was part of a longer term 
process of reorientation towards innovation, due partly to the realisation during the 2000-
2006 period that the previous approach and its implementation had become dated and 
inefficient, resulting in the launch of a cluster policy. Similarly, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 
there was a clear shift towards Lisbon priorities for the 2007-2013 programme, which 
represented a fundamental change in direction. Although ostensibly driven by EU 
requirements, it was also embedded in the framework of domestic policies, notably the 
competitiveness poles and the new ‘Regional innovation strategy’, elaborated with the 
support of the European Commission and aligned with the Contrat de Projet Etat-Région 
and the Regional Economic Development Scheme (SRDE, 2005). 
                                                 
6 Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur (GRW), Joint task for the 
improvement of the regional economic structure. 
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Most recently, the economic crisis has led to extensive re-programming in a few regions7 
(Dytiki Ellada, Campania, Norte), linked sometimes (in Campania and Basilicata) with a 
parallel change in domestic regional and national governments and thus policy priorities. In 
some respects, it is remarkable how few regions did overhaul their strategies in response to 
such major external shocks, a point noted also later in this report (see Chapter 8 ) which 
highlights the lack of flexibility of some programmes. 
Within this strategic context, the key thematic trends over time were as follows (more 
detailed information on the evolution of individual regional strategies is provided in Table 
3, Table 4 and Table 5). 
 Greater emphasis was placed on R&D and innovation mainly from 2000 onwards. 
Earlier attention to these themes was evident in several regions (e.g. Aquitaine, 
Campania, Ireland, North East England, Nordrhein-Westfalen), but the 
interventions often underperformed initially, due to a lack of readiness and 
understanding of the main co-financing bodies or beneficiaries. 
 Support for entrepreneurship and more sophisticated SME interventions – e.g. with 
support not just for fixed assets but also for marketing, internationalisation, 
financial engineering, industrial areas, cluster support etc. - also increased over 
time. Burgenland was distinctive in making the modernisation of the industrial base 
of the Land the central theme of all its programmes from 1995 to the present. 
 The Urban Community Initiative paved the way for the integration of urban 
development in the mainstream programmes, reflected in support for regeneration 
and specifically community development, which featured more strongly in the 
2000-2006 and 2007-2013 programmes. 
 Continuity of support throughout the study period was evident in four areas: (a) 
tourism, in virtually all regions, increasingly linked to wider attractiveness/cultural-
related interventions; (b) environmental infrastructure and/or nature protection in 
some regions (e.g. Basilicata, Campania, Galicia); (c) cross-border linkages and 
cooperation with neighbouring regions, as part of the mainstream programmes, 
INTERREG programmes or both (e.g. Galicia, Aquitaine, Norte, Itä-Suomi); and (d) 
improvement of quality of life, in a few programmes, such as Campania, Dytiki 
Ellada and Galicia.  
A more detailed overview of the evolution of objectives across the programme periods is 
provided in Table 3 (‘Objective 1/Convergence’ Regions), Table 4 (‘Phasing-in/out’ 
Regions) and Table 5 (‘Objective 2/RCE’) Regions. 
3.6 SMART objectives 
Overall, the case study research found a general perception among programme authorities, 
other stakeholders and external experts that programmes had improved over time and had 
                                                 
7 As have other European regions more generally (see European Commission 2013a; 2013b). 
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become more ‘SMART’. However, they varied in their success in this respect, and in some 
cases there were reversals. 
Taking the SMART attributes in turn, objectives should be specific, clear and unambiguous. 
However there was a tendency in many of the programmes to have general statements 
about improving development in the region and unrealistic ambitions of closing the gap 
with national or EU averages, without specific objectives which connected with the needs 
of the region. Many programmes were generic, and could have been adopted in other 
regions. Whilst strategies did become more regionally specific over time, there was also 
some convergence due to the pressure from the Commission to address EU-wide Lisbon 
objectives.8 
Considerable progress was made in making objectives measurable, although more needs to 
be done to meet expectations for the 2014-20 period.9 In the programme periods of the 
1990s, programmes lacked quantified targets and monitoring systems. Later programmes 
have often had some form of impact measure, but the metrics used were often been crude 
and poor measures of the interventions. This led to projects seeking to optimise the 
measurements rather than delivering the best results for the region. In addition, some 
objectives were not easily amenable to quantified targets, and were best described in 
qualitative terms, although this presented problems for measurement and estimating 
whether the project was as successful as it should have been, given the resources invested. 
Some of the programme-level objectives were over-ambitious, and hence not attainable 
(discussed in more detail in Chapter 5). Setting a target for an activity needed a detailed 
understanding of how that target will be achieved. This could be relatively simple for a 
construction activity where relative costs were known, but much more difficult in 
interventions where benchmarked costs were unknown, or where activities were highly 
heterogeneous and the mix was not known in advance. Even for construction, though, there 
were often problems of poor targets being set, one explanation being that assumptions 
about costs were shown to be unreasonable. Missed targets in many regions could be 
attributed to poor implementation, but also to unrealistic targets. 
The relevance of programmes was a central issue in the study, examined in more detail 
below. The crucial question was whether programmes were designed to meet the real 
needs of the region. As noted above, many of the regions saw some fragmentation of 
                                                 
8 A source of weakness in the development of specific objectives, which is also relevant for the 2007-
13 generation of programmes, was the unpreparedness of regional administrations at the time. In this 
regard, the 15 regions were not an exception. A recent study by DG Regio on 23 pilot Managing 
Authorities in 15 Member States found that programme objectives tended to be generic, and that the 
logic of intervention in programmes was often weak, with priorities often resulting from the 
aggregation of ‘more or less related’ sub-priorities. The study underlines that some programmes 
‘were designed in a deliberately vague fashion so that resources could be spread thematically and 
geographically’ (European Commission, Directorate General Regional and Urban Policy, 2013, p.9). 
9 Inaccurate target setting is also not a problem exclusive to the 15 regions covered by this study. The 
European Commission in its working document on the 2013 Strategic Report found that even in 
current programmes, ‘Target setting remains perhaps the most widespread and substantial problem. 
In a number of cases, targets were not been set. Where targets were set, many were often 
substantially over- or underachieved’ (European Commission, 2013b, p.21). 
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interests as different stakeholders had different conceptions of the needs of the region. 
Thus, if the needs were contested then there would inevitably be disagreements about 
what was relevant.  
Finally, objectives should be timely: there should be a realistic timescale over which 
objectives should be achieved with the resources available. This was automatically 
introduced in some respects by the nature of programmes which set a specific timescale for 
interventions, although they usually did not specify the timescale over which results were 
expected – especially where the scale of ambition was much greater than can be achieved 
within the programme period (see Chapter 8). This then introduced problems of evaluation, 
especially where results arose only after the programme ended. In most regions, this was 
due to inadequate consideration of the timeframe over which interventions could be 
assessed. Major infrastructure projects exemplified the difficulty because many required 
support from successive programmes. 
3.7 Relevance 
A key question for the study is the appropriateness of programmes in meeting regional 
needs, specifically whether the design of programmes (strategic goals, objectives, 
priorities, expenditure allocation) can be considered as relevant to the needs of the region. 
It is important, moreover, to stress that relevance can only sensibly understood in terms of 
what was perceived to be needed at the time the programme was formulated. Based on the 
case study research, the regions can be categorised into three groups which do not, to any 
particular degree, reflect the three different types of eligibility for Cohesion policy support 
(see Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8). 
 High relevance – where programme strategies were judged to be relevant across the 
study period – applicable to Sachsen-Anhalt, Norte and Galicia, Burgenland, Nord-
Pas-de-Calais and Ireland and Nordrhein-Westfalen. 
 Moderate to high relevance - where programme strategies were considered to be 
relevant for much of the time, with the exception of certain periods or areas of 
need, and/or where the programmes captured the right needs with their 
overarching objectives but without necessarily being able to appropriately 
modulate and prioritise the financial effort or devise appropriate instruments – 
applicable to Basilicata, Campania and Andalucía. 
 Moderate relevance - where programme strategies were regarded as being only 
partially relevant – applicable in the cases of Dytiki Ellada (in earlier periods), Itä-
Suomi, Algarve, Aquitaine and North East England. 
The tables provide both a summary review of the assessment of relevance for each case 
study, as well as the evaluation team’s assessment of relevance in hindsight i.e. whether 
the programme objectives would still be considered relevant today, based on the current 
appreciation of need and development theories and models, compared to when the 
programmes were drafted.  
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There is no obvious pattern linking the degree of relevance to the relative development of 
regions and thus to their Cohesion policy status, and the strategic scope and financial scale 
of programmes. The picture is mixed across the three groups of regions - Objective 
1/Convergence, Phasing-in/out and Objective 2/RCE. Thus, whether the regions belong to 
one or other of the three categories does not appear to have been a factor in determining 
the degree to which programme strategies were relevant.  
Whether regional strategies were drafted at regional or national level does not appear to 
be a key factor either. However, programme strategies and objectives appear to be more 
relevant where strategies were underpinned by solid ex ante evaluation and analyses of 
need, something which tended to improve over time (although even during preparation for 
the 2000-2006 programmes, the actual impact of ex ante evaluations was limited by the 
tendency to undertake them in parallel with the drafting of programmes - see Bachtler et 
al., 2009). Only Ireland and Nordrhein-Westfalen consistently undertook evidence-based 
programming. However, even in Nordrhein-Westfalen the linkage between ex ante analysis 
and strategy was indirect, in the sense that the domestic ‘Regionalised Structural Policy’, 
which informed the content of the Land’s ERDF programmes, was itself informed by several 
studies and analyses that had been undertaken independently of Cohesion policy. 
Perhaps surprisingly, strong thematic concentration is not always positively correlated with 
relevance. In some cases, the strategic focus on a single dimension in early programmes 
negatively affected the programmes’ ability to address the main perceived needs (e.g. in 
Dytiki Ellada). Similarly, in the 2007-13 period, the focus on Lisbon priorities is perceived 
to neglect development needs which are still relevant (for instance the specific needs of 
rural areas in Aquitaine and of physical regeneration in the Tees Valley in North East 
England).   
The lack of direct correlation between the needs declared in programme documents and 
the explicit strategies may, however, signal that implicit strategies (rather than what is 
stated in programme documents) matter more, and could strengthen rather than weaken 
the programme’s actual relevance. For example, in Campania, successive programmes 
explicitly recognised the need to rebalance spatial population and economic patterns, at 
the same time as they were directing most of the resources to the metropolitan area of 
Naples. Apparently contradictory, this choice can be considered justified, due to the 
concentration of population, economic activity and social and economic problems in this 
area and this area’s relative economic potential (and spillover effects). 
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Table 3: Evolution of strategies: ‘Objective 1/Convergence’ Regions 
Region 1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006 2007-2013 
Sachsen-
Anhalt 
Capital oriented funding approach  Continuation of capital-oriented 
funding approach, explicit focus 
on SMEs, support for 
endogenous entrepreneurial 
potential, support to coal, steel 
conversion and urban regions 
(Community Initiatives) 
Firms competitiveness especially SMEs; 
infrastructure in education, science and inter-
regional transport (federal programme);   
internationalisation strategy and strengthening 
export capability; urban development (Urban 
C.I.) 
Growth and job-creation through innovation, 
research and education, entrepreneurial capital  
& infrastructure (in transport sector, federal 
programme). Addition of urban dimension in 
programme strategy, continuation of 
internationalisation & exports strategy. 
 Dytiki 
Ellada 
Infrastructures, quality of life, 
stimulation of endogenous 
growth, local development. 
Infrastructures, linking the 
region’s development with the 
planned major transport 
projects, endogenous and local 
development, quality of life, 
industrial development and SME 
support. 
Infrastructures, linking development with the 
planned transport projects, SMEs and 
environment, quality of life, innovation and 
Information Society for regional competitiveness, 
integrated spatial development (rural, urban and 
specific population groups), tourism & culture, 
diversification of rural income. 
Continued emphasis on infrastructure 
development, focus on competitiveness and SMEs, 
and innovation/ Information Society for regional 
competitiveness. 
Weakening of the strategic choice to connect the 
region’s development with large transport 
projects. Improving quality of life. 
Campania Investments in infrastructure and 
(to a lesser degree) in support to 
firms, urban regeneration and 
community development, 
investments in cultural heritage. 
Infrastructure, increased 
support to firms, research and 
innovation, urban regeneration, 
cultural heritage, introduction 
of legality and security and of 
‘softer issues’ such as social 
cohesion and education. 
Alignment with ‘New Programming’ approach and 
thus emphasis on governance, transportation, 
urban renewal, local development, research and 
education, softer issues such as gender and 
capacity-building. 
Alignment with NSRF, and thus emphasis on 
transport, environmental sustainability, 
education, R&I, local development, tourism 
development, urban renewal. 
Norte Accessibility and Human Capital 
infrastructures 
Education, health and cultural 
infrastructures, clustering, 
transport   infrastructure 
(roads, railways). 
Transport and education infrastructure, 
innovation 
Innovation, R&D and competitiveness, 
supplemented by development support for low 
density areas. 
Andalucía Articulation and ‘unlocking’ the 
territory, water infrastructure, 
tourism development, areas and 
services to businesses, social 
infrastructure. 
Environmental infrastructure, 
support to the productive and 
industrial location factors, 
development of compulsory 
secondary education. 
Completion of transport infrastructure network, 
e-PA and computerisation of citizen services, 
regional innovation system, intangibles 
(organisational capital, innovation, ICT, etc.), 
nature conservation, tourism development, 
economic diversification,  branding. 
R&D&I, entrepreneurship (away from subsidies), 
reform of the incentives system and 
reinforcement of financial instruments, increased 
connectivity and quality of transport 
infrastructure, nature conservation and 
biodiversity, differentiation and quality tourism, 
social infrastructure. 
Galicia Internal connections, external 
accessibility, sanitation and 
purification, investment and 
modernisation of productive 
sectors.    
Access from outside of the 
region, internal 
communications, environmental 
deficit, halting industrial 
downturn, regional 
development agency. 
Improving access from outside and internal 
communications, environment, infrastructures, 
productivity and competitiveness of firms, R&D 
Plan, Regional innovation system. 
Access from outside the region and internal 
communications via high-capacity road networks, 
R&D Plan, Regional Innovation System, pollution 
control and protected areas 
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Table 4: Evolution of strategies: ‘Phasing-in/out’ Regions 
Region 1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006 2007-2013 
Burgenland N.A. Large -project strategy (business parks, 
technology parks),  IT-Infrastructure,  
grants for industrial investments, FDI 
tourism, training (ESF) 
Completion of business infrastructure, 
increased emphasis on SMEs and start-
ups, Clusters & cooperation, tourism 
training (ESF) 
Grants for industry investments, SME 
support, increased focus on ‘soft-aid’, 
R&D/Innovation, centres of excellence, 
tourism & culture 
Itä-Suomi N.A. Recovery from recession, modernising the 
periphery via business development support 
Promoting the knowledge-based 
economy (knowledge infrastructure ) 
Creating innovative environments (support 
to networks of firms and joint laboratories) 
Nord-Pas-
de-Calais 
In line with domestic policies, 
infrastructure and businesses. 
More efforts on former mining area (Objective 1 
area); focus on infrastructure but stronger 
emphasis on HR and social issues; improving 
‘image’ and ‘attractiveness’. 
Continued focus on large projects and 
infrastructure but increasing concern on 
innovation, ICT, sustainable 
development. 
Strong influence of EU regulations on Lisbon 
strategy. Coordination with domestic 
competitiveness poles; more qualitative 
approach of industrial renewal. 
Ireland Broadly based CSF with a focus or 
direct support for enterprise, 
infrastructure, training 
Broadly based CSF with continued investment in 
infrastructure and enterprise, new local 
development OP 
Focused NSRF (EU-Funded component of 
much larger NDP) addressing innovation 
and regional development 
Focused NSRF (EU-Funded component of 
much larger NDP) addressing innovation, 
environment, ICT and Gateway locations 
Basilicata Building infrastructure for growth 
and tourism development 
Infrastructures for growth and social cohesion; 
SMEs and soft interventions 
Endogenous growth, SMEs and 
environment 
Competitiveness and jobs (Lisbon strategy) 
Algarve Investments in environment  and 
basic education infrastructures 
Environmental investments, education and 
health infrastructures, accessibility 
 
Accessibility , urban rehabilitation 
projects, support for low density areas 
Innovation, R&D, competitiveness, urban 
rehabilitation projects and 
intervention in low density areas 
 
Table 5: Evolution of strategies: ‘Objective 2/RCE’ Regions 
Region 1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006 2007-2013 
Aquitaine Industrial diversification, new 
activities, integration of Lacq-
Orthez basin with surrounding 
industrial areas Adour basin 
(Obj.2); job maintenance and 
creation (Obj.5b) 
Insertion in European trade flows, infra-regional 
cohesion, conditions for economic development 
(Obj. 2); agriculture & forestry as drivers for 
rural areas, economic diversification, 
environment, attractiveness of rural areas 
(Obj.5b). 
Strengthen the key role of businesses in 
job creation 
Enhance local resources from the 
perspective of a sustainable and balanced 
territorial development 
Innovation and sustainable development 
as drivers of regional competitiveness,  
strengthening competitiveness through 
innovation, exploitation of 
environmental assets in a sustainable 
development perspective 
Nordrhein-
Westfalen 
Diversification of industrial 
structure, environmental quality 
and sites reclamation, CBC and, 
from 1992, HR modernisation. 
Diversification of the industrial structure, SME 
infrastructure, reuse of industrial wasteland and 
environmental quality, human capital and, from 
1997, support to enterprise development. 
Enterprises and start-up support; 
innovation and competences, innovation 
infrastructure, support to targeted 
groups. 
Strengthening entrepreneurship, 
innovation and knowledge economy, 
sustainable urban and regional 
development. 
 North East 
England 
Aligned to domestic strategy of 
attracting inward investment, 
with physical development and 
local connections. 
Increased emphasis on innovation & enterprise,  
introduction of ‘softer issues’ (community 
economic development, redevelopment of large 
strategic sites and transformational tourism 
projects). Emerging cluster approaches and 
university involvement.  
Alignment with new Regional Economic 
Strategy and Business Links programme. 
Stronger focus on SMEs and new financial 
instruments: softer infrastructure, 
business support, excellence centres and 
finance equity instruments. 
Embedded in larger Regional Economic 
Strategy/RES Action Plan and Single 
Programme match funding: business 
support, innovation connectors, finance 
equity instruments. 
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Table 6: Assessment of relevance: ‘Objective 1/Convergence’ Regions  
Region Relevance Assessment 
Sachsen-Anhalt HIGH. Programme objectives, priorities and expenditure allocation on the whole responded to the needs 
identified in the programme’s background analyses and as perceived at the time. Progressive widening 
of programme scope was justified. In the current period, however, it may lead to reduced effectiveness 
given the spread of reduced resources across too many areas of intervention. 
 
1991-1994 programme mono-dimensional (due to pragmatic 
rather than strategic choice), not all needs were adequately 
addressed (e.g. urban structure, innovation). 
Dytiki Ellada MODERATE. Mono-dimensionality of programmes from early periods (infrastructure) and new 
institutional set up and wide coverage (many themes and priorities) in current period mean that not all 
regional needs have adequately been addressed in programme strategies. 
2007-2013 programmes’ objectives are too dispersed. The 
stated intention to focus on strategic projects, rather than 
continuing the past practice of spreading resources thinly to 
many small projects, has tended to be overhauled by the 
current crisis. 
Campania MOSTLY HIGH.  The strategies formulated in the programmes were generally coherent with the needs 
identified, with a few exceptions in relation to labour market, enterprise, social cohesion and the 
spatial distribution of economic activities.  
Spatial distribution of population and economic activity 
mentioned as need, but without building fully-fledged 
strategies to redress imbalance (with the exception of 
interventions in agriculture, rural and urban regeneration, 
cultural heritage and tourism development). In reality, 
programme interventions tended to focus on the Naples 
metropolitan area. 
 
Norte HIGH.  Serious deficiencies in infrastructure and human resource skills duly taken into account in all four 
programme periods. From 1994, focus also on enterprise, structural adjustment and innovation was 
correct given prospective change in international competition. 2000-2006 programmes further seeking 
better balance between traditional sectors and new activities (structural adjustment) and exploitation 
of advantages geographical position in the Atlantic Area, whilst supporting innovation to modernise 
traditional sectors. Current programmes. NSRF paradigm shift towards regional competitiveness & 
critical mass building cannot be assessed as undergoing change (financial crisis). 
 
Cluster strategy introduced in 1994-1999 was inappropriate due 
to cultural attitudes amongst the entrepreneurial class 
(consisting of microenterprises). This was not acknowledged at 
the time. 
Andalucía MOSTLY HIGH. Overall relevant throughout the study period (view shared by regional stakeholders). 
However, this assessment differs if one compares need and imputed objectives on a theme by theme 
basis (where for some themes there is a wide discrepancy between theme and needs).  
 
Insufficient efforts to reinforce the industrial base. 
Galicia HIGH. Main regional needs in the initial programme periods were: lack of transport infrastructure 
(accessibility and internal connectivity), telecommunications and electricity networks; conservation and 
improvement of the environment (drinking water distribution, waste water and solid waste 
management); diversification and competitive enhancement of agriculture and industry; a need for 
innovation.  These objectives were largely addressed by the programmes (innovation in later periods), 
exactly designed to indirectly impact on the productivity of the economy and its ability to generate 
employment opportunities. Strategic shifts from one period to the next were justified. 
Insufficient attention was given to the promotion of 
internationalisation and small businesses. 
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Table 7: Assessment of relevance: ‘Phasing-in/out’ Regions 
Region Relevance Assessment 
Burgenland HIGH. Programmes e based on broad and good understanding of regional needs. Strategies 
developed further over the three programme periods and addressed regional needs: (i) provision 
of business infrastructure; (ii) high-quality telecoms infrastructure; (iii) modern water supply 
and wastewater system (fundamental bottleneck); (iv) modern product and services in tourism; 
(v) improvements to education infrastructure. 
A lack of flexibility and adaptability to the changing needs of the 
programmes. 
Itä-Suomi MODERATE.  Relevance limited by need to accommodate 4 distinct sub-regional strategies in the 
programmes and, in first period; reactive approach focussed on declining industries. 
Correspondence between needs and programme goals has improved over time. 
1995-1999 programme too focused on mature or declining industries & not 
sufficiently geared towards the support of the structural change processes 
necessary for the renewal of the production structure of the region. 
Nord-Pas-de-
Calais 
HIGH. Programme strategies adequately matched the regional needs as perceived at the time. 
The more pronounced focus on innovation, R&D and competitiveness from 2000 was in tune with 
the region’s need for reconversion.   
Support of traditional sectors in earlier periods, whilst protecting jobs and 
businesses in the short term, delayed transformation. Relevance hampered 
by implementation difficulties (coordination of local actors, mobilisation of 
SMEs to innovate). 
Ireland HIGH. Changing emphases over time, but clear relevance throughout. From the outset, 
strategies were devised based on sound analyses of need (e.g. formal evaluations by ESRI, 
foresight exercises, wider political and public debates). Clearly, however, as focus of investment 
and availability/relative size of ERDF resources changed over time, needs have been addressed 
to a varying degree over time (whilst relevance was maintained throughout).  
There might have been some missed opportunities: broadband/ICT and 
renewable energy. Domestic constraints limited the effectiveness of the 
strategies, i.e. limited public sector reform, transport regulation 
difficulties, absence of user charges in domestic water, a failure to 
develop a real regional development policy (NSS too late). 
Basilicata MODERATE. Programmes were  able to identify existing needs and to respond to them, but only 
in a partial way and key needs have remained unaddressed in all periods from 1994 (for differing 
reasons in each period). [This assessment only relates to the ROPs]. 
 
Algarve MODERATE. Overall relevant until 1999. Not fully relevant in 2000-2006 (economic 
diversification intended but not pursued as main focus continued to be on tourism) and in 2007-
2013 (focus on competitiveness contested in the region and lack of acknowledgement of need for 
different sectoral specialisations and need to develop internal areas). 
The focus on tourism in 1989-1993 and 1994-1999 meant that the 
productive fabric beyond this sector was neglected.  
Focus on Lisbon is leading to a neglect of internal areas’ needs. Different 
sectoral specialisations also not adequately acknowledged. 
Table 8: Assessment of relevance: ‘Objective 2/RCE’ Regions 
Region Relevance Assessment 
Aquitaine MODERATE. Until 1999 programmes based on domestic strategies/policies rather than needs 
analysis. 2000-2006 strategy not focussed due to divergent stakeholders needs). 2007-2013: 
greater focus, but some traditional fields (transport, tourism, culture) and needs of rural areas 
left out. Environment under- represented compared to need until 2007.   
- 
Nordrhein-
Westfalen 
HIGH. Programme strategies were relevant. However, ERDF programmes were a framework 
strategy:  linking problems and activities rested on the regional initiatives.  
No understanding of the nature of the change that structural adjustment 
would require. Poor appreciation of need for coordination between cities. 
North East 
England 
MODERATE. Difficulty to strike right balance: 1989-1993 focus on infrastructure meant that not 
all regional needs were addressed. 1994-1999: too many interventions and weak prioritisation. 
2000-2006 concentration on entrepreneurship and innovation neglected some core needs (CED), 
and again in 2007-2013. Early programmes had little coherence between strategies and actual 
investment.  
- 
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3.8 Complementarities & Synergies 
The ERDF does not operate in a policy vacuum, but complements (and operates in parallel 
with) other EU funds, notably the ESF and EAGGF/EAFRD, but also with domestic regional 
policies and other domestic policies and spending programmes. EU regulations and guidance 
expects that EU funds will be implemented in a complementary manner – which forms part 
of the rationale for Community Support Framework or National Strategic Reference 
Framework planning structures - whilst complementarities with domestic policies often 
operate explicitly through co-financing or matching funding requirements. 
3.8.1 Synergies among ERDF programmes 
In the Convergence regions, the ERDF actions usually consisted of a combination of regional 
and national thematic Operational Programmes, coordinated through the CSFs. Formal 
planning requirements should lead to explicit complementarities, and in some regions this 
was the case, notably where national programmes funded trans-regional transport 
infrastructure whilst regional programmes funded local networks or stations. Such planning 
frameworks may better match government structures in a country where national ministries 
are responsible for major infrastructure spending whilst regional bodies have more limited 
responsibilities for softer investments such as advice to business and local development 
projects.  
The coordination between national and regional level Operational Programmes, however, 
was not always straightforward. In Basilicata and Campania, for instance, despite some 
exceptions (notably transport, education and, to a more limited extent, research), national 
and regional programmes were generally poorly linked, despite the formal existence of an 
overarching cross-regional strategy, represented by the CSF. Elsewhere, there was a lack of 
coordination in the earlier periods between, for example, Objective 2 and Objective 5b 
programmes in adjacent areas, as well as between the mainstream programmes and the 
Community initiatives. The latter did have an important role, though, in testing new 
concepts and types of project that were later mainstreamed in the core ERDF programmes.  
3.8.2 Synergies with ESF and other EU funds 
The interaction between ERDF and ESF has historically been a major challenge for the 
strategic management of the ERDF programmes (Davies, 2011; Bachtler and Mendez, 2010; 
Taylor and Promé, 1997). Insofar as synergies could be achieved, they usually involved the 
use of ERDF to create the infrastructure and fund equipment, and the ESF to fund training 
activities. Whilst Operational Programmes have often sought to combine the two Funds, 
sometimes within integrated actions, the ERDF and ESF have distinct objectives, targets, 
operating rules/modalities, and coordinating entities (often operating with very different 
mindsets). This presented difficulties in being able to linking the objectives to each other 
and managing implementation.  
For example, in the R&D sphere the ERDF funded buildings, research and lab equipment, 
research activities, innovation projects in private firms and transfers from public and 
private research centres to private firms, while the ESF funded the provision of training in 
research centres, higher education institutions and in private firms. Sometimes combined 
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within a single, composite project, these activities required coordination between different 
administrations/units which was not always easily achieved. More fundamental is the 
question of whether, at a strategic level, there was correspondence between the strategic 
employment and training objectives and priorities governing the regional use of ESF and the 
sectoral or enterprise strategies being pursued through ERDF funding. 
The 15 regions present some good examples of integration and synergy between ERDF and 
ESF. One of the most positive examples of synergy between the Funds was in Ireland, 
where a National Development Policy guided all ERDF programmes and ensured good 
coordination between them, reducing overlap and duplication, and facilitating good 
synergies with other EU programmes such as ESF and Fisheries Guidance. Good practice 
examples included coordination between ERDF support for tourism product development 
alongside ESF support for tourism training, and linked educational programme and 
infrastructure support in the vocational training sector and universities. In Burgenland, too, 
a good synergy was reported between ERDF support for training facilities and ESF 
programmes, such as in the development of the University of Applied Sciences, in the 
support of company relocation and in the tourism sector (where the ERDF generally funded 
qualification measures and equipment, and the ESF provided training of human resources). 
Positive ERDF/ESF coordination experiences were reported in Itä-Suomi where, for 
example, ESF supported training programmes using ERDF supported clean-room facilities, 
and a number of other innovation oriented projects drew on both funds.  
Sachsen-Anhalt started to integrate sources from different EU funds to tackle urgent 
problems at a very early stage. The ex post evaluation of the 1991-93 programme noted 
that 44 projects integrating ERDF and ESF funding had been implemented. In these 
projects, enterprises (mainly SMEs) received ERDF support to improve their technical 
standards and enhance their competitiveness, while at same time the ESF supported 
training activities to upgrade employee qualifications. Overall, these projects led to a 
reported total of more than 4,000 jobs being created or safeguarded. Similarly, integrated 
ERDF/EAGGF projects for the development of rural areas and infrastructure investments in 
46 local communities were reported to have created more than 2,400 jobs. Despite this 
apparent success, synergies or complementarities were judged to have been low or non-
existent in the first programme period. Subsequent evaluations revealed continual problems 
with coordination, although in the 2000-2006 programme there was some bundling around 
integrated priorities, and harmonisation of organisational procedures and reporting 
requirements. 
Further challenges, relevant to only some of the case study regions, arose in attempts to 
achieve coordination with the EAGFF and EFF - a wider issue for ERDF programmes, as the 
ex post evaluation of 2000-2006 programmes demonstrated (Applica et al., 2010, p.106). At 
both strategic and operational levels, the experiences of the case study regions 
demonstrated examples of both the exploitation of synergies and disjuncture between the 
management of the Funds. Nevertheless, good examples of synergies between the ERDF and 
the EAGGF can be found in Burgenland, and also in Dytiki Ellada, Andalucía and 
Aquitaine. Burgenland saw the establishment of quality brands in food and viticulture and 
their links with tourism, as well as in the development of national parks and the use of 
EAGGF support for biomass linked with ERDF funded renewables projects. In Dytiki Ellada, 
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the LEADER initiative between 1994 and 2006 was important for the diversification of 
mountainous and disadvantaged rural areas through tourism and small scale business, 
complementing the investment delivered through the mainstream programmes. The switch 
from agricultural subsidies to agri-tourism supported the move to an entrepreneurial 
culture.  Some of the strongest synergies between programmes were associated with the 
Integrated Programmes of Rural Development (OPAAX) during 2000-2006 in selected 
mountainous and disadvantaged rural areas. There was, however, less synergy with ESF 
sectoral programmes, although ESF and ERDF did jointly fund social welfare projects: ERDF 
supporting the infrastructure whilst ESF supported the operational costs. 
Andalucía benefited from a LEADER initiative to develop tourist villages, and 
complementarities within the Forest Plan: the ERDF financed water infrastructure, erosion 
protection and fire prevention whilst EAGGF supported forest management programmes. 
The ERDF and ESF were also used together to support entrepreneurship with training 
activities for entrepreneurs alongside financial instruments and land and property projects. 
In Aquitaine, good complementarity between the EAGGF and ERDF occurred in 2000-2006 
around agro-food and forestry. Since 2007, however, the transfer of the EAFRD (formerly 
the EAGGF) outside Cohesion policy has meant that the EAFRD took on sole responsibility 
for a core set of rural development actions, with the ERDF dropping out of those actions, 
although synergies still exist in the water and wood energy sectors. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the case study research on Algarve and Norte found 
that, in Portugal, different ministries were responsible for ERDF, ESF and other funds and 
were not adequately connected. There may have been a few cases in which synergies were 
achieved at a project level, but these were not considered as evidence for a general 
strategic complementarity between funds. Similar sectoral thinking was reported in Italy, 
where individual ministries saw the Structural Funds as sources of funding for their own 
plans for investment in the regions rather than integrated strategies across ministerial 
responsibilities (although integration was sought and achieved in certain fields, such as 
education and research). 
Nordrhein-Westfalen also reported disappointing results regarding synergies between ESF 
and ERDF due to the differences in implementation structures and ways of thinking. 
Specific cases of good connection were realised at the project level, but this did not reflect 
coordination in strategic terms, with even separate sub-regional structures for the two 
programmes. The situation regarding EAFRD was also similar with some project-level 
synergies but an absence of a common overall approach. 
In the United Kingdom, ESF programmes since 2007 have been planned at a national level to 
meet national needs which may be different to the objectives at a regional level. Hence in 
North East England it was reported that specific needs identified through the ERDF 
programme for higher level skills could not be addressed by ESF as it was targeted on basic 
skills.  
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3.9 Synergies with domestic programmes 
Synergies with domestic programmes were largely determined by the need for matching 
funding whereby ERDF and domestic programmes co-funded projects or industry assistance 
schemes. At a strategic level, the integration between ERDF and domestic programmes 
varied across the 15 regions. As elsewhere in the EU, the extent to which Cohesion policy 
acted as a driver for domestic policy strategies (which tended to be the case for bigger 
ERDF recipients) – or vice-versa domestic funding determined the strategic choices made 
within the ERDF programmes (as tended to be the case in Member States and regions where 
Cohesion policy had little financial weight and significance compared to domestic policies), 
varied (Polverari et al., 2005). Nevertheless, arguably due to the top-down requirement to 
align the ERDF programmes with the (Lisbon strategy) National Reform Programmes, the 
strategic integration between the two strands of policy has increased, at least formally, 
during the 2000s and especially in 2007-2013. From a more operational perspective, good 
degrees of comprehensive integration and coordination between the two strands of policy 
were recorded in Ireland, Dytiki Ellada, North East England, Itä-Suomi, Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Aquitaine and Nord-pas-de-Calais. More limited synergy, confined to specific 
policy fields, was found in Campania.   
In Ireland, ERDF in 2000-06 and 2007-13 has supported targeted elements of national 
programmes, notably innovation. However, one area where EU and national policy have 
differed is the regionalisation of programmes: strongly encouraged by the Commission, but 
not enthusiastically received by national authorities. As a result, the new regional 
structures developed were mainly limited to the implementation of the Structural Funds 
and most policies remained nationally determined. Similarly, in Greece, domestic policy 
was implemented through the Operational Programmes in the CSFs and hence the two 
funding strands were strongly connected. Around 70 percent of the national Public 
Investments Programme for the whole 1989-2013 period was allocated to meet the national 
contribution to the Structural Funds. 
The French regions saw close cooperation between the ERDF programmes and the state-
regional plans (CPERs) with complementary programmes to avoid direct duplication, and 
harmonised timing and monitoring. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, in 2007-2013, the CPER and ERDF 
OP priorities were essentially the same. However other instruments such as the 
competitiveness poles had less synergy with ERDF. In Aquitaine, the ERDF could have been 
used to support technologies similar to the competitiveness poles, but differences in 
eligibility made it a less attractive source than national funds. In both French regions, there 
was also coordination under environmental policy since the Grenelle Environmental 
agreement in 2007. This multipartite agreement between the state and all stakeholders 
identified sustainability initiatives which were jointly funded by national funds and ERDF. 
Synergies with domestic programmes in North East England were strong over much of the 
period, but became increasingly tightly integrated during the 2000s because of the 
emergence of regional development agencies. During the 1990s, a number of national 
initiatives either sought ERDF co-funding, or submitted regional projects to ERDF 
programmes. Some nationwide programmes in the 1990s such as the SPUR and SMART grant 
schemes, or Business Link looked to ERDF to provide additional funding in the eligible 
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regions. However, with the formation of RDAs and the development of their own regional 
programmes, and especially from 2007, the ERDF was expected to support projects within 
these regional programmes, until the final demise of the RDAs in 2012. 
In Itä-Suomi, the ERDF supported a number of projects within national programmes such as 
the Centres of Excellence Programme (OSKE). Nordrhein-Westfalen also experienced good 
connections between ERDF and domestic programmes, such as support for the state 
programme for the International Building Exhibition Emscher Park where ERDF supplied 
around 20 percent of the total funding, or the ERDF contribution to federal innovation 
programmes. In the context of funding for integrated urban development, ERDF funding was 
combined with national and federal programmes for urban development. Together with the 
experience of the Community Initiatives URBAN I and II, the national and federal 
programmes were used as the basis for developing the urban development funding approach 
in the 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 ERDF programmes.  
Elsewhere, there was more limited complementarity with domestic programmes. In 
Campania, the main area of complementarity was in transport investment, with co-funding 
of some parts of the Naples underground and the Battipaglia logistical hub from the 
national ‘Legge Obiettivo’. Fundamentally, however, the Italian 2007-2013 NSRF’s attempt 
to link the domestic and European regional development strategies more closely did not 
succeed due to a change of national-level government priorities. 
An example of relatively limited integration is represented by Sachsen-Anhalt. Prior to 
2000, there were parallel domestic and ERDF programmes which were poorly coordinated 
and provided competing funds. After 2000, there were attempts to develop region-level 
integrated programmes in which projects had to target domestic as well as ERDF support, 
but these did not work well and applicants preferred mono-fund programmes, as a result of 
which the integrated programmes were discontinued. There seemed to be a general 
preference for domestic programmes due to less demanding funding criteria.  
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4. EXPENDITURE PATTERNS AND TRENDS 
Analysing trends in spending of Structural and Cohesion Funds over time and across regions 
has traditionally been problematic. Multiple sources, inconsistent reporting, and delays in 
closing programmes and finalising expenditure have presented major challenges for 
comparative research. It is only in the 2007-13 period that the Commission has been able to 
introduce structured, systematic approach to Member States reporting on the financial 
progress of programmes. This research study, therefore, has had to undertake primary 
research based on a bottom-up classification and aggregation of measure-level expenditure 
information, undertaken for each of the 15 regions, according to the methodology 
described in more detail in Annex 2. Notwithstanding important data limitations and gaps, 
this is the first analysis of long-term expenditure trends for the entire period from 1989 to 
2012, reconstructing ex post the final expenditure at NUTS 2 level.10   
Complementing the previous chapter on strategies, this chapter reviews the expenditure 
patterns and trends across the 15 case study regions. It begins with an overview of total 
recorded spending, and then discusses expenditure trends by thematic axis and category of 
regions. 
4.1 Overall expenditure trends 
Over the period from 1989 to 2012, more than €146 billion of Structural Funds are 
estimated to have been spent in the 15 regions (see Figure 4). The Objective 
1/Convergence regions had the largest share, of 68.3 percent (c. €99.6 billion), with 
Phasing-in/out and Objective 2/RCE regions representing a more modest 21.6 percent (c. 
€31.5 billion) and 10.1 percent (c. €14.7 billion) respectively. Across the entire period, 
allocations exceeded expenditure by around €14 billion (c. 9 percent of the initial 
allocation). This figure should however be interpreted with great caution given that, 
especially for early periods, it was not always possible to reconstruct the non-earmarked 
regional allocations of the national or multiregional OPs (which overinflates expenditure 
compared to allocations) and that this sum is negatively affected by the expenditure delays 
of the 2007-13 programmes.  
 
 
                                                 
10 The ex post evaluations of the 1994-1999 ERDF programmes, for instance, only include reflections 
on commitments (ECOTEC 2003; CSES 2003); the  synthesis report of the ex post evaluation of 2000-
2006 ERDF programmes includes elaborations on non-final expenditure data (at 31 December 2008), at 
Member State level only (Applica et al., 2009); whilst the thematic study on 2000-2006 ERDF and 
Cohesion Fund regional expenditure, undertaken when the programmes were still underway and 
published in 2008, whilst focusing on sub-national data (NUTS 2 and NUTS 3), only provides 
information on commitments (SWECO, 2008). The most recent report produced by the DG Regio 
Evaluation Network on 2007-2013 programmes (Ciffolilli et al., 2013) provides the thematic 
breakdown of the programmes’ planned, rather than actual expenditure. In relation to expenditure, 
the report focuses mainly on its evolution and on the reprogramming shifts between categories (i.e. 
planned expenditure).  
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Figure 4: Total Structural Funds allocations compared to actual expenditure by regional 
groups and across all 15 regions (1989-2010/11/12) – Million Euro, 2000 values 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaborations based on data collected by the regional teams. Data included are for ROPs 
and, where applicable, NOPs11 combined. 
 
The discrepancy between planned and actual expenditure is the highest in absolute terms 
in the Objective 1/Convergence regions (c. €10.2 billion).Again, however, the lack of 
reliable data on allocations for some of the MOPs/NOPs affects the validity of this 
assessment. 
As a percentage of GDP, Structural Funds expenditure is the highest in: Dytiki Ellada 
(almost four percent in 1994-1999 and over five percent in 2000-2006); Norte (6.1 in 2000-
06): and Algarve (5.29 in 2000-2006). Nordrhein-Westfalen had the lowest Structural Funds 
expenditure in relation to GDP: less than 0.1 percent in each of the periods. 
 
                                                 
11 Again, there are some data gaps in relation to earlier periods and MOPs/NOPs expenditure, which 
could not always be regionalised. Detail can be found in the case study reports.  
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Table 9: Annualised Structural Funds expenditure expressed as a percentage of GDP 
 
1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006 2007-2013 
Algarve 2.00 2.09 5.29 2.01 
Andalucía 1.19 1.77 1.95 0.26 
Aquitaine 0.13 0.54 0.41 0.22 
Basilicata NA 1.61 2.59 1.07 
Burgenland NA 3.78 2.32 0.38 
Campania 0.34 0.58 2.27 0.53 
Dytiki Ellada 0.52 3.83 5.05 2.49 
Itä-Suomi NA 1.87 2.44 0.94 
Galicia 0.87 1.66 1.93 0.36 
Ireland  0.58 1.60 0.11 0.14 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 0.16 0.76 0.79 0.30 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 
Norte 1.50 2.72 6.12 8.60 
Sachsen-Anhalt 2.06 2.8 2.97 1.12 
North East England NA 0.52 0.40 0.09 
Source: own elaboration based on regional expenditure data collected by the regional teams. 
Note: for the 2007-2013 period, annualised expenditure for the Aquitaine and Norte regions is based 
on total allocations divided by seven years. This is because data on the last is absent. For the other 
regions, annualised expenditure for the last period has been calculated taking into account the 
number of years of actual expenditure, provided by each region. See Annex 2 to see last year tracked. 
 
4.2 Expenditure by thematic axis 
Turning the analysis of expenditure by thematic axis, Figure 5 shows the total Structural 
Funds expenditure of each region across the whole study period and the relative weight 
assigned to the eight thematic axes. Andalucía and Norte spent the most (with c. €26.3 
and €29.9 billion respectively), followed closely by Sachsen-Anhalt (€20.4 billion) and 
Campania (€17.5 billion)).12 Burgenland is the region with the lowest spend, c. €1.7 billion 
over the entire period: not a negligible figure nevertheless, given the size of the region, the 
fact that Cohesion policy support started only in 1995, and in GDP terms (representing c. 
3.78, 2.32 and 0.38 percent of GDP in each programme period respectively from 1995 to 
date). 
The proportion of spend across the themes varies considerably among the regions, ranging 
from a strong emphasis on enterprise support in Burgenland (56 percent of total 
expenditure from 1989 to date) and Itä-Suomi (59 percent), to a predominance of 
infrastructure spending in the two Spanish regions (representing 61 percent of total 
expenditure in Galicia and 49 percent in Andalucía), in Dytiki Ellada (43 percent), and in 
Ireland (37 percent). Aquitaine, Sachsen-Anhalt and Campania show a concentration of 
                                                 
12 The data limitations already noted apply. In particular, the figures for Basilicata are 
underestimated given that the data included in the analysis only comprise ERDF (and not all Structural 
Funds) and the ROPs only for the periods 1989-1993 and 1994-1999. Similarly, for Algarve and Dytiki 
Ellada actual expenditure is underestimated by the lack of data on the expenditure for some or most 
of the NOPs. 
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expenditure on two main themes (enterprise and structural adjustment in Aquitaine and 
Sachsen-Anhalt, and enterprise and infrastructure in Campania), whilst the remaining 
regions display more mixed expenditure patterns, with no dominant theme. 
The relative distribution of expenditure across the eight themes and its evolution over time 
can be more precisely appraised from the next three figures, which provide a period-by-
period disaggregation of expenditure for the three regional aggregates, the Objective 
1/Convergence, Phasing-in/out and Objective 2/RCE regions in turn (Figure 6, Figure 7 and 
Figure 8). 
Figure 6 shows a predominance of infrastructure spending across all programme periods 
(except 2007-2013) in the Objective 1/Convergence regions, ranging from 43 percent of 
total expenditure in 1989-1993, to 27 percent in 1994-1999 and 30 percent in 2000-2006, 
and to a low of 14 percent in 2007-2013. Another prominent theme is structural adjustment 
which remained over 20 percent from 1989-1999 (22 percent in 1989-1984, 24 percent in 
1994-1999) but decreased sharply to six percent in the 2000-2006 period before growing 
again to 13 percent in 2007-2013. The main thematic shift across periods in this group of 
regions was the relative growth of the categories of social cohesion and labour markets 
starting in the 2000-06 period. Perhaps surprisingly, innovation is shown as remaining 
broadly stable, accounting for five and ten percent of total expenditure in the first two 
programme periods, and then seven percent in 2000-2006 and eight percent in 2007-2013. 
The environmental theme too has remained broadly stable throughout, at around 15 
percent of total expenditure, with a downward trend in 2007-2013 (11 percent, compared 
to 12-17 percent respectively in previous periods). 
The situation is similar in the 1989-93 period for the Phasing-in/out regions (Figure 7), with 
expenditure strongly polarised around infrastructure (58 percent of expenditure). However, 
the composition of expenditure in Phasing-in/out regions becomes more diversified over the 
following programme periods, with a predominance of enterprise support (34 percent, 38 
percent and 21 percent respectively in 1994-1999, 2000-2006 and 2007-2013) and, in the 
2007-13 period, structural adjustment and innovation (respectively at 23 and 22 percent of 
expenditure).   
Lastly, Figure 8 demonstrates a strong focus in the three Objective 2/RCE regions on 
enterprise in the first three programme periods (with 50 percent of the money spent on this 
theme in 1989-1993, later falling  to 30 percent (1994-1999), 35 percent (2000-2006) and 14 
percent (2007-2013) and a marked shift towards innovation and social cohesion in the 
current period. In the current period, moreover, there is no expenditure on labour market 
in this group of regions, largely due to the mono-fund nature of the programmes. In the 
Objective 2/RCE regions, two themes record the least expenditure throughout the study 
period: spatial distribution of economic activities and environmental sustainability. 
However, whilst the former has progressively diminished (from ten percent in both 1989-
1993 and 1994-1999, to three percent in the 2000-06 period and no expenditure in  2007-
13), the latter has seen its share double since 2000-2006 (from four percent to 11 percent 
of total expenditure). 
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Figure 5: Total Structural Funds expenditure per region and theme - Million Euro, 2000 values* 
 
*Representative of available expenditure data only (see Annex 2).  
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Figure 6: Total Structural Funds expenditure in ‘Objective 1/Convergence’ regions’ regions, by programme period and theme – percentage values* 
 
*Representative of available expenditure data only (see Annex 2).  
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Figure 7: Structural Funds expenditure in ‘Phasing-in/out’ regions, by programme period and theme – percentage values* 
 
*Representative of available expenditure data only (see Annex 2).  
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Figure 8: Total Structural Funds expenditure in ‘Objective 2/RCE’ regions, by programme period and theme, percentage values* 
 
*Representative of available expenditure data only (see Annex 2).  
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5. THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF COHESION POLICY PROGRAMMES 
5.1 Introduction 
The considerable investments made by the ERDF in the 15 case study regions can be 
expected to have made significant differences to the development of these regions. 
Increasingly, these expectations have been specified in the objectives of programmes as 
noted previously, and this chapter examines the nature of the achievements in the regions 
as a result of this investment. 
There is no simple, single assessment of achievements: they can and have been assessed 
over time in a variety of different ways, sometimes rigorously, sometimes barely at all. This 
chapter is the first of three that examine achievements, focusing on the achievements 
reported by the regions and a qualitative assessment of the achievements within each of 
the eight themes identified in this study. The subsequent chapters then examine 
quantitatively the achievements compared with needs and objectives and the impact of the 
programmes on regional performance.  
This chapter begins by reviewing the nature of achievements and the methodology used in 
assessing reported and actual achievements. It distinguishes between two sorts of 
achievements. 
 Reported achievements are as reported by the programme managers in their annual and 
final implementation reports to the Commission. Typically, these are output measures 
reflecting the activities undertaken by projects, indicators relating to the effects that 
the projects have on beneficiaries and the wider region, and qualitative case studies of 
projects and their results. Actual achievements may differ from those reported because 
the latter may underestimate or overestimate achievements, for a number of reasons 
explained in the next section. The calculation of actual achievements at programme 
level requires either detailed auditing of each project or macroeconomic analysis, but 
here an assessment of actual achievements is made on a thematic basis to identify what 
kinds of interventions have worked in each of the regions. 
5.2 The nature of achievements 
ERDF expenditure in any region will deliver various types of achievements. They encompass 
the direct outputs of the projects and the wider changes they stimulate within the region; 
they can be anticipated by formal targets or can be unanticipated or accidental; they can 
be measured using numerical metrics or softer indicators, or be purely qualitative in 
nature; and they can have positive or negative consequences for the region. The complex 
nature of achievements presents problems for research and evaluation, as some things are 
measureable and measured, whilst others are not. A comprehensive view needs to cover all 
aspects, but usable data are inevitably easier to obtain for the measured aspects, even if 
what is measured may not be the most useful indicators of desired changes. 
Typically, for each programme, a set of indicators is agreed between programme 
authorities and the Commission at the outset, against which the targets for each measure 
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can be monitored, and then recorded in annual and final implementation reports submitted 
by programme authorities to the European Commission. These indicators have been refined 
over the study period from being more-or-less absent in 1989-1993 through to being 
relatively sophisticated in 2007-2013 period. Outputs are indicators that relate to activities 
and which are used to monitor the immediate deliverables of projects.13 They could 
encompass a physical measure of the completeness of projects such as kilometres of 
completed road, or hectares of restored land; or the number of beneficiaries assisted, 
usually in the form of numbers of firms or individuals. In the case of support for firms or 
individuals, the indicator might differentiate between the form of support offered (scale of 
advice measured in value or days of consultancy) or according to the status of the 
beneficiary (unemployed individuals, women, people from particularly disadvantaged 
areas).  
A second level of reported achievements are results and impacts. During the programme 
periods covered in the research, managing authorities were advised by Commission 
guidance to define results as the (immediate) effects on the direct beneficiaries of the 
actions financed, while impacts were the longer term effects of interventions on the global 
or specific objectives of the programme. Impacts were typically reduced to a small set of 
indicators such as employment created, increase in SME activity, or a more thematically 
specific indicator such as numbers of new firms created. Whilst outputs may be the direct 
and sole result of an intervention – a project to build a road will result in km of road built – 
the impacts are more likely to be the consequence of a combination of ERDF intervention 
and other activities as an illustration, a new firm may be partly assisted by an ERDF 
project, but will also be the result of additional private investment and, possibly, nationally 
funded interventions as well.  
Despite the emphasis placed in programme reports on the development of quantitative 
measures of outputs, they only tell part of the story, even though ever more complex 
metrics have been developed to capture the diverse forms of interventions, such as advice 
to firms. Sensible output indicators for activities such as business support are difficult to 
identify – differentiating between advice given in a seminar or over the phone, and an 
intensive consulting engagement can be made by referring to the time or cost involved, but 
does not necessarily reflect the quality of the advice. Aggregation across a range of 
projects then becomes impossible. Instead, some achievements are best identified through 
qualitative targets and descriptions of services offered, although these tend to be related 
more to project case studies than programmes as a whole.  
The assessment of quantitative reported achievements by programme managers faced a 
number of difficulties which may have led to under or over reporting, including at times 
simple deception by projects, all of which feature in the case study reports.  
                                                 
13 European Commission, Directorate General XVI, Regional Policy and Cohesion (undated) The New 
Programming period 2000-2006: Methodological Working Papers. Working Paper 3, Indicators for 
Monitoring and Evaluation: An indicative methodology, available online from 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/working/doc/indic_en.pdf (accessed 12 
September 2013).  
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There is a tension between the number of discrete indicators and the specificity of outputs. 
The variety of outputs may require a long list of output indicators whereas simplicity of 
reporting may make fewer indicators desirable. Even for something as simple as road-
building, it may be desirable to differentiate between a dual freeway, normal main roads 
and local roads, as well as between new roads and upgraded roads. A large number of 
different indicators may be needed to capture the variety, and any simplification therefore 
reduces accuracy, and can be misleading or result in variance from initial targets. If the 
indicator is simply km of roads, then should a dual freeway count as twice the length? 
Programme managers usually depend on projects to provide data. Managers of projects may 
have limited information on some kinds of outputs, may find it difficult to attribute the 
outputs of projects to standard indicators, or may provide misleading information to 
programme managers. Aggregated data will thus be subject to the limitations of the 
project-level data. 
The process of aggregation also potentially introduces errors where double-counting occurs. 
There may be several projects aiming to provide advice to firms, each reporting the 
number of firms assisted. In some cases, this approaches the number of firms in the region 
as each incidence of advice is counted separately, even though the indicator might be the 
number of firms assisted. Recognising that there is multiple counting here, it is still 
impossible to know whether a large number of firms received some advice or a small 
number of firms each received many different interventions. Unless each project produces 
a list of beneficiary firms and these are reconciled, it is difficult to assess how many firms 
were assisted. It may not be in the interest of a project even to indicate the number of 
unique companies assisted. 
Results or impacts are even more difficult to assess by both project managers and 
programme managers. In some programmes, monitoring data included estimates of results, 
such as jobs housed in new business parks. However, such impacts may take time to unfold, 
and estimations made at the time of completion of the funding may seriously understate or 
overestimate the longer term effects. An innovation project may not deliver job creation 
until several years later when a product has become successful in the market, while a 
factory building will not house jobs until a tenant has been found, again perhaps only after 
one or two years. Monitoring data cannot capture these effects. They need to be appraised 
with ad hoc evaluation activities, although even then these are usually undertaken before 
longer term effects are realised, and are usually only based on a sample of projects. 
A particular problem with some very large infrastructure projects is that, as noted earlier, 
the duration of construction of the project is longer than a single programme period. When 
a project has to be broken down into several phases, there may be few direct achievements 
in the earlier phases. Roads, ports, railways etc. often take many years to complete with 
the full benefits only being seen when the project is complete (CSIL and DKM, 2012)14, 
although some benefits may be realised and measured on an interim basis. The Rion-Antiron 
                                                 
14 CSIL and DKM (2012) Ten Projects Observed: Ex Post Evaluation of Investment Projects Co-financed 
by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) or Cohesion Fund (CF) in the Period 1994-1999, 
Final Report, European Commission. 
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bridge in Dytiki Ellada, for example, involved preparatory studies in the 1989-1993 period 
with construction during both the 1994-1999 and 2000-2006 periods. Further, the different 
tranches through which such large infrastructure projects are realised may draw from 
different sources of funding, e.g. from domestic spending programmes. This makes it 
difficult to disentangle the specific contribution of the ERDF programmes. 
The estimation of actual results on a quantitative basis through evaluation is subject to all 
of the problems identified for the reported achievements, with the added difficulty that if 
not done contemporaneously there may be a loss of information linking the output with the 
impact. If done contemporaneously then the problems of assessing long term benefits 
occur.  
Consequently, in this study, the reported achievements were taken primarily from the final 
implementation reports or evaluation documents. This analysis concentrated on a 
programme-by-programme assessment against the output targets set for the programme. 
Whilst some qualitative reporting was available, this was anecdotal and tended to be at a 
project level whereas the analysis of reported achievements was undertaken at programme 
level. 
A separate analysis was undertaken on a thematic basis drawing on quantitative and 
qualitative reported information, evaluations, interviews with stakeholders and other 
available information. In some cases, for example, projects were subject to evaluations 
undertaken at a much later date than ERDF evaluations, which provided useful additional 
information on longer term impacts. This collection of information was necessarily partial 
and could not provide total results, but it was possible to identify instances of interventions 
which resulted in significant changes in a region.  
5.3 Reported achievements 
5.3.1 1989-1993 
In the 1989-1993 period, the requirements for reporting achievements were almost non-
existent, and in most of the 15 regions documentation was difficult to obtain. At this time, 
most regions focused on demonstrating that funding had been spent on the projects which 
had been agreed, and any indicators that were available related to either financial progress 
or physical output indicators such as kilometres of roads built. In some regions, lists of 
projects were produced (e.g. Campania), but in most cases there are no quantitative data 
available.  
In seven regions, detailed output indicators were available from final reports or 
evaluations. Typically these consisted of numbers of projects where they involved a 
building (sports facilities, for example, in Norte or modernised training facilities in Nord-
Pas-de-Calais), studies/plans, or SMEs assisted. The other main group of indicators related 
to the scale of output such as area of land reclaimed, km of roads, railways or 
water/sewerage networks, or hotel rooms. These indicators allow some comparison 
between output achievements and original targets (when there are targets), although given 
that regions were unused to such programming, the variation between targets and outputs 
may be due to unrealistic targets rather than poor delivery. As an illustration, Nord-Pas-de-
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Calais only achieved 115,800 m2 of premises built or rehabilitated against a target of 
250,000 m2, but it may be that the target was set using typical costs for lower grade 
buildings than were built, or that funds were directed to different types of project. 
In the Objective 1 regions, the major achievement indicators related to networks, for 
example, 639 km of improved roads and 1,264 km of water and sewerage networks in 
Norte, and 118 km of water pipes and 80 km of sewerage networks and some 134 km of 
roads constructed or improved in the Algarve. 
In Dytiki Ellada, there were some indications of impact: the population served by water 
supply projects reached 42 per cent, and service by wastewater treatment increased from 
three to 30 per cent; 1,162 jobs were reported as being created, of which 245 were 
permanent jobs rather than temporary construction jobs. Ireland provided more detailed 
achievement indicators with, for example, 20,000 net new jobs per year during the period 
in manufacturing and traded services, and 11,474 net new jobs over four years. These 
figures however relate to all supported firms, and not all benefited from ERDF supported 
initiatives; they indicate that manufacturing in particular only maintained employment 
compared with a decline in previous years – the net new jobs were mainly in services. 
Ireland also saw strong annual output growth of six per cent and a 75 per cent increase in 
SME exports by the mid-1990s, but this was also driven by macroeconomic policies and 
other interventions, as well as ERDF expenditure. Tourism grew substantially with a 33 per 
cent increase in visitors and 20,000 net new FTE jobs over the period, with at least a 
substantial proportion of this being due to the investment in new visitor attractions, tourist 
waterways and marinas, golf courses etc. 
The most detailed results are available for the German regions. In Nordrhein-Westfalen, an 
interim evaluation by the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung reported a total of 17,000 jobs created or 
safeguarded directly with a further 7,000 ‘likely to be created’. Specific outputs included 
116 ha of re-utilised wasteland, 17,200 m2 of reused buildings and 13 new technology 
incubator centres. In Sachsen-Anhalt, over a shorter period (1991-93), aid for business led 
to a reported 36,321 jobs created or maintained, although much of the support was judged 
to be subsidies for on-going businesses. 
5.3.2 1994-1999 
The 1994-1999 period saw more detailed development of indicators and targets, both of 
outputs and results. However, this was not done systematically across all regions. The new 
entrant regions of Burgenland and Itä-Suomi established only a very limited set of targets, 
and experienced difficulties in assessing achievements. Some of the other regions also had 
estimation problems. Nordrhein-Westfalen, for example, only completed the development 
of its monitoring system in 1996, and Aquitaine reported problems of lack of 
standardisation and an emphasis on output indicators. These difficulties can be illustrated 
by some examples. 
 In Burgenland, hardly any targets were set initially, and only later was an 
employment target of 7,300 new jobs set, revised to include safeguarded jobs. The 
actual reported result of 2,216 new jobs was a gross value, whilst the 5,887 
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safeguarded jobs included the total number of people employed by supported 
firms. Clearly, many of the jobs reported as safeguarded would have been 
unaffected by the intervention, and a proportion of the new jobs would have been 
offset by displacement losses elsewhere.  
 In Itä-Suomi, new and safeguarded jobs were poorly defined, with the Objective 6 
programme declaring 21,000 new jobs and 62,000 safeguarded jobs against a 
combined target of just over 29,000. An ex post evaluation suggested that a true 
figure might be 10-20 per cent of the reported figure. The Objective 5b programme 
also reported 102,000 jobs created or safeguarded compared with a target of 
22,000, implausibly high figures of around a third of total employment in the 
region. In both cases, the estimates seem to have interpreted numbers of jobs 
safeguarded very liberally, and to have included employment growth that would 
have taken place without assistance.  
 In the case of North East England, Objective 2 programmes ran for two periods of 
three years each (1994-96 and 1997-99), and the two programmes had separate 
reporting of achievements. This led to some difficulties in meeting targets, 
especially for results indicators such as jobs or GDP, as projects had less time 
before reporting to meet employment targets, for example. This was especially 
problematic for office and factory provision; the short programme period meant 
that it was difficult to complete construction within the three-year period, meaning 
they missed their targets for jobs housed, and thus making it likely that projects 
were underestimated compared to if the region had had a single six year 
programme. 
Overall, regions reported a wide range of outputs. In Campania, for instance, the ex-post 
evaluation of the 1994-99 CSF provides an estimate of the regional-specific outputs of 
support in terms of new road stock, rail tracks and dual tracks, fibre optic, water 
purification plants, firms assisted, provision of tourist accommodation (ISMERI, 2002: 160-
165). This makes comparison difficult, but there was some standardisation of results, 
notably around gross jobs created or safeguarded (the latter often being ill-defined). Table 
10, below, shows the reported employment effects of the programmes, although noting 
that for some regions this is restricted to the regional programme only and excludes the 
employment effects of national programmes in the regions.15 The table also illustrates the 
continued variability even of this indicator, with differences between net and gross jobs 
being reported, temporary and permanent jobs, jobs in construction, and also lack of 
clarity sometimes between new and safeguarded jobs. The reliability of the data is highly 
variable, especially for safeguarded jobs which were often just the numbers of existing jobs 
in assisted firms, regardless of whether the assistance was instrumental in keeping the 
business going. Those programmes with an emphasis on support for firms (such as Sachsen-
Anhalt, Itä-Suomi, Nord-Pas-de-Calais or North East England) tended to report much 
higher levels of jobs created (or safeguarded). Programmes with a greater emphasis on 
                                                 
15 The tables on employment creation are provided for illustrative purposes: they represent only the 
raw numbers, and not the significance of the impact (relative to the size of the regional workforce for 
example). 
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infrastructure sometimes reported relatively low levels of new jobs, although temporary 
jobs in construction may be considerable. 
In some of the regions (Andalucía, Galicia, Dytiki Ellada, Basilicata, Algarve) estimates of 
jobs created are limited to the regional programmes only, or to specific measures (Norte). 
In these cases, the numbers are relatively small as many more jobs may be created through 
national infrastructure programmes or business support programmes that cover the region. 
It therefore makes it impossible to compare these figures with total regional employment 
or expenditure, as the missing data would make the comparison meaningless, even if the 
estimations had been made using comparable methodologies. 
Table 10: Reported jobs created or safeguarded for 1994-1999  
Region Jobs created or safeguarded 1994-1999 
Sachsen-Anhalt 28,348 jobs created, 55,217 jobs safeguarded 
Dytiki Ellada 5,881 temporary jobs, 718 new jobs (ROP only) 
Campania  17,646 temporary jobs, 9629 permanent new jobs 
Norte 5,860 new jobs from firm incentives 
Andalucía  7,780 new jobs created in industry and services, 11,739 retained. (ROP only) 
Galicia 26,684 jobs created of which 16,754 in infrastructure and 9.930 in 
industry/services (ROP only) 
  
Burgenland 2,216 net jobs created, 5,887 net jobs safeguarded 
Itä-Suomi 21,000 new jobs and 62,000 safeguarded jobs via Objective 6 and 102,000 
jobs created or safeguarded under Objective 5b 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 11,847 gross new jobs, 4,508 indirect gross new jobs, 8,422 safeguarded jobs 
Ireland c.33,000 net new jobs 
Basilicata 2,329 new jobs in SMEs (ROP only) 
Algarve 319 permanent new jobs and 2810 temporary jobs (ROP only) 
  
Aquitaine 14,560 new jobs, 21,695 safeguarded jobs 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 12,400 new jobs, 13,600 safeguarded jobs 
North-East England 14,633 jobs created and 7,355 safeguarded in 1994-6: 25,395 gross additional 
jobs, of which 13,267 net additional jobs and 7,116 jobs safeguarded in 1997-
99. 
Source: Case study reports. 
 
5.3.3 2000-2006 
The 2000-2006 programmes saw further efforts to enhance monitoring processes, and more 
specific output and results indicators, but output indicators were still diverse and were 
sometimes too numerous to be accurately tracked (e.g. the Sachsen-Anhalt and Campania 
ROPs had respectively c. 780 and 350 indicators), and results were problematic. As with the 
previous programmes, jobs created was the most common results indicator, but with 
continuing variation in how this was reported (see Table 11 below). 
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With larger budgets in many cases, and a greater emphasis on support for firms also, the 
jobs created estimates tend to be much higher than the previous period, although doubts 
remain about their accuracy. The figure of 317,000 jobs safeguarded in Andalucía appears 
to be a generous estimate, although it should be noted that some 780,000 jobs were 
created in the region between 2000 and 2006, according to Eurostat data, taking total 
employment to 3.1 million. 
The 2000-2006 programmes were much more oriented to the Lisbon agenda, and hence they 
had a greater focus on enterprise and innovation, reflected in targets for outputs and 
results, although in some regions there were difficulties in meeting these targets. In 
Burgenland, for example, a manifestly overly ambitious target of 700 technology business 
start-ups saw just 33 being realised. In Andalucía, assistance for people to be involved in 
R&D transfer saw just 196 assisted against a target of 4,420. This epitomises the danger of 
early setting of quantitative targets, especially where the region lacks the expertise to 
deliver such projects. In the case of innovation and enterprise, most regions seem to have 
been seduced by the success stories of regions with strong innovation systems, and 
proposed ambitious targets as a result. 
Table 11: Reported jobs created or safeguarded for 2000-2006 
Region Jobs created or safeguarded 2000-2006 
Sachsen-Anhalt 20,950 jobs created and 56,733 jobs safeguarded 
Dytiki Ellada 2,310 permanent new jobs in enterprises and 14,824 temporary jobs in 
construction 
Campania  12,542 new or maintained jobs through ROP support measures to firms + 664 
new jobs in tourist firms + 486 new or maintained jobs deriving from 
integrated projects in parks (ROP only) 
Norte 3,108 jobs created (ROP only) 
Andalucía  49,797 jobs created and 316,757 retained, plus 140,580 jobs in infrastructure 
construction (ROP only) 
Galicia 78,880 total jobs created, 67,754 in infrastructure and 11,126 in industry and 
services. (ROP only) 
 
 
Burgenland 3,008 net new jobs 
Itä-Suomi 30,789 jobs created and 45,025 jobs safeguarded 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 27,661 temporary jobs in projects, between 33,000 and 43,000 direct and 
indirect jobs created 
Ireland No estimate provided 
Basilicata* No estimate provided 
Algarve 14,000 new jobs 
  
Aquitaine 12,470 net new jobs 
Nordrhein- 
Westfalen 
14,100 new and 14,800 retained jobs from direct funding plus 17,000 new and 
45,000 safeguarded jobs through business advice. 
North-East 
England* 
48,000 gross jobs created and 56,000 safeguarded, with estimated 35,000 net 
new jobs 
Source: Case study reports. 
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5.3.4 2007-2013 
In the 2007-2013 period, data are very limited due to delays in the commencement of many 
programmes, the lags in the production of annual implementation reports and the effects of 
the reorientation of programmes to fit new challenges and situations. In some regions, 
austerity measures have slowed implementation due to a lack of matched funding, making 
overall comparative analysis of achievements difficult at this stage. In several regions, 
annual implementation reports reveal slow progress on key indicators, especially indicators 
relating to results, such as job creation. Inevitably, too, the depth of the recession will 
have had a negative effect. 
Although there have been modest improvements in the implementation of output target 
indicators and greater attention paid to economic results, there are still problems in 
monitoring the achievements of ERDF programmes. In some regions, such as Andalucía and 
Galicia,  new information systems have been introduced but with delays in their 
operationalisation. Some regions have been reducing the number of indicators. Itä-Suomi 
for example both reduced the number of indicators and defined them more precisely, 
removing the indicator for ‘renewed jobs’ and refining the definitions of the remaining 
employment figures. Sachsen-Anhalt reduced the number of indicators from 776 to 300 but 
further consolidation is needed. Yet, concerns remain about the qualitative aspects of 
these indicators – output indicators for buildings give consistently defined costs per unit of 
floorspace, but do not indicate the heterogeneity of projects. Problems also remain with 
measuring outputs relating to advice to SMEs. Streamlined indicator systems allow for 
easier aggregation and management of programmes, but are not necessarily any more 
helpful for evaluators seeking to judge the effectiveness of programmes. Problems of 
aggregation, additionality and duplication of measurement remain. At the level of results, 
all regions seem to have difficulties, especially as the main effects are likely to take place 
beyond the end of the programme. 
5.4 Thematic evaluation of achievements 
The reported achievements are limited in nature and concentrate on monitoring data 
relating to outputs. To arrive at a better understanding of the longer term achievement of 
the programmes, a thematic approach was taken which focused on the eight themes 
identified earlier in the study. In each region, the outputs of activity related to each theme 
were reviewed alongside additional evaluative information and interviews with 
beneficiaries, programme managers and other stakeholders. The aim was to understand the 
detailed nature of interventions within each theme, how they related to objectives and 
needs, what the underlying theories that led to intervention choices were, and what 
changes happened as a consequence. The resulting analysis is highly specific to each region, 
but the following section summarises the approaches and draws out general points about 
the types of effects realised. 
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5.4.1 Innovation 
ERDF investment in innovation has been growing in significance over the 4-5 programme 
periods from being a very minor priority in 1989-1993 to one of the largest spending themes 
in some regions in 2007-2013. Achievements in this area have increased dramatically over 
time, as well as often shifting in emphasis as regions have gained experience of 
intervention in support of RTD and innovation, and developed more sophisticated 
approaches to regional innovation systems. 
Several alternative paths can be identified, and these are reflected in the varied nature of 
the achievements. In some of the Objective 1/Convergence regions (e.g. Algarve, 
Andalucía, Galicia, Norte), the initial focus was on building up public research capacity, 
mainly in universities, with a gradual broadening out of the agenda to encompass business 
R&D, innovation support and science parks. In Basilicata, which exited Objective 1 status in 
2007, there was specific support for two research laboratories. Campania had a strategy to 
increase R&D supported by both national and regional programmes, which supported the 
construction or improvement of university buildings and equipment (during the study 
period, the Second University of Naples and the University of Sannio were created, and 
other universities improved their premises), and the establishment and growth of public 
and private research centres. Some of these centres have been able to survive on the basis 
of private funding despite the reduction of research funds within Italy. Elsewhere, the 
initial focus was on accommodation for innovative business with a shift to include 
investments in research and innovation networks. Some of the former Objective 2 regions 
began with a focus on support for innovation in SMEs, as they were already reasonably well 
endowed with innovation centres and universities, but emerging sectoral strategies have 
involved new technology centres, investment in research and new kinds of science parks.  
A number of the case study regions focused on stimulating R&D growth, especially after 
2000, to meet Lisbon and Barcelona targets. Often, this was led by investment in the public 
sector, and especially universities, which could most easily absorb the investment. Norte is 
a typical case of a Convergence region where RTD investment was minimal up to 2000, but 
since then substantial investment has been directed to local universities for research 
facilities and project funding. Some of this investment has provided the core competences 
of a health sector cluster in the region and underpins the award-winning Porto University 
Science and Technological Park. Andalucía also promoted public research through much of 
this period, and especially since 2000, with 2,109 research groups (mainly in universities) 
employing 18,583 researchers benefitting from support during 2000-2006 (although there 
may be some double-counting here).  
Such approaches have undoubtedly been beneficial in boosting the overall level of research 
in some of the regions, although the degree of sustainability varies. Ireland used ERDF to 
build up research institutes to underpin key sectors of the economy and modernised the 
universities as a core element of a knowledge-based economic development strategy. In 
Portugal and Spain, the considerable funding that went into research projects in 
universities lacked such a strategic vision, and the long term benefits are more elusive. A 
lack of prioritisation, with funding being distributed widely across large numbers of 
research groups, also seems to have been less effective in translation into economic 
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development. Nevertheless, a result of this investment across all Spanish regions has been a 
doubling of Spanish contributions to global scientific publications, from 1.28 per cent in 
1990 to 2.63 per cent in 2004, with Andalucía slightly increasing its share from 13.1 to 14.4 
per cent of the increased level of Spanish publications. 
In the private sector, firms have been supported through technology transfer offices in the 
universities and a smaller number of private sector projects, but the achievements have 
been uneven. A notable success is the Technology Park of Andalucía which now houses 
14,599 employees in 562 companies and organisations. This park itself is claimed to be 
worth 6-8 per cent of GDP in the Malaga province. It is not clear, though, how many of 
these firms are genuinely high technology, or have emerged as a consequence of the 
intervention, as such parks tend to attract existing local firms and have a high level of 
deadweight. But, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, despite investments in new research centres in the 
1990s and technology advice to enterprises, the effects on regional R&D levels and 
patents16 were limited, and the region’s RTD strengths remained primarily public sector 
focused. However, since 2007 there has been a new emphasis on innovation with a new 
platform for innovation focused on growth in private sector R&D.  
Overall, Ireland has perhaps been most successful here, with R&D as a share of GNP 
reaching 2.21 per cent in 2010, a massive increase from the 1980s when it was below one 
per cent, with some of the improvement having been facilitated by ERDF investments. This 
has involved both expansion in the public sector and, especially, growth in the tertiary 
education sector to exceed the EU average, as well as growth in the private sector. Whilst 
multinational firms still account for most R&D expenditure, there has also been significant 
growth in research performed by indigenous SMEs, and high levels of R&D have been 
maintained during the recession. Some regions, though, have struggled to achieve any real 
improvement in the innovation activities of firms. Dytiki Ellada, for example, still had a 
level of business expenditure on R&D (BERD) of only 0.1 per cent of GDP during the 2000-08 
period, reflecting a failure to translate public R&D investment into private sector 
innovation. 
In the Objective 2/RCE regions the approach to innovation has been orientated much more 
towards businesses. For example, Nordrhein-Westfalen initially focused on technology 
centres and technology transfer, then moved on to a cluster or competence network 
development process. Some of the initial technology centres were quite successful, 
illustrated by the growth of micro and nanotechnology in Nordrhein-Westfalen from 925 
employees in 1999 to 2,274 in 2008. The cluster-type initiatives have also had a varied 
success rate as the time needed for the maturity of these policies is quite extended.  There 
has been criticism that some strategies are insufficiently focused and do not build on 
existing strengths – criticisms addressed in part by the proposals for smart specialisation 
from 2014 onwards.  
                                                 
16 Programme achievements in relation to number of patents registered is discussed for all 15 regions 
in more detail in Section 7.3.2. 
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In North East England, the initial emphasis was on innovation support and advice for SMEs, 
with a particularly successful collaborative scheme to connect SMEs with experts across the 
region’s five universities. With just over €4m of ERDF support over three programmes, the 
programme generated around €40 million by value of private sector spending on 
consultancy in the universities. After 2000, the region refocused its innovation support 
around a small number of key research and commercialisation institutes. The most 
successful of these were linked to renewable energy and process industries and are now 
national centres of excellence, sustained by national funds and private sector contracts. 
5.4.2 Enterprise 
Enterprise is another theme which has become central to regional strategies and 
programmes over the study period and has also become more sophisticated in the forms of 
intervention. At the core of most regional programmes has been a desire to increase the 
number of SMEs through support for entrepreneurship or to stimulate growth in existing 
SMEs through support for competitiveness. In a few cases In Sachsen-Anhalt, and in the 
Algarve, Norte, Andalucía and Galicia, support for enterprise also encompassed larger 
firms, but in other regions this was usually undertaken more indirectly through support for 
structural and sectoral change or through infrastructure etc. 
Although the case studies report notable achievements in support for SMEs, they also raise 
doubts about the true additionality of the results, as the following examples indicate. 
 There was major expenditure in Itä-Suomi aimed at raising productivity, expanding 
capacity or improving quality, but evaluations have questioned the additionality, as 
many projects would have gone ahead without support. 
 In the 1990s Galicia also provided subsidies for loans to SMEs to support capital 
investment, with a €194.5m fund inducing €1.6bn investment and creating a 
reported 9,789 jobs, but the main sectors supported included retail as well as food 
and fishing, again raising questions about deadweight.  
In some regions, results were slow to emerge. Both North East England and Nord-Pas-de-
Calais sought to increase the number of SMEs through support for entrepreneurship over the 
whole period, with limited success initially but improved results after 2000. Thus, the rate 
of start-ups in Nord-Pas-de-Calais exceeded the national rate, even though the density of 
entrepreneurs remained below national levels. In North East England, a more 
comprehensive enterprise support system led to increased formation rates after 2000, 
though still below national levels. Efforts to provide venture capital in the 1997-99 
programme set the foundations for bigger schemes in 2000-2006 and for a large Jeremie 
fund in 2007. Initial results for this shows 850 firms supported and over 5,000 jobs created 
by 2011. 
Some common approaches appeared to bear fruit. Most regions developed some form of 
incubators to support new business starts. In Galicia, incubators established since 2000 had 
generated 880 new companies employing 2,987 people or 0.3 per cent of all jobs. A 
regional incubator in Aquitaine, having received €1.5m from two programmes, had created 
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117 firms, of which 50 had survived, and creating 400 employees. North East England has 
seen several successful incubators – Silicon Alley in Newcastle creating 150 firms, 
Sunderland BIC creating 530 companies and 3,823 jobs and Digital City on Teesside creating 
132 new firms since 2008. Galicia supported management skills with the PIMEGA 
programme making an investment of €23.4m in training 4,056 entrepreneurs and supported 
1,226 companies in developing an improvement plan.  
The effects of business advice have often been difficult to assess as the causal link between 
the advice offered to the firm and changes made by the firm can be intangible. Some initial 
business advice schemes worked on the basis of maximising the number of firms assisted, 
with the level of bespoke advice and support for each firm being limited, and often best 
characterised as awareness-raising. However, the link from such advice to increased GDP or 
employment is tenuous, and it is hard to show how much firms made use of such advice. In 
many cases the advice simply has no effect; in others, there may be deadweight as 
assistance is given to firms that would have grown in any case. More intensive consultancy 
offers better chances of both stimulating change in the business as well as being able to 
measure the effects. 
Overall, regions have tended to support enterprise projects, rather than aiming to foster a 
holistic policy environment to achieve their objectives for enterprise – whether to increase 
levels of entrepreneurship from relatively low levels, improve survival rates, or improve 
quality and productivity of SMEs. North East England is one exception in that, since 2000, 
there was a more systematic attempt to create a more supportive regional system for 
entrepreneurship through a coordinated set of initiatives, steered by a regional strategy 
which the ERDF complemented. This started to have an effect in terms of an increasing 
firm birth rate during the 2000s but that has fallen back subsequently. 
5.4.3 Structural change 
All 15 regions had identified a need for the transformation of their industrial base as a 
central element of their strategies and hence considerable activity and achievements are 
concentrated under this thematic heading. This theme also overlaps and complements the 
innovation and enterprise themes, with evidence of common strategies, as well as support 
for related infrastructure and labour market initiatives. 
Structural adjustment strategies can be broadly divided between firm-based and sectoral or 
cluster-based approaches. Under firm-based approaches is support for specific firms or 
types of firms, such as restructuring grants or foreign direct investment assistance. A 
striking example of this approach was in Sachsen-Anhalt which devoted the bulk of its ERDF 
funding to direct support for restructuring of enterprises such as privatised or newly 
established private units. Over the whole period, €16.9 billion was spent on enterprise and 
structural adjustment.  
Cluster-based approaches tend to encompass a broad range of policies to promote cluster 
growth including aid to individual firms, dedicated infrastructure and support and advice 
aimed at the wider cluster. In some cases these were not identified as clusters strategies 
per se, however programmes were oriented towards a particular cluster which received a 
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combination of support. In one form or another, they were adopted by nearly all regions 
covering a mix of traditional sectors, new technology or knowledge-based sectors and 
services such as tourism. Support for traditional sectors may have helped to slow decline 
but usually did not produce employment growth, and in some cases traditional sectors saw 
significant job losses despite assistance. For example, incentive programmes for the 
traditional sectors in Norte had an initially positive effect on the footwear industry, which 
saw growth to 2000, but all the target sectors declined after 2000 – textiles losing 28 
percent of employment from 2000 to 2007, clothing losing 20 percent by 2007, footwear 
losing 35.2 percent to 2011, and furniture losing 17 percent between 1998 and 2005. These 
results may suggest that an alternative strategy could have produced better outcomes, 
although in a region dominated by traditional sectors, there may not have been alternatives 
capable of absorbing the funds and generating more jobs than those being lost in the 
declining sectors. 
Tourism was one of the most popular supported sectors, with all but one of the 15 regions 
identifying it as a priority. In most regions, support was focused on visitor attractions 
(sometimes in the private sector) or marketing, but in a few regions there was direct 
subsidy for hotel operators: Burgenland, for example, saw the construction of spa and 
leisure facilities with associated hotels; Campania supported hotel renovation or extensions 
with its ROPs, and Galicia placed considerable emphasis on the conversion of rural 
properties for tourist accommodation and spas with around 4,000 additional rooms 
available. Basilicata focused on the conservation of its natural and cultural heritage and 
then on the development of the tourism supply chains and marketing activities, as well as 
investing in improved accommodation. ERDF support for some forms of basic service 
infrastructure associated with tourism complemented some domestic policy initiatives, such 
as the restoration of the Sassi di Matera in Basilicata’s second city, although regional actors 
were critical of inadequate investment in external transport links. 
Table 12 below illustrates the main cluster initiatives pursued by the regions with 
indications of where they were successful. It also identifies cases where regions pursued 
support for particular clusters albeit without being named as a specific cluster strategy. 
Other major visitor attractions supported included some internationally iconic sites such as 
Ancient Olympia in Dytiki Ellada, and Pompeii-Herculaneum in Campania, as well as many 
new and local attractions, implemented with a view of expanding the tourist season and 
the tourist market to more local visitors. In North East England, whilst the Sage music 
centre and Baltic contemporary art gallery have attracted international acclaim, it has 
been the clustering of tourist and cultural facilities in Newcastle that has had most impact 
in enhancing the city’s position for city-break holidays, but also enhancing the wider 
reputation of the city and achieving a cultural renaissance. Tourism was also encouraged 
through the regeneration of historic towns and cities. 
The effect on the growth in tourism was varied. In Burgenland the number of overnight 
stays grew by almost 40 per cent from 1995 (compared to a national figure of under 10 
percent), and the targeted thermal regions saw over 120 per cent growth. A reported 1,337 
new jobs were created, although a significant number of these were filled by foreign 
workers due to a shortage of local skills. Aquitaine saw a relative decline in tourism 
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activity initially, with some modest growth later, although it seems that tourism investment 
has had little impact. Basilicata reported an increase of tourists to the region to 425,000 
compared to a planned 293,000. However, not all efforts were successful; in Galicia, 
despite the massive increase in rural tourist capacity, demand remained weak and room 
occupancy in 2010 was only 16 percent. 
The Algarve was the region most dominated by the tourism industry, and the ERDF 
programmes reinforced that domination with considerable short term success. The region’s 
GDP grew to the point that it moved out of the Convergence category, overtaking all 
Portuguese regions except Lisbon. The region’s strategy delivered a combined approach 
across almost all themes of support. Transport infrastructure helped access to the region 
for tourists and movement between resorts, environmental investment improved basic 
facilities but also supported eco-tourism, enterprise support assisted new hotels, and social 
investment included the upgrading of hospitals which created a safety net for tourists, as 
well as meeting the needs of local people.  
The story on tourism is not clear cut though. In some regions and for some niche markets, 
the ERDF investment helped to develop new tourism and stimulated growth which may not 
otherwise have taken place. Selected transport investment would certainly have been 
needed to cope with greater numbers – enlarged airports, new port facilities for cruise 
ships, for example. Improved internal mobility within regions also helped spread the 
benefits of tourism into rural areas which had been previously poorly accessible. However, 
this all took place against the background of rapidly growing tourism industries, driven by 
general economic growth, low-cost airlines, and easier booking of accommodation via the 
internet. How much of the growth was purely down to the effects of ERDF is impossible to 
disentangle as the effects were cumulative across all of these drivers. It is however likely 
that many of these regions would have found it difficult to accommodate growth without 
the assistance of the ERDF, and that growth would have been likely to be more 
concentrated in existing tourism hotspots and, probably with a more negative 
environmental impact. 
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Table 12: Cluster policy approaches in the 15 regions 
Region Cluster approaches Key clusters supported Areas of success 
Algarve Tourism was the 
main focus of the 
regional programme 
and the region did 
not participate in 
national cluster 
initiatives 
A focus on the tourism cluster ran 
across most thematic axes, but 
there was an additional small 
effort on the maritime cluster. 
The region’s rapid growth has been 
driven by tourism, but whilst 
increasing the region’s GDP this has 
also made the region dangerously 
dependent on this cluster. There has 
been little growth in the maritime 
cluster yet. 
Andalucía  Some priority 
sectors 
Food, electronics, ICT, and 
tourism 
Failure to build a sustainable 
manufacturing sector, but some 
success in tourism diversification 
Aquitaine Weak cluster policy Metals, agri-food, electrical 
engineering, paper and 
publishing, lasers, tourism 
Particular success in lasers with 8500 
jobs partly attributed to ERDF 
Basilicata Tourism focus only Tourism Doubling of number of visitors 
Burgenland Yes ICT; Electronics & control 
systems; Materials; Logistics; Bio-
tech; Energy & environmental 
technologies; Optoelectronics; 
Creative enterprise; Tourism 
Absence of critical mass so regarded 
as unsuccessful. Tourism was 
exception although not  an 
‘industrial cluster’ but a separate 
programme 
Campania  Clusters pursued 
under enterprise 
and innovation 
measures 
Industrial/handicraft clusters 
(shoe, jewellery, leather, food 
industry and technology, textile 
and silk); tourism; biotechnology, 
transport systems, aerospace 
Aerospace and biotechnology sectors 
particularly successful. 
Dytiki Ellada Tourism only Tourism Significant growth in visitors (31%) 
and tourism GVA (83.5%) 
Galicia No general cluster 
approach 
Tourism supported as a priority 
sector 
Significant growth in visitors with 
diversification away from the coast, 
although under-occupancy of rural 
hotels remains a problem. 
Ireland Selected sectors or 
clusters were 
targeted 
Target sectors included ICT, life 
sciences, food and tourism (which 
had its own OP) 
Tourism grew dramatically, 
especially in Dublin. Many national 
flagship projects were ERDF funded. 
Itä-Suomi Yes key clusters 
policy in 2000-2006 
Targets for enterprise 
development included forestry, 
materials, tourism, measurement, 
energy, environment, welfare and 
pharmaceuticals 
No data 
Nord-Pas-de-
Calais 
Yes Health; ICT; technical textiles; 
transport, car manufacturing, 
tourism and culture, food 
processing 
Some success in the car industry, 
transport and logistics, and since 
2000 in ICTs 
Nordrhein-
Westfalen 
Focus on clusters 
from 2000 
New service sectors, knowledge 
economy, tourism creative 
industries 
Some success in regional 
diversification into tourism, creative 
industries and ICT. 
Evaluation of the main achievements of Cohesion policy programmes and projects over the longer term 
in 15 selected regions: Final Report 
EPRC 65 LSE 
 
Table 13: Cluster policy approaches in the 15 regions (continued) 
Region Cluster approaches Key clusters supported Areas of success 
Norte Weak cluster 
policies mainly 
targeted on 
traditional sectors 
Textiles, footwear, tourism, 
engineering, maritime, 
health/biotech. 
Some success with footwear and 
engineering. 
North-East 
England 
Cluster initiatives in 
late 1990s and 
revised focus from 
2000 
Many clusters in 1990s, but post-
2000 focus on health, energy, 
process industries and ICT. 
Tourism runs through whole 
period. 
Some growth in tourism. Growth in 
ICT and renewable energy in 2000s. 
Sachsen-
Anhalt 
Focus both on 
traditional and new 
industries 
Chemicals, food, mechanical 
engineering, automotive sector, 
renewable energy and on 
recycling 
Some success with re-
industrialisation in the industries 
mentioned, though the  photovoltaic 
industries have recently lost 
enterprises and employees 
 
5.4.4 Infrastructure 
Infrastructure investment has also varied in form and scale across the 15 regions with a 
strong orientation – and large allocations of resources - towards major transport networks, 
water and basic and environmental infrastructure (e.g. sewage, depurators) and energy in 
the Convergence and Phasing–in/out regions and a greater emphasis on industrial sites and 
smaller scale transport projects in the RCE regions. This section deals mainly with transport 
and broadband infrastructure, whilst water and other environmental infrastructure is 
discussed under the environmental theme below. 
The consequences for achievements are clear. In some regions, the main achievements of 
whole programmes are focused on kilometres of roads, rail networks and other such major 
infrastructures, whereas elsewhere the main achievement is in the construction of 
industrial accommodation with targets for the numbers of jobs housed. 
All regions tended to focus on infrastructure in the 1989-1993 period, but there is limited 
published information on the achievements, although some regions provided some simple 
output data such as length of roads constructed. The large infrastructure investments in 
Convergence regions have been transformational, developing new highway networks, 
improving large proportions of existing road networks, building new high speed rail lines or 
enhancing metro systems, new water crossings and massive improvements in key airports 
and ports. They have also been central to the intervention logics of successive programmes, 
leading to fundamental improvements in facilities. The consequence of successive 
programmes with large infrastructure components has been a cumulative improvement of 
transport networks beyond that of isolated projects, enabling links across modes – providing 
improved road and rail links into expanded ports, for example.  
Yet there have also been failings, associated notably with the fact that large additional 
investments in capital infrastructure create significant increases in operational costs which 
may not be budgeted for, and such costs are excluded from the ERDF. In cases where 
quality was perhaps sacrificed to complete projects within a programme period, remedial 
work was subsequently needed. In Andalucía parts of the road network had to be rebuilt, 
having been built quickly over difficult terrain. A rebuilt section of the A92 motorway was 
repaired, then reconstructed, and then needed further repair following landslides. At 
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worst, some new infrastructure was left unused because of high operational costs – a 
problem with some wastewater purification plants (again, in Andalucía). These issues were 
less prevalent in the Objective 2/RCE regions, although some environmental or public realm 
improvements from the earlier periods have become neglected. 
As illustrations of these chequered results, Campania saw dramatic improvements in public 
rail networks with the completion of the regional integrated network including the Naples 
underground, local surface lines, and the connection to the high-speed rail network from 
Rome to Salerno. Journey times to Rome been cut by 38 percent to 65 minutes, and local 
commuting has also become much easier, thereby increasing access to employment. Most of 
the 139 million passengers per year using the metro network are due to the new facilities 
built with ERDF support. The consequences for local mobility have been huge - but they are 
difficult to quantify, despite anecdotal evidence. However, as in Andalucía, budget cuts 
have hit maintenance and operating costs in Campania which has led to reductions in use of 
regional and local (metropolitan) railway lines as services have been cut. 
A few regions made investments in ICT networks – Basilicata increased connection to ADSL 
networks to 85 per cent of households compared with a planned level of 49 per cent, and 
supported increased connection by public services. Campania also saw investments in 
broadband to bring coverage close to 100 per cent through a mix of ADSL and 3G. 
The regional benefits of these investments are varied according to the objectives: some 
were aimed at facilitating greater trade, some facilitating tourist visitors, some helping to 
better connect up communities within regions, some to improve quality of life.  
In terms of trade, some of the road investments in Norte and Galicia (for example) were 
intended to facilitate the flow of goods through Spain to major markets, although evidence 
of this was lacking. However, port investments had led to increases in freight movements. 
For instance, there was an increase in total freight in the Port of Leixões in Norte by 14 
percent between 2004 and 2008, and a 30 percent increase in containerised freight. In 
Andalucía, the traffic in containers grew from 1.4 million tonnes in 2000 to 2.3 million 
tonnes in 2009. Similarly, airport investments saw large growth in passenger numbers in the 
cases of, for example, Faro in Algarve where the number of passengers doubled. In 
Andalucía major investments were made in Málaga airport where passenger numbers 
increased from 6 million in 1995 to 13.6 million passengers in 2007, dropping back to 11.6 
million in 2009 and rising again in 2011 to 12.8 million. However, in this latter case it has to 
be questioned why the airport was enlarged to a total capacity of 30 million passengers per 
year, in excess  of the likely demand  over the subsequent decade. Port developments have 
also helped facilitate greater cruise traffic, with numbers up in Porto in 2012 by 81 percent 
in the first year of the operation of a new cruise terminal. In Dytiki Ellada, the new port of 
Katacolo is now taking 350,000 cruise passengers a year, mostly stopping off to visit Ancient 
Olympia (a site also supported by ERDF investment). 
The wider investment in new and improved roads, especially within regions, can be better 
seen in reduced travel times, which have facilitated easier access from rural and suburban 
locations to employment opportunities in urban areas, better access to hospitals and other 
public services, and encouraged tourists to spread out from traditional resorts to more rural 
areas. There is however a question as to whether improved travel times between regions is 
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always beneficial as shorter travel times can mean the peripheral area is more easily served 
from a core region. Regions had generally not undertaken this form of detailed impact 
assessment and improved travel infrastructure was regarded as generally positive. Certainly 
though, the benefits of new metro/local integrated transport systems in Porto and Naples 
were clear, simply in terms of the numbers of users which represents fewer road journeys 
coupled with increased mobility within the city and shorter commutes. Improved safety was 
also acknowledged in several regions, with reduced numbers of accidents on railways and 
roads in Portugal as a result of the replacement of level crossings by bridges. In Naples a 
reduction of CO2 emissions was also reported. 
Table 14: Infrastructure support in the 15 regions 
Region Importance (% 
of programme 
expenditure) 
Key examples of infrastructure projects 
Algarve 21% overall 
but varying 
from 47% to 
15% 
A22 East-West motorway and Guadiana bridge into Andalucía. 
System of dams and water distribution network and water 
sanitation and waste disposal.  
Andalucía  51%, reducing 
over time 
Development of main highway network 
High speed rail network and connections 
Airport and port expansions 
Gas and electricity network upgrading 
Aquitaine 19% Industrial parks, ports and airport development, ICT networks 
Basilicata 50-60% Local road networks, water and sewerage systems, limited rail 
connections, broadband ICT networks 
Burgenland 9% Water and sewerage networks, ICT and business parks 
Campania  27% Regional public rail network, high speed train connections, 
Logistical hub at Nola-Marcianise, broadband networks 
Dytiki Ellada 43% Rion-Antirion bridge, improvements of existing road networks, 
regional road network, motorway network, port upgrading 
Galicia 61% Regional road network, ports, airports, limited rail network 
development 
Ireland 53% but 
declining 
Road construction and improvement, rail networks, airports 
and ports, water and wastewater treatment 
Itä-Suomi Less than 10% Major roads, rail links and broadband networks 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 7+% Brownfield site conversion, multimodal logistic platforms, 
some local road and rail improvements 
Nordrhein-
Westfalen 
Less than 5% Redevelopment of industrial land e.g. Phoenix site in 
Dortmund 
 
 
Norte 15% overall 
but dropping 
to zero in 
2010 
Considerable investment in roads including motorways to 
Lisbon and to Spain, modernisation of railways, new bridges 
over the Douro, Porto Underground, hospitals and schools, 
renovation of Porto Airport and Leixões Port 
North-East England Dropping 
dramatically 
from 80% to 
zero 
Metro extension 
Industrial site development 
Sachsen-Anhalt 5% Industrial and training site development, tourism facilities, 
road improvements 
Source: Case study reports. 
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5.4.5 Labour market 
Labour market projects have tended to be a minor element within ERDF programmes as 
these issues were primarily met by ESF programmes, or ESF measures within multi-fund 
programmes. However, some ERDF measures were targeted at labour market objectives, 
beyond the general aim to create and support jobs across the mainstream ERDF 
programmes. Typically, ERDF has been used to support the infrastructure needed to deliver 
training, such as training centres, and has been measured in terms of the number and 
floorspace of training establishments provided. For example, in Sachsen-Anhalt in 2000-
2006 ERDF was used to provide 6,596 new multimedia workplaces (workstations) in training 
facilities. In Aquitaine, 19 vocational training centres received support for expansion and 
100 were modernised in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. In Burgenland, ERDF contributed to the 
development of the Burgenland University of Applied Sciences which has produced 3,000 
graduates to date. 
In all of these projects, the evaluation of the results is extremely limited as the immediate 
consequences have been the housing of ESF-supported projects which then have their own 
results. The main labour market benefits of the ERDF have come from the effects on job 
creation and preservation in other thematic axes, such as enterprise or infrastructure. 
5.4.6 Social cohesion 
The social cohesion theme has often been the focus of ESF measures, especially in areas 
where social cohesion is linked with access to labour markets, but the focus here is on 
social cohesion projects within the ERDF. This involves various types of measure and project 
– some concerned with basic public and social services such as education and health – 
others focused more on urban or rural regeneration and community economic development.  
The largest social cohesion programmes were concentrated in the Objective 1/Convergence 
regions where basic public infrastructure provision was supported such as the building of 
schools and hospitals. Achievements of this kind take the form of completed or improved 
facilities leading to a better provision of public services – more patients treated, more 
students staying in schools for longer. In Andalucía, three new hospitals were built with the 
renovation of many others and also primary health centres. 103 new secondary schools and 
34 primary schools were built, but also sports facilities such as 23 indoor pools and 18 
sports centres as well as care centres and shelters for the homeless. Such scale of basic 
public service provision was the case in several of the Convergence regions and has clear 
social benefits as well as an economic impact. For example, enhancement of health care in 
Basilicata led to a marked reduction in the number of people having to seek treatment 
outside the region. 
At the softer end of the scale were programmes for community economic development in 
the Objective 2/RCE regions. Here, the nature of projects has been much wider and tended 
to focus more on building social capital in deprived areas and helping to lay the foundations 
for people to get back into work, often in the social enterprise sector. Community projects 
have often been quite small, limited in some cases by the ability of the third sector to 
provide matched funding, and hence achievements have been limited. A particular issue in 
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this theme has been whether such small projects have been effective at generating 
achievements, although they have often been good at leveraging voluntary resources and 
reaching groups that would not otherwise have been engaged in the Structural Funds. 
5.4.7 Environment 
Sustainability as a theme varies considerably in scale depending on the degree to which a 
region needed to build or renovate its waste and water infrastructures. Hence, a major 
focus of effort and achievements has been on the provision of clean water and installation 
of waste-water treatment. Another environmental problem, addressed in several regions, 
has been derelict or contaminated land, especially due to old industries such as mining and 
steel. Other major elements of this theme include the preservation of natural 
environments, through the designation of nature reserves, and investment in renewable 
energy and CO2 reduction. 
Investment in water resources was particularly important in the case study regions in Spain, 
Italy, Ireland, Greece and Portugal, but also Sachsen-Anhalt and Itä-Suomi. All of these 
regions had a need to upgrade water supply and sewage treatment to meet new standards, 
but also just to ensure basic supply coverage of the population. In Dytiki Ellada, the 
proportion of the population connected by sewerage networks increased over the period 
from three to 100 per cent and in Basilicata and Campania both water and gas networks 
have been built up through a combination of ERDF and domestic investments. In Galicia, 
the population served by waste purification plants increased from 0.4 million to 3.4 million, 
and the Ria de Vigo saw substantial reduction in water contamination. In Norte, only 51.6 
per cent of the population was served by sewerage treatment in 2004, but the whole region 
was served by 2007. However, problems of water pollution and waste management remain 
in the case of Campania despite efforts of this kind. 
By contrast, the major problem in the old industrial regions of Nordrhein-Westfalen, Nord-
Pas-de-Calais and North East England was derelict and polluted land, and hence a focus of 
activity was on land reclamation. In Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1,000 hectares of waste land 
were reclaimed and various former industrial sites were converted to a mix of natural, 
leisure and business uses. In particular, the International Building Exhibition Emscher Park 
initiated a collection of innovative reclamation projects including cultural facilities and 
eco-buildings as internationally acclaimed demonstration sites for the restoration of old 
industrial sites. North East England saw considerable progress, with the reduction of 
derelict land from 5,900 hectares in 1988 to 2,660 hectares in 2007 and a reduction from 
14.6 per cent of the estimated total for England to just 7.9 per cent. However, Nord-Pas-
de-Calais still accounts for half of all derelict land in France. In these regions the scale of 
derelict land was considerable and in some cases increased during the study period, such 
that choices had to be made as to how much of the derelict land should be restored, in 
balance with the need to devote resources to other objectives.  
Several regions also supported the creation of new national parks and nature reserves, or 
environmental projects to protect natural environments. The results of such projects are 
not amenable to quantification as they range from the protection of biodiversity to 
enhancement of public spaces such as beaches and parks. Examples include:  
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 regional parks and nature trails created and rivers cleaned-up in Nord-Pas-de-
Calais; 
 some 1,000 km of shoreline remediated in Galicia after the ‘Prestige’ oil spill, 
resulting in clean beaches and recovery of flora and fauna, and benefits for tourism 
and well as fishing and the environment; and  
 in North East England, beaches were also restored after decades of coal waste 
dumping, and again these beaches are now clean enough to be designated as nature 
reserves. 
Finally, some regions supported the implementation of renewable energy and clean 
technologies. Aquitaine made investments in biomass and solar energy as well as in energy 
efficiency, as did Basilicata. The scale of achievements was often limited, though, and this 
was not a major infrastructural priority in any of the regions. 
The benefits of environmental improvement tended to be focused on quality of life, 
particularly in terms of the local environment, with cleaner waterways and restored natural 
areas, as well as the reduction in possible risks to the human population from pollution and 
unsafe water supplies. But ‘green’ jobs were also created: for example in Andalucía it was 
estimated that in 2000-2006, support for the protection and regeneration of the natural 
environment helped to generate 34,790 jobs in construction, and to maintain 1,095 jobs. 
5.4.8 Spatial or territorial cohesion 
This final thematic axis is re-balancing development across the territory, both as an 
overarching goal and through differential access to ERDF across the region. Examples of the 
latter included Nordrhein-Westfalen and North East England having some excluded areas, 
with differentiated EU eligibility in Nord-Pas-de-Calais (split between Objectives 1 and 2) 
and  Itä-Suomi (split between Objectives 5b and 6) and latterly Ireland. In most regions, 
though, there were specific territorial development questions concerning the inequalities 
within the region, whether between more and less developed areas, between urban and 
rural areas, or between a core and periphery relating to access, or to a coastline. In 
Campania, despite rural problems, some of the most significant problems were in urban 
centres where an integrated approach was used to overcome the problems of segregated 
neighbourhoods in cities such as Naples and Salerno, and restoring the heart of the cities. 
Both Naples and Salerno became better places to live, and also became safer for tourists, 
thereby transforming their image and creating an environment in which other forms of 
investment could succeed. Whilst there were almost no specific measures identified as 
being purely about territorial rebalancing rather than the other themes already discussed, 
most regions could identify some form of impact on territorial questions arising from the 
programmes as a whole. 
In some cases, projects undertaken as part of other themes have had discernible results, 
examples being: 
 in Campania, investments in transport and telecommunications, rural clusters, 
tourism development and public services in the more rural hinterland of the region 
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have helped to stimulate development, despite most of the ERDF funding going to 
the densely inhabited urban areas on the coast;  
 In Andalucía, efforts to support rural areas have been focused on tourism, with 
support for tourist villages through new accommodation and promotion, diversifying 
the tourism offer beyond the beaches and the historic cities, with some positive 
results in the form of a growth in rural overnight stays from 180,430 in 2001 to 
511,619 in 2011;  
 among the achievements in Basilicata was the success in connecting remote 
mountain areas through internal road improvements;  
 rural areas of Galicia needed significant infrastructure investment, for example in 
telecommunications, road and sanitation networks. There was also an ERDF local 
fund for small village infrastructure projects, although aggregate results are 
difficult to judge. 
In some cases, the effects of the Structural Funds have been to exacerbate inequalities as 
investments have been concentrated in more urban areas or areas which had greatest 
potential to absorb funding. There may have been measures with the objectives of 
offsetting such effects, but these are often smaller in scale – such as community 
development actions. Itä-Suomi, for example, is experiencing continued drift of population 
and economic activity towards the cities, as is Basilicata, with the shift away from rural 
development towards thematic programmes in the ERDF facilitating this. In North East 
England, it was felt that the move away from infrastructure spending towards innovation 
and enterprise favoured the Tyneside conurbation whilst the former coalfield areas and 
Tees Valley were less able to absorb the new priorities, leading to a widening of intra-
regional disparities. Similarly, in Burgenland, the relatively weaker south of the region has 
not been able to reverse emigration trends or achieve significant catch-up despite receiving 
the highest intensity of ERDF support. Its ERDF receipts were 141 per cent of the regional 
average, compared with 83 per cent in the North of the region, which facilitated the 
growth of new economic sectors such as renewable energy and tourism. Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
also still has considerable internal disparities as some of the weaker areas such as Douai 
failed to match the growth of Lille.  
5.5 Conclusions 
Although there are difficulties in assessing the aggregate achievements of programmes, it is 
clear from the available data and the qualitative assessment that there have been 
considerable areas of success, as well as disappointments. Achievements indicators have 
improved over successive programme periods, with all programmes now using output 
indicators and there is a growing use of results indicators, but many problems remain. In 
part, these problems relate to the setting of appropriate targets against well-developed 
intervention logics, but are also due to poor definition of indicators, weaknesses in 
recording outputs and simplistic aggregation. The nature of programmes with diverse 
interventions has also made the setting of consistent indicators difficult, both within and 
between regions. 
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While aggregate quantification of achievements is difficult or impossible at the level of the 
region, let alone across regions, the qualitative assessments of achievements provide some 
insights. In particular, they provide more detailed understanding of the development paths 
pursed by individual regions, for example the shifts in innovation investment from building 
up public research capacity to include business R&D, innovation support and science parks 
as part of regional innovation strategies, or from generic business aid to improving the 
business environment.  
The case study research also provides some indication of ‘what works’. Some large 
infrastructure, environmental and social cohesion investments in Convergence regions have 
been transformational, in terms of improved accessibility, increased standard of living 
through better housing, better quality healthcare, connection to water supply and sewage 
networks, and environmental remediation (such as of derelict or contaminated land). Such 
initiatives have been central to the intervention logics of successive programmes. By 
contrast, the fragmentation of interventions (for example of innovation support) has 
reduced achievements in economic development compared to the focusing of 
research/innovation on key themes or centres. The value of a systemic or holistic approach 
to interventions is evident in some regions, especially in the provision of enterprise 
support, integrated territorial development schemes, (some) financial instruments and 
cluster-based strategies such as investment in tourist and cultural facilities to promote 
change in image and tourist flows. 
Conversely, the assessment of achievements highlights problems with strategies, notably: 
 insufficient consideration given to the additionality of interventions and 
deadweight (e.g. in enterprise support); 
 a lack of prioritisation of interventions, especially in the failure to concentrate 
support to achieve critical mass; 
 insufficient clarity on the time periods over which certain interventions can be 
expected to be effective and yield results - the long term benefits of certain kinds 
of intervention (e.g. university investment) are elusive in the absence of linkages 
with other aspects of economic development; 
 the balance between public and private sector investment at different stages of 
economic development strategy – particularly an initial emphasis on public 
investment for innovation which was only later followed by support for innovation 
in industry; 
 the degree of sustainability of interventions, in terms of funding e.g. 
underutilisation or over-expensive maintenance costs of physical infrastructure, 
underestimated operational costs of investment in cultural facilities;  
 inadequate consideration of the appropriate scale of investment, especially with 
regard to community development projects or renewable energy initiatives; and 
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 insufficient attention to the spatial or territorial cohesion of regions – the spatial 
concentration of investment (often associated with scope for spending funds) has 
widened disparities or inequality in several regions. 
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6. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COHESION POLICY PROGRAMMES 
For any programme to be effective, the outputs and results that flow from it have to fulfil 
the objectives set when the programme was formulated. Objectives may be explicitly set 
out in programme strategies, possibly with specific targets for outputs, but are often also 
implicit and therefore have to be imputed. For this study, effectiveness is defined as the 
extent to which programme objectives were achieved, distinguishing, where relevant, 
between explicit objectives stated in programme documents and those imputed by the 
research team. Effectiveness can be assessed both by looking at the achievements in 
relation to the overarching goals of programmes and, bottom-up, by appraising the targets 
relating to specific measures and/or priorities. 
The following chapter draws together the results of the analysis of effectiveness. It begins 
by reviewing the challenges associated with analysing effectiveness. It then presents the 
results of the overall analysis of effectiveness across the whole study period, and by period 
and thematic axis. Subsequently, the chapter discusses effectiveness at programme and 
measure levels based on the assessments made by the case study teams. 
6.1 Analysing effectiveness 
In examining 15 regions over four programme periods, and often with several parallel 
programmes in each period, there is a natural expectation that effectiveness would vary 
greatly. The variety of regions, programmes and contexts mean it is likely that some will be 
successful and some will have experienced considerable problems. Because no simple 
conclusion could be reached that programmes have been generally effective or not, this 
section focuses more on the conditions under which effectiveness has been achieved or not, 
and what lessons can be learned on how to improve effectiveness in future.  
Effectiveness can be judged at several different levels and in terms of different forms of 
intervention. 
 Programmes have overarching or programme level objectives, usually set as a small 
number of overall goals which may be a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
objectives. These might be as generic as improving the quality of life or much more 
precise, such as creating a specified number of jobs. 
 Within programmes there are usually objectives and targets for specific measures or 
themes, which again may be a mix of qualitative and quantitative objectives. Here 
a measure may have a greater range of targets depending on the variety of actions 
anticipated. 
 At the level of individual projects, there are objectives which will be expected to 
contribute to measure objectives, but may include additional objectives not 
anticipated in the original programme. 
However, the scope for assessing programme achievements is constrained by data 
availability. Among the problems identified were: vague or unspecified objectives, with 
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only imprecise targets; a propensity to change targets as programmes evolved, with little 
information on what had been attained or why the target had changed; and 
incompatibilities between objectives that rendered intervention logics hard to identify. A 
common problem in the 1989-1993 period, and for some regions in subsequent periods, is 
that the overall programme objectives (and sometimes measure objectives also) were not 
measureable, with a lack of clear targets, benchmarks or appropriate measurement 
indicators (see also the earlier discussion in Chapter 3 as to whether objectives were 
SMART).  Further, particularly in the 1990s, monitoring data were incomplete and often of 
questionable quality, as already discussed.  
6.2 Overall effectiveness of intervention across 15 regions, 1989-
present 
A first exercise makes use of ordinal correlations to explore whether there is a ‘pair-wise’ 
correspondence between the objectives and achievements of the programmes in the 15 
regions over the period 1989-present. This relatively simple statistical technique has been 
employed to translate the qualitative assessments made by the case study teams into 
comparative quantitative findings across the 15 regions. For each region, achievements, 
objectives and needs were assessed by regional research teams on an ordinal scale for each 
of the eight thematic axes. The teams were asked to rate objectives on a five-point scale 
from those that were a very high priority to those which were not a priority. Similarly, 
achievements were ranked from very high to very low. It should be noted that because 
these are the judgements of the teams, based on the mix of research they conducted, 
there will inevitably be a degree of arbitrariness about the scores assigned. Nevertheless, 
with caveats, the exercise provides a worthwhile overview about effectiveness. 
In essence, if there is a positive and statistically significant ordinal correlation this suggests 
that the policy intervention can be judged to be effective, whether for the programme 
overall or in the respective thematic axis of intervention. Thus, if objectives are assessed 
to be a high priority, and achievements are also assessed as high, there will be a high 
ordinal correlation which indicates strong effectiveness. By contrast, if one of the pairs is 
rated as ‘high’ and the other is rated as ‘low’, the ordinal correlation will signal 
ineffectiveness. In particular, if the priority is low, but the achievement is high, this is still 
to be welcomed, but means that what the programme is achieving is not central to its 
objectives. Effectiveness therefore has to be interpreted as the degree to which high 
priority objectives are met, and should not be confused with other possible interpretations 
such as value-for money. In this exercise, all axes are treated as being of equal 
significance, which means that the aggregate assessment of effectiveness at a programme 
level is not sensitive to the balance of expenditure across thematic axes. 
The findings of this analysis suggest that, overall, the regional experts judged the  
programmes to have been effective (see Table 15). Starting with the whole sample there is 
a high, positive and statistically significant correlation between the views on achievements 
and the imputed objectives for all the axes, assessed for the full 23year period, 1989-2012. 
The correlations are also positive and significant for all the axes in the individual 
programme periods, albeit somewhat lower, though still significant, for the incomplete 
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2007-2013 period. Several of the case studies reported a degree of convergence or, at 
least, the arresting of relative decline (North-East England and Burgenland). 
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Table 15: Relationship between achievements and objectives (ordinal correlation) 
  
 
1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006 2007-2013 All periods 
  Number of obs 104 
 
120 
 
120 
 
120 
 
120 
 
All thematic axes Spearman's rho 0.672 
 
0.421 
 
0.405 
 
0.193 
 
0.518 
   Prob > |t| 0 *** 0 *** 0 *** 0.0348 ** 0 *** 
  Number of obs 13 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
Enterprise Spearman's rho 0.490 
 
0.093 
 
0.250 
 
0.268 
 
0.369 
   Prob > |t| 0.0894 * 0.7406 
 
0.3692 
 
0.3348 
 
0.1754 
 
  Number of obs 13 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
Structural adjustment Spearman's rho 0.597 
 
0.345 
 
0.320 
 
0.133 
 
0.791 
   Prob > |t| 0.0312 ** 0.2077 
 
0.2456 
 
0.6374 
 
0.0004 *** 
  Number of obs 13 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
Innovation Spearman's rho 0.325 
 
0.106 
 
-0.321 
 
-0.104 
 
0.392 
 
  Prob > |t| 0.2784 
 
0.708 
 
0.2431 
 
0.7129 
 
0.1488 
 
Environmental 
sustainability 
Number of obs 13 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
Spearman's rho 0.852 
 
0.653 
 
0.717 
 
0.128 
 
0.675 
 
Prob > |t| 0.0002 *** 0.0083 *** 0.0026 *** 0.6495 
 
0.0058 *** 
  Number of obs 13 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
Labour market Spearman's rho 0.613 
 
0.320 
 
0.183 
 
0.144 
 
0.168 
 
  Prob > |t| 0.0259 ** 0.2456 
 
0.5145 
 
0.6094 
 
0.5489 
 
  Number of obs 13 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
Social inclusions Spearman's rho 0.760 
 
0.608 
 
0.095 
 
-0.309 
 
0.110 
 
  Prob > |t| 0.0026 *** 0.0163 ** 0.736 
 
0.2626 
 
0.697 
 
  Number of obs 13 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
Spatial Cohesion Spearman's rho 0.531 
 
0.376 
 
0.375 
 
0.595 
 
0.381 
 
  Prob > |t| 0.0616 * 0.1667 
 
0.1681 
 
0.0192 ** 0.1618 
 
  Number of obs 13 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
Infrastructure Spearman's rho 0.598 
 
0.138 
 
0.595 
 
0.127 
 
0.716 
   Prob > |t| 0.0307 ** 0.625 
 
0.0193 ** 0.6534 
 
0.0027 *** 
Source: Elaborations on data collected by the case study team for this project. 
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Effectiveness is considered to have been especially high in the 1989-93 period, in which it is 
positive and significant for seven out of the eight thematic axes taken individually. In this 
period, although the monitoring of outputs was poor, many regions prioritised 
infrastructure and achievements were clearly observable. It is therefore, pragmatically 
easier to measure effectiveness where the objectives are physical (such as in Andalucía and 
Galicia in which considerable effort went into improving transport infrastructure). The 
exception is the innovation axis, where the correlation is positive but statistically 
insignificant.  
Environmental sustainability is the thematic axis with the greatest perceived effectiveness, 
as shown by the high, positive and significant correlations in periods 1989-1993, 1994-1999 
and 2000-2006. The correlation is also positive in 1994-1999 for social cohesion, while for 
regional infrastructural endowment the effectiveness is very high in 2000-2006 and for 
spatial distribution of economic activity within the region, it peaks in 2007-2013. 
Nevertheless, some regions, such as Burgenland were not effective in reducing intra-
regional disparities. It is also noteworthy that there is no theme or period with a 
statistically significant negative correlation, meaning that there have been no significant 
backwash effects in any particular thematic axis or period. 
6.3 Effectiveness at programme level 
A second way of looking at programme effectiveness is to examine individual regions. The 
assessment in the following two sections concentrates on programme-level and measure-
level objectives, with emphasis on what makes the difference in the achievement of 
objectives. The starting point is again the synthesis of the qualitative assessments 
conducted by the 15 case study teams of how effectively programme objectives were 
achieved. 
A particular aim of this synthesis is to identify whether there are specific regional issues or 
types of interventions which detracted from effectiveness. As there are regions with 
different levels of development, and with different levels of complexity and scale of 
Structural Funds programmes, systematic differences in effectiveness might be expected. 
For example, are small, focused programmes more likely to achieve their objectives than 
large complex programmes addressing diverse objectives? The thematic analysis of 
achievements also presents opportunities to examine the effectiveness of different kinds of 
intervention and to reach some conclusions as to whether the choice of intervention, and 
decisions about how they are implemented, has consequences for effectiveness. 
As anticipated, the case studies present a variety of judgements at programme level, with 
some being broadly effective whilst others struggled to achieve their objectives. Table 16 
below assesses the level of effectiveness at the regional scale across programmes, 
indicating whether they achieved their objectives as set at programme level. This is by 
necessity a crude indicator, but it seeks to differentiate those cases where the programmes 
as a whole met the objectives set for them. Estimates are not made for the 2007-2013 
period as it is too early yet to judge whether regions will achieve targets, although in most 
regions the effect of the financial crisis has rendered initial objectives irrelevant. 
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Table 16: Programme-level assessment of effectiveness 
Region 1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006 
Algarve 3 3 3 
Andalucía  4 4 4 
Aquitaine 3 3 3 
Basilicata 3 3 3 
Burgenland n.a. 3 4 
Campania  2 3 2 
Dytiki Ellada 2 3 4 
Galicia  3 4 
Ireland 4 4 1 
Itä-Suomi n.a. - 4 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 3 3 3 
Nordrhein-Westfalen - 3 1 
Norte 1 1 1 
North-East England - 1 4 
Sachsen-Anhalt 5 1 5 
Key  
5 strongly exceeded objectives 2 under-performed against objectives 
4 exceeded objectives 1 strongly under-performed against objectives 
3 met objectives - insufficient data 
 
For most regions and programme periods, the judgement of case study teams was that 
programmes more or less achieved their objectives, although with many caveats as 
indicated below. In a few cases it seems the programmes exceeded their objectives, such 
as in Sachsen-Anhalt (which focused on job creation and significantly exceeded its targets 
in two of the periods) and Ireland (which also exceeded objectives during the 1990s, but 
missed its targets in the 2000-2006 programme).  
Several regions had at least one ‘bad’ period when objectives were not realised, again 
often due to over-ambitious objectives, and a small group of regions had a poor 
performance overall. In some regions, objectives were set at over-ambitious levels and as a 
consequence were not achieved. North East England set very ambitious objectives during 
the late 1990s aiming to create large numbers of new jobs and halt GDP divergence with 
the rest of the United Kingdom, yet it was unable to do this. Similarly, Burgenland sought 
to spread economic development to the relatively disadvantaged South of the region, but 
managed only to stabilise disparities, while the Basilicata aims of unifying the territory 
proved to be overly optimistic. In part, this was a weakness in the logic of the intervention 
in that many of the funded projects would be unable to deliver results in the short term, 
but partly also reflected unrealistic expectations. Importantly, and certainly in the earliest 
programmes, the objectives were framed as aspirational, indicating the direction of travel, 
rather than targets to be achieved over the lifetime of the programme. In the case of 
Campania, the vagueness of objectives and lack of good information on achievements 
makes it difficult to judge how well the objectives were met. However, given an underlying 
implicit objective to overcome the backwardness of the regional socio-economic system, 
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the conclusion was that the programmes were ineffective: employment rates did not 
improve during the period and the region’s economy slipped back relative to the rest of 
Italy and the EU.  
The table shows the shifts over time, with some regions showing improvements in meeting 
targets and others seeing poorer performance. These changes do not necessarily reflect a 
change in absolute achievements as the assessment is made against objectives which 
themselves change. This may simply be because one region might have softened an 
objective to make it more attainable, while another set more ambitious targets which were 
less likely to be achieved. This is a general weakness of measures of effectiveness (as 
defined for this study), as programmes operate within their own world and the setting of 
objectives and targets can just as equally influence effectiveness as the outputs. Generally 
regions became better at setting realistic objectives which were attainable, although this 
was not the case in a number of regions – notably Norte and Campania - where 
effectiveness was judged to be poor in all periods. 
Quality of life was a particular issue in several regions – often portrayed as a key priority, 
but rarely specified or quantified, highlighting problems of measurement of very general 
objectives. In most cases, quality of life was indeed improved, at least for the users of new 
infrastructures or the beneficiaries of enhanced public services or cultural facilities. Urban 
and community regeneration also improved people’s lives. However, these reported 
achievements have not necessarily contributed to the economic changes that were the core 
objectives. As noted above, Norte, for example, struggled to meet its objectives across the 
whole period, as these were heavily focused on modernisation, job creation and economic 
growth, yet the region has seen rising unemployment throughout the period and a declining 
economic position relative to Portugal. As a result, it not only failed to meet growth 
objectives, but was also unable to prevent further relative decline.  
6.4 Effectiveness at measure level 
At a measure level, the variability of performance increases, with examples of highly 
successful measures considerably exceeding objectives (at least as measured by targets), 
and some which largely failed to achieve anything. What is perhaps more important than 
documenting such variety is to explore the factors behind success and failure at a measure 
level, given that it is the performance of such components that underscores the 
achievement of programme level objectives. 
There was a generally positive view of the effectiveness of objectives relating to different 
forms of infrastructure across the regions. Objectives were met, although sometimes only 
after successive rounds of investment spanning more than one programme period, and 
infrastructure projects were well delivered and had a good impact on quality of life. 
Clearly, regions were reasonably assured in their ability to deliver these kinds of projects, 
although with some reservations. In Aquitaine, there was a concern that transport 
infrastructures were under-used and hence had limited economic impact, with similar 
issues in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and, to some extent, in Algarve, Norte, Andalucía and 
Galicia. In Basilicata, for example, the interplay between multi-regional and national 
Operational Programmes, on the one hand, and regional OPs, on the other, was 
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unsatisfactory, with the result that external transport connections continue to be a 
problem. 
Business parks also led to mixed results. Although, floorspace targets were attainable, the 
jobs which followed were significantly delayed, often beyond the period of assessment of a 
programme. Even if there were specific actions to encourage firms to move into new 
accommodation, this would often be in a different programme to the development of the 
land and construction of the buildings. Issues of quality also led to mixed results – in 
Andalucía the rapid construction of roads led to subsequent need for repairs and 
realignments in later periods, whilst in North East England ERDF support led to an 
improvement in the overall quality of business accommodation, but this had a negative 
effect on output levels due to higher unit costs. An implication is that assessments of the 
effectiveness of physical investments – whether for public services or business development 
– have to look beyond the delivery of the new facilities to include how they are used. 
Structural adjustment activities and industrial modernisation were seen as more 
problematic, often slow to yield results, reflecting the difficulties in changing from 
established industries to new activities. In Campania, support was provided for industrial 
modernisation but did not achieve its objectives – possibly due to the labour-replacing 
effects of capital investment in manufacturing. Support allowed firms to remain in the 
market (thus safeguarding jobs in the short/medium term), but it did not spur them to 
become more competitive for the longer term. In several regions, emphasis was placed on 
safeguarding jobs in industrial sectors when the long-term sustainability may be 
questionable, even assuming the deadweight effect of such support is ignored. In 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, programme authorities were reluctant to make radical changes in 
approach that might have led to more rapid diversification and in Nord-Pas-de-Calais the 
initial emphasis was to preserve existing industrial sectors, only later switching to support 
for emerging industries. Such considerations had an impact on effectiveness depending on 
whether safeguarded jobs or new jobs were set as the objective. A focus on new industries 
might help achieve greater numbers of new jobs, but at the same time allow a more rapid 
reduction in jobs in the declining sectors.  
Tourism was an important target sector in most of the regions, as already noted in the 
previous chapter, and several programmes achieved good effectiveness in that area. 
Significant benefits were noted in Dytiki Ellada, Basilicata, Algarve, Andalucía and others. 
North East England and Nord-Pas-de-Calais saw the benefits of tourism and cultural 
investments as going beyond the immediate objectives to help change the external (and 
internal) perception of the region to enhance its wider attractiveness for investment and 
mobile people. 
Innovation measures also experienced limited short-term effectiveness, but with an 
expectation of more significant effects in the longer term, suggesting that looking at 
whether objectives were met within the timespan of a single programme (or soon after it 
ends) may give a misleadingly negative impression. Initial effects, especially where funding 
was concentrated in the public sector, were often restricted to output measures only. For 
example, the university sector might grow in line with the level of investment made into 
university research, but wider growth of R&D and innovation in the private sector would be 
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slow to take place, if at all. This was reported in Sachsen-Anhalt, Andalucía and Nord-Pas-
de-Calais, while in Basilicata there were successes in establishing selected new research 
facilities, such as a geodesic research laboratory, supported by domestic as well as ERDF 
interventions, but limited diffusion to the economy as a whole. Better effectiveness was 
achieved where innovation measures had a greater emphasis on support for the private 
sector through knowledge exchange projects and the development of a more sophisticated 
innovation system.  
Similarly, with entrepreneurship, regions which had developed a good systemic approach to 
supporting entrepreneurship, with a mix of policies including incubators, finance, training 
and encouragement of a wider entrepreneurial culture, reported high effectiveness (North 
East England, Sachsen-Anhalt, Aquitaine). Nord-Pas-de-Calais had less success with 
entrepreneurship, although it seems to be improving in the most recent period. 
Environmental measures had mixed results, with good effectiveness for land and water 
reclamation projects, but limited success with clean technologies until most recently. Here, 
it was clear that most regions had expertise in the restoration of derelict and polluted sites 
and were able to deliver programmes in that field.  But few were able to promote clean 
technologies effectively in the absence of significant demand or newly established bodies 
for technology development and knowledge exchange. There is, nevertheless, a positive 
story to be told about preservation of natural assets in regions such as Basilicata and 
Aquitaine. 
Finally, experience was mixed for social, community and territorial development actions. 
Conventional interventions such as urban regeneration schemes were generally effective 
and met objectives, but some of the softer community measures struggled to achieve 
targets, in part because the sheer diversity of activities did not easily translate into SMART 
objectives.   
6.5 Conclusions 
The main conclusion from the qualitative assessments of achievements in relation to 
objectives is that, overall, Cohesion policy intervention over the period 1989-present was 
effective, but with variation by programme period, theme and region. Further, regions are 
considered to have (mostly) improved their attainment of objectives; in 1989-1993, only six 
regions were judged to have met or exceed objectives, for six others it was impossible to 
make a judgement, and three others underperformed. By contrast, in the 2000-2006 period, 
most regions met or exceeded their objectives. 
With respect to specific areas of intervention, short-term effectiveness appears to be 
higher for large-scale physical infrastructure, environmental improvements and local 
business and innovation infrastructure. Regions had difficulty with areas such as structural 
adjustment, business support, innovation and community development which required 
strategies, systems and capacity. A further difficulty reflected in the overall assessment of 
effectiveness was the coordination of measures into a coherent strategy. 
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Most regions had good expertise in capital programmes and were able to set reasonable 
objectives which were attainable and which were then delivered. However, in those regions 
with strong infrastructure needs, there were absorption problems in being able to deliver so 
much so quickly and in being able to guarantee maintenance of the finished schemes.  
Business support was much more difficult both in setting objectives and meeting them and 
an important success indicator was whether the strategy involved a well-designed systems 
approach.  Regions also had difficulties over structural adjustment in getting the right 
balance of support for traditional sectors and emphasis on new activities as well as 
anticipating the consequences of this balance for targets attached to the objectives. 
Support for innovation often became focused on public R&D, especially in universities, and 
successful business innovation depended on the development of an innovation support 
system oriented to the needs of firms. Lastly, social and community activities were highly 
problematic in delivery when not again tied to infrastructure for core public services such 
as schools and hospitals.  
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7. UTILITY 
Whether or not programmes are effective in meeting their objectives, a broader and 
arguably more fundamental evaluation question is whether they succeed in meeting the 
needs of the region. For this study, the concept of ‘utility’ is interpreted as the extent to 
which programmes led to results that are in line with ‘society's needs and the socio-
economic problems to be solved’, which may differ from the goals explicitly stated in the 
programmes or which may not have been stated explicitly in the programmes. ‘Utility is a 
very particular evaluation criterion insofar as it makes no reference to the official 
objectives of the programme’ (European Commission, 2012, p.35). The concept of utility is 
particularly useful where objectives are not explicitly defined or are poorly defined, or 
when unforeseen effects are anticipated, but is also susceptible to differences of 
interpretation, precisely because it is does not necessarily refer to stated goals. 
As a consequence, utility can be seen holistically as whether or not Cohesion policy 
fostered regional development in terms of economic growth, increases in employment, and 
better social and environmental conditions. However the underlying needs can also be 
regarded sectorally, so that utility can be judged in terms of improvement in a range of 
determinants of regional development, such as innovation or accessibility. In either case, 
the question is whether the needs of the region were met regardless of any strategy or 
objectives set by the programme. 
7.1 Analysing utility 
For each of the regions, achievements were compared with a set of specific sectoral needs 
of the region, as revealed by the assessments of regional case study teams regarding the 
main thematic axes used in the study. This analysis asked what positive (or negative) 
effects the programmes had on the region and how these related to the needs, regardless 
of the objectives or targets of the programmes. An activity which failed to deliver against 
its objectives may be ineffective, but if it still partly met the objective or delivered some 
other benefits not specified in the objectives then it would still constitute utility. In this 
analysis, the focus was on a set of thematic needs and achievements, rather than aggregate 
changes such as GDP growth or employment. 
As with the analysis of effectiveness, a first approach to assessing utility was to analyse 
ordinal correlations between regional achievements and needs, again based on the 
qualitative assessments provided by the case study teams Subsequent sections present a 
more qualitative assessment of the nature of achievements in regions with differing 
characteristics and a quantitative analysis of measures of regional performance.  
Ordinal correlations between assessments of needs and achievements provide a broad-brush 
view of the utility of ERDF policy, and are subject to the same caveats noted in relation to 
effectiveness in the previous chapter. For utility, the regional research teams were asked 
to score needs on a scale from ‘very high’ need to ‘very low’, recognising that although a 
need may be present, it may matter much less than others for the development of the 
region. For example, a dearth of basic infrastructure might be seen as a very high need in a 
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lagging region, whereas social cohesion is not. But as the level of infrastructure improves, 
there may be an evolution of needs which brings social cohesion to the fore, while further 
investments in infrastructure are less pressing. 
For all periods and all axes taken together, there is a positive and statistically significant 
correlation between needs and achievement, as assessed by the case study teams. Although 
this correlation is not high, it implies that the policy has indeed been useful in meeting 
regional needs over the long run. Utility is higher for the two first programme periods, 
while for 2000-2006 the correlation is positive but not statistically significant and for 2007-
2013 there is no positive correlation, although it is probably too early to arrive at a firm 
verdict because at the time of the research it was still incomplete. 
Among the individual thematic axes, the regional assessments indicated maximum utility 
for investment in regional infrastructure endowments, where regional needs were 
accompanied by high achievements in the long run but also, in the shorter run, in the 
programme periods 1989-1993 and 2000-2006. This finding is confirmed in several of the 
case studies which note the improvement of accessibility as a key achievement (Andalucía 
and Galicia), although continuing problems of accessibility were reported in the southern 
part of Burgenland and in Basilicata where external connections have improved less than 
intra-regional links. In Campania, the assessment is that its transport infrastructure is now 
in line with or above national standards, although the case study also notes that it took a 
long time to complete. A caveat in Campania is, though, that a lack of funding for running 
and maintenance costs, expected to come from domestic sources, diminishes the utility. 
For the enterprise and innovation axes, there is evidence of utility in the long run. Ireland 
is a good example, where the case study team argues that there is a strong legacy in 
research-based activities, although in Norte the findings are that entrepreneurial activity 
shifted in focus from export activities with too many firms concentrating on non-tradable 
sectors. Nevertheless, the Norte case study notes the emergence of some centres of 
excellence and niche activities, despite the overall achievements falling short of 
expectations. In Galicia, the research reaches a fairly sanguine conclusion about the 
sectoral change, noting the emergence of new clusters and internationally competitive 
firms. 
For the social cohesion thematic axis utility is high in the first three programme periods but 
significant only for the 1989-1993 period. There is no theme and no period for which there 
is a significant negative correlation. Some of the case studies do make clear, however, that 
much greater emphasis was placed on some themes during different periods. In Aquitaine, 
for instance, an early focus on jobs and SMEs was considered to be at the expense of other 
needs, such as for internationalisation of the economy, but later programmes at least partly 
compensated. In the earlier programmes, the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region was dominated by 
efforts to cope with the decline of major staple industries. 
This analysis is not, however, able to examine aggregate utility, which might be seen in 
terms of overall convergence with the EU average in GDP and employment, as assessments 
were only provided at the thematic axis scale. Regions in many cases saw utility at a 
thematic level, where specific needs were met (accessibility improved, levels of innovation 
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increased, environmental problems were cleared up), but these improvements may not 
have been sufficient in themselves to narrow the gap with the EU average in terms of 
economic performance as measured by standard macroeconomic variables. 
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Table 17: Relationship between needs and achievements (ordinal correlation) 
    1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006 2007-2013 All periods 
  Number of obs 104 
 
120 
 
120 
 
120 
 
120 
 All thematic axes Spearman's rho 0.345 
 
0.195 
 
0.120 
 
-0.105 
 
0.204 
   Prob > |t| 0.0003 *** 0.0332 ** 0.1929 
 
0.254 
 
0.0255 ** 
  Number of obs 13 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 Enterprise Spearman's rho -0.009 
 
0.384 
 
0.039 
 
-0.341 
 
0.523 
   Prob > |t| 0.9757 
 
0.1571 
 
0.8901 
 
0.2132 
 
0.0454 ** 
  Number of obs 13 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 Structural adjustment Spearman's rho 0.440 
 
-0.061 
 
0.112 
 
0.138 
 
0.141 
   Prob > |t| 0.1323 
 
0.8295 
 
0.6909 
 
0.6231 
 
0.6163 
   Number of obs 13 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 Innovation Spearman's rho -0.111 
 
-0.147 
 
-0.206 
 
0.125 
 
0.464 
   Prob > |t| 0.7178 
 
0.6014 
 
0.4621 
 
0.6585 
 
0.0811 * 
Environmental 
sustainability 
Number of obs 13 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 Spearman's rho 0.410 
 
0.356 
 
0.381 
 
-0.018 
 
0.172 
 Prob > |t| 0.1637 
 
0.1925 
 
0.1616 
 
0.9482 
 
0.5394 
   Number of obs 13 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 Labour market Spearman's rho -0.078 
 
0.000 
 
0.137 
 
0.325 
 
0.065 
   Prob > |t| 0.7998 
 
1 
 
0.6273 
 
0.2368 
 
0.8181 
   Number of obs 13 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 Social inclusion Spearman's rho 0.576 
 
0.420 
 
0.402 
 
-0.218 
 
0.166 
   Prob > |t| 0.0392 ** 0.1194 
 
0.1377 
 
0.4346 
 
0.5541 
   Number of obs 13 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 Spatial Cohesion Spearman's rho 0.406 
 
0.038 
 
-0.161 
 
-0.378 
 
-0.148 
   Prob > |t| 0.1685 
 
0.8938 
 
0.5672 
 
0.165 
 
0.5979 
   Number of obs 13 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 Infrastructure Spearman's rho 0.479 
 
0.297 
 
0.466 
 
-0.021 
 
0.596 
   Prob > |t| 0.0979 * 0.2819 
 
0.0798 * 0.9423 
 
0.019 ** 
Source: Elaborations on data by the case study team for this project. 
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7.2 Qualitative assessment of utility 
The following assessment of how Cohesion policy funding contributed to overall regional 
development is organised by the categorisation of funding regime in each of the regions.   
7.2.1 Objective 1/Convergence regions  
The first group comprised regions characterised by major underdevelopment and deficits in 
all indicators, from basic infrastructure and services to human resource skills, often 
compounded by peripherality (national or European) or significant internal disparities, and 
which were in the most assisted category (Objective 1 or Convergence) throughout the 
whole study period. These comprised Dytiki Ellada, Campania, Norte, Andalucía, Galicia 
and Sachsen-Anhalt. The intervention logic in this group of regions has tended to be to 
favour physical investments in the earlier programme periods, then to increase the 
emphasis on softer interventions. Although the relative emphases have inevitably varied 
among the group, the underlying logic has been one of wide-ranging transformation. 
A common theme across five of the regions (the exception being Sachsen-Anhalt) is a 
preponderance of infrastructure investment and support for quality of life improvements, 
and across all these regions these needs have been met to some degree. However, the 
regions also needed to stimulate economic development, transform the industrial base and 
promote innovation and enterprise. These needs were not always highly prioritised in 
programme objectives, and investments in infrastructure have not led to the economic 
stimuli that were anticipated. Utility has thus been quite low in economic terms across 
these regions, regarding enterprise, innovation, and structural change. These regions have 
not benefited from the kinds of exogenous growth opportunities which Ireland and, to a 
lesser extent, the Algarve experienced (both in the group of regions which moved out of 
Objective 1 status – see next section), and the effort devoted to endogenous economic 
development has been too small compared with the scale of the challenge.  
Nevertheless, the enhancement of infrastructure has tended to bring more benefit to the 
wider public, through improved public transport networks and roads and personal services 
(education, health, water quality), as well as some environmental improvements. To this 
extent, ERDF investment in these regions has a clear utility in meeting some of the needs of 
the population for improvements in the quality of life, but it has been insufficient to 
establish self-sustaining growth. As a result, the economic achievements are more fragile 
and have not provided an adequate foundation for a response to the current downturn. 
Sachsen-Anhalt pursued a different strategy, focused on enterprise and restructuring and 
has had some success with capital investment in existing industry. In the analysis in Chapter 
2, Sachsen-Anhalt was notable for very high productivity growth linked with falling 
employment as the old industries were partially replaced with new, higher value added 
activity. This has stabilised decline and restored growth, but there is still recognition that 
further productivity improvement is needed based on innovation. Norte and Campania also 
experienced the decline of traditional industries, but have struggled either to upgrade 
those industries or to develop new growth industries. The heavy focus on infrastructure and 
social needs has been insufficient to stimulate wider economic growth. 
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Galicia experienced notable improvement in productivity, in part through the use of capital 
investment aids as well as better access to markets, yet this has not been transformative, 
and innovation performance is still weak. Support for innovation has started to develop an 
innovation support system, which was previously absent, so that despite limited results 
there was some utility in beginning what is likely to be a long process of upgrading. 
Tourism has been seen as a growth opportunity by all of these regions, but with relatively 
limited success. In most cases some of the transport infrastructure has had a strong tourism 
orientation and all have invested in tourism attractions and new niche strategies. Andalucía 
was perhaps the only one of the six regions with a significant mainstream tourism profile at 
the outset, but whilst all have had some successes, this has not been sufficient to create a 
major new source of growth. 
Some consideration must also be given as to whether the large investments by the ERDF and 
Cohesion Fund had some negative utility in these regions by contributing to the conditions 
of the current crisis. In some of the regions in this group, notably Campania and Andalucía, 
the negative consequences are clearer as costly infrastructure has been put in place 
without the underlying growth in a tax base to maintain and make effective use of it. 
Choices therefore have had to be made between on-going public expenditure or austerity 
cuts, a dilemma which risks undermining the previous strategy.  
7.2.2 Regions which have phased out of Objective 1 status 
The regions which had Objective 1 status but have phased out as a result of improvements 
in relative GDP performance are all by definition regions which have seen significant 
positive change, whether or not this was the consequence of Cohesion policy. Six of the 
study regions were in this category: Burgenland, Itä-Suomi, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Ireland, 
Basilicata and Algarve, but in each case their story is different. Ireland, Basilicata and 
Algarve were all classic underdeveloped regions with poor performance in a wide range of 
indicators, although Ireland’s status as a small country was distinctive and afforded 
particular advantages. Nord-Pas-de-Calais was more of a typical industrial decline region 
which had partly fallen into Objective 1 status as a result of localised decline – its problems 
were more specific. Burgenland and Itä-Suomi were predominantly rural regions, 
peripheral within their respective Member States (and at that time relative to the EU), 
facing agricultural modernisation and economic diversification. For these regions, the 
intervention logic combined efforts to improve connectivity with the promotion of new 
forms of activity, while managing the evolution of traditional activities. 
The region which stands out as having achieved transformational change is Ireland 
(notwithstanding the difficulties encountered since 2008), whilst the others continue to 
experience difficulties to varying degrees. Algarve and Basilicata both also moved out of 
the Convergence category in 2007 to Phasing-out status, although still experiencing 
structural problems and specific challenges which have been exacerbated by the current 
crisis. Ireland is very much the success story of the last twenty years, rising from Objective 
1 status to well above the EU averages, posing the question of much of this was due to 
Cohesion policy. During the 1990s, the ERDF and Cohesion Fund provided substantial new 
investment in historically neglected infrastructure such as transport and water, whilst also 
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boosting research and innovation facilities dramatically. This investment helped to support 
endogenous development but, more importantly, exogenous growth through the attraction 
of foreign direct investment and can be judged to have responded to the country’s needs. 
The high level of funding during the 1990s coincided with the ‘Celtic tiger’ period of rapid 
real growth. Clearly, several other drivers of change were influential, notably the high 
levels of foreign direct investment, but Cohesion policy facilitated the ability to respond to 
those opportunities whilst also modernising the indigenous economy (Honohan, 1997). After 
2000, ERDF expenditure dropped as Ireland moved out of the Objective 1 category, but 
ERDF interventions continue to make a positive contribution to development albeit in a 
more focused way within a national strategy. 
Algarve has also seen significant improvement as a result of the Structural Funds, albeit 
less dramatically than Ireland. Infrastructure and urban regeneration has facilitated the 
development of a modern tourism-based economy, with a marked improvement of 
economic indicators as well as the quality of life. Support for business has also contributed 
to this development, but was insufficient to stimulate other export-oriented industries. 
Human capital was strengthened - with the growth of the university and the development 
of R&D playing an important part - but the region lacks strong demand for enhanced skills 
and research. Despite these improvements, which constitute a degree of utility, the region 
remains overly dependent on tourism and has not achieved a sufficient degree of economic 
diversification. Other regions in this group also experienced significant improvements in 
tourism, such as for example Burgenland, or Basilicata, where natural assets and cultural 
heritage became a source of competitive advantage as a result of Cohesion policy funding. 
Itä-Suomi saw mixed results in innovation and enterprise and partial utility, but its 
performance nationally was overshadowed by the dramatic growth in other regions; the 
peripherality of the region nationally continues to be a difficulty. 
Problems can arise in sustaining improvements or in moving beyond what has already been 
attained. Some of the gains in Basilicata were exposed as fragile when the crisis struck in 
2008/9. Even in Ireland, the combination of high investment in infrastructure and the 
growth of expenditure in areas such as public R&D and universities, driven initially by the 
ERDF, led to increases in recurrent public expenditure which were difficult to sustain as tax 
revenues fell during the crisis. The construction boom of the early 2000s, which was a 
major contributor to the crisis in Ireland was partly stimulated by road investment 
supported by the Cohesion Fund, and costs were exacerbated by rising land and labour 
rates. Overall though, even taking into account the fall in GDP since the crisis, Ireland is in 
a much stronger position now than it was in 1989. 
An enduring issue is the consequences of a growing focus on knowledge based economic 
strategies for the territorial balance within each of the regions. All of these regions had 
either significant rural areas or internal disparities. The focus on innovation has reinforced 
the position of the more urban settlements, exacerbating internal territorial imbalances in 
Itä-Suomi. This problem, also recognised in some of the other regions, is a conundrum for 
regions as economic transformation seems to require agglomeration economies which are 
difficult to replicate in more rural locations. Whilst sectors such as tourism can be 
developed in the more rural areas, and these six regions have had some success in this, the 
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scope for higher value-added is limited in comparison with the urban areas. The 
competitive environment of tourism drives down profitability and the typical quality of jobs 
cannot compare with innovation-intensive sectors which concentrate in the urban cores. 
Achieving maximum utility at a regional scale may require the acceptance of continued 
territorial disparities, and the knowledge that policy is one of the causes. 
7.2.3 Objective 2/RCE regions 
The third group of regions were those typified by economic restructuring dominated by 
large, declining traditional industries. Nordrhein-Westfalen and North East England were 
prototypical examples of this kind of region, whilst Aquitaine had an initially small but 
expanding Objective 2 area coupled with extensive Objective 5b designation. The 
intervention logic for these regions has been one of shifting from an outdated industrial 
model which had left acute social and environmental legacy problems to embrace new 
activities and socio-economic structures. These regions mainly faced three broad 
challenges: to rehabilitate the environment in areas affected by the closure of traditional 
industries; to convert the economic base to new knowledge-based activities; and to address 
the social consequences of deindustrialisation. Aquitaine, and to some extent, North East 
England also experienced some problems of rural disadvantage and peripherality. 
On the first of these challenges, there was considerable success and a high level of utility. 
Environmental improvement and infrastructure projects, focusing on the reclamation of 
contaminated and derelict land, had considerable success leading to the restoration either 
as green space or re-use for business or residential purposes. Aquitaine made efforts to 
revitalise urban centres. Nordrhein-Westfalen and North East England had severe 
problems of derelict land, particularly from mining and steelmaking, and these sites had 
symbolic significance - both negatively as highly visible indicators of industrial decline, but 
also more positively as icons of regional identity. Both regions were able to gain high utility 
from the revalorisation of this land, the removal of ecological problems, the bolstering of 
cultural heritage, and the change in the regional image to one that was more attractive for 
new investment and even tourism. The scale of these problems was beyond the resources of 
local and regional actors and required a coordinated effort involving national government 
and the Structural Funds. However, the expertise for these types of intervention was well-
established, and projects were typically well managed and at times innovative, and high 
utility was achieved where there was strong experience and expertise. 
In meeting the needs of the conversion of the economic base, experiences were more 
mixed, although improving over the programme periods. Again, Nordrhein-Westfalen, and 
North East England faced similar problems due to the rationalisation of many larger 
employers and knock-on effects across the supply chain, coupled with weak 
entrepreneurship and innovation, and an under-representation of newer growth sectors. 
During the 1990s, the levels of utility were weak in Nordrhein-Westfalen and North East 
England as insufficient support was channelled to a broad-based conversion process. 
Support was given to some traditional sectors and larger firms, or to support foreign direct 
investment, rather than endogenous development. Support for entrepreneurship and 
innovation commenced during this period, but was small in scale and scope and 
insufficiently systemic in nature.  
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In the 2000s, there was evidence of increased utility in economic terms as the regions 
began to develop more sophisticated systems to support entrepreneurship and innovation, 
with strong encouragement from the ERDF. New firm formation and growth improved in 
North East England as the region developed more incubator capacity, reinforced by better 
links with universities and venture capital, as well as by the promotion of a more 
entrepreneurial culture. Better targeting of support for growth clusters and sectors also 
developed in the 2000s, including innovation programmes. Tourism was important in all 
three regions, but with mixed success. However, considering the extreme negative image of 
earlier years for the two industrial regions and the link to investor optimism, this was 
another theme with strong utility. Similarly, the creative and cultural industries have 
developed strongly, especially in Nordrhein-Westfalen and North East England. Aquitaine 
also experienced limited success in the transformation of the SME base, but has been able 
to support employment well.  
Perhaps the weakest area of utility for these four regions is in the social challenges. One of 
the consequences of deindustrialisation has been the concentration of disadvantage in 
particular communities, with high levels of unemployment, health and social disadvantage, 
and in some cases poor housing and built environment. In Aquitaine, some rural 
communities fared less well than the favoured urban centres, highlighting problems of 
spatial imbalance. Measures to address these issues have been modest in nature, and, as 
reported above, the effectiveness has often been limited, as indeed has the utility. Here 
the scale of resources available under the ERDF has been small relative to the scale of the 
problem, and it is questionable whether it has been worthwhile. Aquitaine, North East 
England and Nordrhein-Westfalen all had relatively small-scale ERDF programmes17, 
compared with other regions in the study and especially measured relative to regional GDP, 
limiting their ability to influence the region, and it is perhaps particularly in the social area 
where the resources have been too limited and have had little impact. 
7.3 Utility of interventions: quantitative assessments for selected 
indicators 
The utility of ERDF intervention can, in a manner similar to the analysis of economic 
performance described in the previous section, also be summarised in charts focusing on 
indicators which capture different facets of needs. Due to the availability of longer than 
average time series, three indicators have been chosen – unemployment, patents (as a 
measure of the results of R&D, and tourism -  each related to at least one of the eight axes 
of the project. They are quite general and, as such, are influenced by more than one axis. 
These indicators can be interpreted as results of policy interventions, not being the direct 
output of any measure or axis. In Figure 9 (unemployment), Figure 10 (patents) and Figure 
11 (tourism) appended to this chapter, needs are shown on the horizontal axis in terms of 
regional endowment of the indicator at the beginning of the programme period, while 
achievement is measured on the vertical axis as the change in the variable over the 
                                                 
17 Whilst the most recent Nordrhein-Westfalen ERDF programme is quite large in financial terms, this 
covers the whole of a very large region with over three times the population of the former objective 2 
area of earlier programmes. 
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programme period. To allow for effects that stem from policies unrelated to Cohesion 
policy, the amount of expenditure in the relevant axes is represented through the size of 
the circles. In addition, to correct for the impact of national effects and macro-cycles, all 
values are depicted relative to the country average, and the horizontal axis represents the 
differential with respect to the country at the beginning of the period, while the vertical 
axis represents the absolute change in this differential between the beginning and the end 
of the period. These adjustments are still insufficient to provide any counterfactual 
evidence, but they are enough to make observations comparable across regions belonging 
to different countries. Due to data availability problems, the analyses are confined to the 
1994-1999 and 2000-2006 programme periods. 
7.3.1 Unemployment 
The unemployment rate is one of the principal direct targets of labour market expenditure, 
but is also indirectly influenced by any other expenditure targeting the regional economy, 
including enterprise and structural adjustment. Unemployment rates in most of the 15 
regions were well above the respective national average, signalling a high need, especially 
in Sachsen-Anhalt (DEE0), Andalucía (ES61) and Campania (ITF3), whose differentials from 
the national averages were above 12 percent.  
Only two regions achieved significant reductions in unemployment gaps relative to their 
national rates. Sachsen-Anhalt (DEE0) managed to reduce its differential by more than 
eight points, interestingly despite any investment directly targeting the labour market, 
albeit with very high investment targeting structural adjustment and, to a lesser extent, 
enterprise. The other was Andalucía (ES61), which was able to reduce its differential by 
almost four points, with ERDF support balanced between the labour market and structural 
adjustment. However this has not been sustainable in the current crisis and unemployment 
has risen rapidly again. In the other 13 regions there was little relative improvement, even 
in Burgenland (AT11) which spent heavily on enterprise and structural adjustment, while 
some regions went backwards. Nord-Pas-de-Calais, in which countering unemployment was 
a core challenge, was unable to make any headway, a result that the case study report 
attributes partly to limited success in some of the unemployment black-spots in the region, 
whereas other centres enjoyed markedly better results. Local concentrations of 
unemployment were also identified in Nordrhein-Westfalen as a continuing problem, 
despite ERDF intervention. 
The need to curb unemployment was especially prominent at the beginning of the 2000-
2006 programme period. Over the programme period 2000-2006, nine regions were able to 
achieve a marked reduction in unemployment differentials, while two (Burgenland (AT11) 
and Itä-Suomi (FI1D)) improved marginally. Moreover, the regions with the greatest needs 
achieved the biggest gains, through investments in the labour market but also enterprise 
and structural change, especially in the cases of Sachsen-Anhalt (DEE0), Basilicata (ITF5) 
and Nord-Pas-de-Calais (FR30). By contrast, two regions which spent heavily on enterprise 
and structural adjustment (Itä-Suomi (FI1D) and Burgenland (AT11)), but did not spend 
significantly in the labour market directly, made no inroads into the gaps. Overall though 
there was more improvement in this period of wider economic growth at a national and 
international level, although the fragility of this growth is shown by the rising levels of 
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unemployment relative to the EU average for some of these regions since 2008. A sobering 
judgement by the Campania case study team is that ‘the region continues to have the same 
problems of poverty, unemployment, worklessness, hidden employment and organised 
crime as it had two decades ago’. 
7.3.2 Patents 
Patents per million inhabitants is a proxy indicator for regional innovativeness, although it 
is primarily a measurement of inventive activity in high technology sectors, rather than the 
exploitation of ideas across a wider range of industries. Patents also tend to represent 
product innovation to a greater extent than process improvements, and many forms of 
organisational innovation are not eligible for patent protection. Consequently, the indicator 
has limitations, but there are no other output indicators for innovation with comprehensive 
spatial and temporal coverage. Some case studies, such as that of Aquitaine identified 
major achievements in long-term innovation potential not necessarily captured by the 
single indicator. Itä-Suomi, similarly, has benefited from a re-orientation of the economy 
towards high-tech sectors, while in Andalucía the ERDF is credited with improving the 
university sector. Because, as in section 7.3.1, the analysis is relative to the respective 
national trends, the findings cannot directly be compared among the fifteen regions. 
Finland and Germany have high rates of patenting, in contrast to southern Member States, 
so that although individual regions may be below the national rates, they may still be high 
relative to an EU average. 
As Figure 10 shows, needs in terms of innovation were sizeable in 1994 for almost all 
regions, which were in some cases around the national mean, in other cases lower than the 
national mean and in other cases much lower. The case study regions in Austria, Germany 
and Finland - countries relatively more innovative with respect to the EU – had especially 
low scores relative to their national means. Moreover, almost all regions, to different 
extents, performed badly in the period 1994-1999, since none of them was able to reduce 
the differential with respect to their country. Direct expenditure on innovation (the red 
circle) was comparatively lower than expenditure on enterprise and structural adjustment, 
though larger in Burgenland (AT11), which however was not able to prevent it falling 
further behind the Austrian average.  
For a number of other regions, Campania (ITF3), North East England (UKC), Andalucía 
(ES61), the expenditure in innovation was comparable to that on enterprise and structural 
adjustment; these were regions characterized by some needs and a limited under-
achievement. The cases of Sachsen-Anhalt (DEE) and Itä-Suomi (FI1D) are interesting, 
because they exhibited high relative needs at the beginning of the period, yet fell further 
behind despite substantial expenditure in enterprise and, for Sachsen-Anhalt (DEE0), 
structural adjustment, with much lower expenditure in innovation and R&D. Finally, three 
regions (Norte (PT11), Algarve (PT15) and Dytiki Ellada (EL23)) were less disadvantaged 
relative to their national mean at the beginning of the period and, despite the very low 
investment in innovation, were able to avoid losing ground. 
Due to the underperformance in the previous programme period, regional needs at the 
beginning of the 2000-2006 period were comparatively larger (Figure 10b). In this period, 
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however, some regions were able to improve their relative position, though others 
continued to lose ground. The Nord-Pas-de-Calais case study reports that ERDF pushed 
innovation up the policy agenda, pointing to one mechanism that may explain these trends. 
A similar conclusion is reached for both Nordrhein-Westfalen and Andalucía where ERDF is 
credited with enhancing the regional innovation system. 
Sachsen-Anhalt (DEE0), despite significant investment in innovation (and enterprise), was 
unable to catch up but managed to lose little ground. Among the regions able to reduce 
their gaps with national averages, Aquitaine (FR61) and North East England (UKC) were 
characterised by low and balanced expenditure. Other regions with low and balanced 
expenditure, however, lost some ground, as in the case of Basilicata (ITF5), Galicia (ES11) 
and Andalucía (ES61). An enduring difficulty, illustrated in the case study of Galicia (where 
business R&D increased from 0.2 percent of GDP in 2000 to 0.5 percent before the crisis in 
2007), is that even where the R&D effort has increased with support from ERDF, it is from 
low initial values and is still an order of magnitude lower than leading regions. In this 
regard, it is noteworthy that Nordrhein-Westfalen (DEA) had little need to boost 
innovation in 1994 and, after losing some ground, only little need in 2000, but in the period 
2000-2006 this region had one of the lowest expenditures and lost more ground than any 
other region. 
7.3.3 Tourism 
It is hard to affirm that there is a regional ‘need’ in relation to tourism, but there are 
‘opportunities’ which could be exploited to improve the regional economic situation, and 
especially important issue for regions with few other potential growth industries. The 
indicator here is the nights spent in tourist accommodation establishments (by residents 
and non-residents) relative to the resident population, normalised with respect to the 
national mean to correct for national differences in the scale and cyclical movements of 
the tourist industry. Expenditure on tourism is included in the structural adjustment axis, 
but results can also be influenced by expenditure on infrastructure and on environmental 
sustainability (see Figure 11).  
Only Algarve and Andalucía, among the 15 regions, could be regarded as major tourism 
regions in 1994, indicating unexploited opportunities elsewhere. Burgenland (AT11) made 
sizeable gains despite being the least tourism-dependent region in Austria at the beginning 
of the period. It improved its position significantly in a programme period in which it spent 
significantly on structural adjustment and infrastructure. The other regions were able to 
maintain their relative position, with the notable exceptions of Andalucía (ES61) and 
Galicia (ES11), which were unable to keep pace with Spanish national trends. Both these 
regions were characterized by large investment in infrastructure, and Andalucía (ES61) also 
by significant investment in environmental protection. However, expenditure on structural 
adjustment was low in both regions, indicating there was limited direct investment in 
tourism. 
At the beginning of the 2000-2006 programme period, two regions relatively specialised in 
tourism, Algarve (PT15) and Aquitaine (FR61) – data on the latter were not available for 
the previous period - had disappointing relative performances, especially Algarve (PT15) 
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which lost as much as it gained in the previous period. It is, however, important to note 
that the strategy in Algarve sought to upgrade the tourist offer towards higher value 
tourism, which is not captured by a visitor-night indicator. In this region, the utility is 
considerable insofar as the case study team concludes that nearly all the improvements in 
the last 23 years are underpinned by ERDF investment. The performance of the other 
regions is mixed, and better than in the previous programme period, with especially good 
results achieved by Galicia (ES11) and Andalucía (ES61), exceeding the Spanish average.  
7.4 The effects of ERDF expenditure 
To complement the analyses based on the findings of the individual case studies, 
econometric methods were used to investigate how ERDF spending affected the economies 
of the 15 case study regions. This integrated modelling approach has generated findings 
that fall in-between effectiveness and utility.. The analysis drew on a set of 17 categories 
of explanatory variables, comprising: innovation, entrepreneurship and industrial 
development, information society, transport, energy, environmental protection and risk 
prevention, tourism, culture, urban and rural regeneration, increasing the adaptability of 
workers and firms, enterprises and entrepreneurs, improving access to employment and 
sustainability, improving the social inclusion of less-favoured persons, improving human 
capital, investment in social infrastructure, mobilisation for reforms in the fields of 
employment and inclusion, strengthening institutional capacity at national, regional and 
local level, reduction of additional costs hindering the outermost regions development and 
technical assistance.  
The main findings of the research can be summarised as follows. 
a) The negative association between ‘disadvantaged’ initial conditions and subsequent 
growth is confirmed, suggesting the presence of some signs of regional convergence 
over the period of analysis, although an employment structure with a relative 
concentration of jobs in the primary sector is negatively correlated with subsequent 
growth in both GVA and employment. 
b) The association between ERDF expenditure and GVA growth – although valid for the 
entire 15-region sample – is stronger for Convergence and Phasing-in/out regions. 
c) The immediate effect of ERDF expenditure on GVA growth is very limited, and only 
seems to be statistically significant for expenditure under the ‘culture’ category of 
variables. However, when a time lag of one period between expenditure and 
growth is introduced, expenditure in a number of categories becomes positive and 
significantly correlated with GVA growth in the subsequent programme period. This 
is true for spending on innovation, tourism, investment in social infrastructure’ and 
technical assistance. There is, however, a negative correlation with spending on 
increasing the adaptability of workers. 
d) Employment growth results are mixed. There is a negative and statistically 
significant association between expenditure in innovation and employment growth, 
in line with the well-documented potential risk of innovation investment to reduce 
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employment. By contrast, expenditure on culture is positively correlated with 
employment growth. 
e) Introducing a one-period time lag, the analysis shows that links between 
expenditure and employment are generally weaker, although increasing the 
adaptability of workers is found to be negatively correlated with employment 
growth. 
f) Social cohesion expenditure is positively and significantly correlated with 
employment growth in the short-term. Conversely both enterprise and spatial 
cohesion spending show a negative and significant coefficient. This might suggest 
the presence of potential trade-offs between enterprise development and 
employment and, at the same time, between internal spatial equity (fostered by 
spatial cohesion measures) and efficiency/total regional employment. All these 
effects tend to fade in the medium-term. 
g) More sophisticated modelling designed to capture the interactions between 
determinants of performance suggests that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between total expenditure and qualitative scores of achievements as 
assessed by the case study teams, but that it is also contingent on an appropriate 
thematic mix in the programme expenditure. Spending on enterprise, structural 
adjustment and infrastructure is the most influential in this regard. 
h) More detailed exploration of time effects was also undertaken. An expected finding 
is that total Structural Funds expenditure as a share of GVA has a positive and 
significant association with regional total GVA growth. However, there is also some 
evidence that the ERDF effect increased after 1999, because the coefficient for this 
variable become a little larger and the statistical significance is higher, possibly 
suggesting regional learning. Building on the findings of Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi 
(2007), the analysis also shows that the effects of ERDF spending on regional 
economic performance can persist, reaching a peak after two years, but then 
tailing-off.  
i) There is, however, no firm evidence on whether or not concentration of spending 
on certain thematic axes makes a difference; indeed, there are very tentative 
indications that a spread of spending across certain themes, notably enterprise, 
structural adjustment and infrastructure is most conducive to better economic 
performance. However, these results are not statistically very robust. 
Findings from the case studies lend qualitative support to some of these broad conclusions. 
For example, in Itä-Suomi, the case study finds that after some initial catch-up to the 
Finnish average, progress has stalled. The study team argues that the explanation lies with 
external forces, and not the ERDF programmes, and that the process of modernisation had 
nevertheless been useful. The North East England case study emphasised the benefits of 
spending on cultural renewal, while the limited employment gains in a number of regions 
highlight some of the tensions in design of programmes with multiple objectives. 
Evaluation of the main achievements of Cohesion policy programmes and projects over the longer term 
in 15 selected regions: Final Report 
EPRC 99 LSE 
7.5 Conclusions 
As for effectiveness, the findings on utility are mixed. On the one hand, the ordinal 
correlations make it clear that achievements are broadly coherent with needs, based on 
aggregation of the qualitative assessments of the case study teams. Moreover, the fact that 
this finding is generally corroborated across regions and periods signals that the nature of 
particular interventions has been appropriate. Policy interventions can, to this extent, be 
judged to be generally appropriate, although a cautionary note is sounded in the North 
East England case study which observes that although ‘in all periods the region’s needs 
were at least partly met, strategic choices affected the degree to which particular needs 
were met’.  
On the other hand, the results of the interventions on the three selected measures of need 
are uneven and volatile. Some regions have moved from under-performing to exceeding 
their respective national benchmarks and vice versa, while success in one area (such as 
tourism) can be offset by a lack of progress on another or an inability to adapt the strategy. 
In Burgenland, for example, the case study finds that with the exception of tourism, many 
of the basic needs remain unmet, especially in the south of the region. In practice, this 
could be explained by how choices are made on priorities, especially where programmes 
have relatively limited resources. The Sachsen-Anhalt case study, as an illustration, 
criticises a one-sided emphasis on fixed assets in the first two programme periods.  
The discussion of the three groups of regions according to funding status shows that 
priorities are, inevitably, also about sequencing and here there are diverse stories from the 
15 regions. Basilicata appeared to have a better logic of development in the early period, 
but was pulled towards a less useful approach subsequently. Regions may choose a 
particular logic of intervention which achieves results in selected areas but fails to deal 
with needs in others. Such a conclusion should be interpreted as neither surprising nor a 
strong reason for criticism, because there is only so much that even the best ERDF 
programme can do. Even so, as the Ireland case study emphasises, the ERDF has ‘left a 
footprint now widely mainstreamed and often taken for granted, e.g. prevalence of multi-
annual public sector investment plans, the use of EU concepts and practices, and 
widespread acceptance of the role of monitoring and evaluation’. It is a dimension of utility 
that is discussed in the next chapter on lessons learnt. 
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Figure 9: Relative unemployment rates in programme periods 1994-1999 and 2000-
2006 
a) 1994-1999 
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Source: Eurostat and data collected by the case study team for this project. 
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Figure 10: Relative number of patent per million inhabitants in programme periods 
2994-99 and 2000-2006 
a) 1994-1999 
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Source: Eurostat and data collected by the case study team for this project. 
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Figure 11: Relative number of nights spent in tourist accommodation establishments (by 
residents and non-residents) on population in programme periods 1994-1999 and 2000-
2006 
a) 1994-1999 
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b) 2000-2006 
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Source: Eurostat and data collected by the case study team for this project. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FOR COHESION POLICY 
8.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study has been to evaluate the main achievements of EU Cohesion policy 
programmes and projects and their effectiveness and utility over the period 1989-2013 in 
15 selected regions of the EU15.  The main objectives of the study were to examine the 
achievements of all programmes co-financed by the ERDF and, where applicable, the 
Cohesion Fund, and to assess the relevance of programmes and the effectiveness and utility 
of programme achievements. Taking the evaluation questions (EQs) in turn, this chapter 
draws together the conclusions to emerge from the research focusing on whether and how 
the programmes addressed regional needs and problems, and the achievements of the 
programmes. 
The experiences of the 15 regions provide extensive evidence on the formulation and 
implementation of Cohesion policy, with both good and bad practices. The study has 
identified lessons that may be applied to enhance the effectiveness and utility of ERDF 
interventions across the full cycle of a programme. In addition to the conclusions, this 
chapter discusses the main lessons learned and draws out implications for future Cohesion 
policy.  
Overall, the main message is one of slow improvement in many aspects of ERDF 
programmes, although problems remain.  Indeed, some regions have experienced a 
deterioration of management or implementation quality in the most recent programmes. 
Nonetheless, there is increasing adoption of good practice, for instance in the 
sophistication of strategies (e.g. evidence base, analysis and strategic focus) and 
programme management (e.g. project selection, monitoring, evaluation time). To 
understand how Cohesion policy functioned, however, it is important to recognise the 
context for decisions and the prevailing orthodoxies when programmes were launched. 
What may be self-evident now about the 1989-1993 programme, for example, was not 
necessarily obvious at the time. Enhanced sophistication in programming over time has 
been a requirement of the European Commission, facilitated by learning from previous 
programmes. What is more interesting is the additional innovation that can emerge from 
below, but also the barriers which prevent learning taking place in some regions. 
8.2 EQ1: To what extent did the programmes address regional needs 
and problems over time?) 
EQ1a: What were the initial regional needs and problems and what has been their 
evolution? 
This analysis has covered a diverse set of regions, with different underlying development 
needs, as reflected in their different ERDF eligibility status. In the late 1980s, the main 
underlying needs related to: (i) major underdevelopment across all economic, social and 
environmental indicators; (ii) problems related to population sparsity and/or peripherality; 
(iii) a weak economic base, for instance due to transition from centrally planned economy 
(Sachsen-Anhalt) or specialisation in agriculture or traditional industries (whether heavy 
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industries or low added value traditional manufacture); and (iv) the effects of spatial or 
labour market disequilibria. The recipients of the most generous ERDF support - Dytiki 
Ellada, Ireland and the Italian, Portuguese and Spanish regions - faced all of these needs at 
the same time. The needs of other regions were more specific, for example related to 
economic restructuring and labour market disequilibria (e.g. Nordrhein-Westfalen, Nord-
Pas-de-Calais and North East England) or population sparsity (Itä-Suomi). 
Over time, some regions were able to overcome their initial challenges, others less so. The 
greatest improvements were realised in the fields of infrastructure for basic public services 
and transport, and the provision of essential public services. Of the various types of need, 
the most resilient and resistant to policy has been the low levels of private sector R&D; this 
was a need faced by all but two regions in the late 1980s and has since been successfully 
met only in Ireland. 
Of the regions classified as facing major under-development, Ireland has been deemed the 
most successful in meeting the broad set of development needs. In many other cases, 
development needs were partially met – for instance R&D expenditure improved over time 
in Campania and in the Portuguese and Spanish regions – but without matching the regions’ 
potential and enabling them to catch-up with national and EU averages.  Some needs were 
not even partially met and indeed, in a few cases, even became worse. For instance, in 
Sachsen-Anhalt long-term unemployment, social exclusion, poverty and weak private R&D 
deteriorated during the study period, as did poverty in Basilicata and environmental 
problems in Algarve and (partly) in Campania. 
Economic growth remained low compared to both national and EU averages in a few regions 
(such as Campania, Dytiki Ellada), meaning that they fell further behind during the period 
notwithstanding periods of convergence. Regions tended to evolve in line with wider 
national trends (with exceptions, as in Algarve). Strong and steady reductions of 
unemployment during the period occurred only in Itä-Suomi, Ireland and North-East 
England. At the opposite end of the scale, Sachsen-Anhalt faced sharp rises of 
unemployment in the early 1990s, with rates remaining persistently high. In most regions, 
unemployment tended to follow cyclical paths, with more-or-less pronounced periodic 
fluctuations (e.g. in the French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese regions), or it fluctuated 
marginally, remaining close to national values (Burgenland, Nordrhein-Westfalen).  
Plotting employment against productivity growth reveals that only one region, Ireland, 
experienced a ‘virtuous cycle’ of higher-than-average growth of both productivity and 
employment over the period. At the opposite end of the spectrum, only one region, 
Campania, experienced the ‘vicious cycle’ of relative decline, i.e. below-par job and 
output growth (although some other regions feature as borderline with this category: 
North-East England, Nordrhein-Westfalen and Basilicata). One third of regions 
outperformed EU averages of either productivity or growth (Andalucía, Algarve, Aquitaine 
and Sachsen-Anhalt) or both (Ireland). The other regions underperformed either on 
unemployment rates (Itä-Suomi and Norte), productivity (North-East England, Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Basilicata, Nord-Pas de Calais, Burgenland and Dytiki Ellada) or both 
(Campania). 
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EQ1b: What was the strategy of ERDF programmes in each programme period? What 
has been their evolution?  
This study covers a period of four sets of programmes over twenty years and hence there is 
an opportunity to examine the way in which programmes have evolved as a result of 
learning from one to the next. Programme evolution is notable particularly in terms of the 
ways in which priorities have been identified in relation to an increasingly sophisticated 
understanding of needs, and changes in those needs.  
The concept of strategic regional planning at a regional level was novel to many regions, 
and in several regions the plans developed for the ERDF were the only or main regional 
development strategies. These strategies varied within groups of regions, and also within 
regions between periods, partly linked to their changing ERDF eligibility status. 
There was a general improvement in the analysis of regional problems over the four 
programme periods with most regions having struggled to bring together suitable data 
before the 1989-1993 programmes, but making investments in data collection and analysis 
over subsequent programme cycles. However, the availability of data is only the first step, 
and regions needed the capacity to make judgements about the real needs and suitable 
interventions arising from the evidence base. Here, judgements are more contested. Some 
regions decided that accessibility and communication were the real underlying needs, and 
these were prioritised accordingly, but such decisions underplayed the importance of 
changing the productive structure of regions. A decision to address critical transport 
problems often made sense, but may have had a limited effect on the resilience of the 
region if the underlying economic base remained unchanged. This was the case in several of 
the southern European regions such as Galicia, Andalucía, Dytiki Ellada and Algarve where 
the opportunity cost of a focus on transport infrastructure may not have been sufficiently 
taken into consideration in the sense that other, less obvious or immediate investments 
might have yielded better results. 
The Objective 1/Convergence regions along with the Phasing in/out regions of Algarve, 
Basilicata and Ireland tended to have wide-ranging strategies, enabled by the financial 
scale of EU support and the parallel implementation of a range of interventions, comprising 
not just regional OPs but also sectoral OPs managed by national ministries and domestic 
programmes. The strategies of these regions focused mainly on the creation of fixed 
capital, i.e. different types of infrastructure, generally supplemented by human capital 
investment and entrepreneurship and/or industrial development and reconversion support. 
This emphasis continued throughout the study period, but from 2000-2006 with a stronger 
emphasis on competitiveness and R&D&I.  
The remaining Phasing-in/out regions had diversified strategies (reflecting their diverse 
development challenges), with needs ranging from peripherality in Itä-Suomi  to industrial 
reconversion in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and predominant rurality in Burgenland. Burgenland 
focused on entrepreneurial development though a mix of supply and demand-side support, 
and a combination of instruments geared to clusters, new start-ups and individual 
enterprise support, and a progressively increasing emphasis on R&D&I. Itä-Suomi’s 
strategies were also predominantly focused on business support, increasingly geared 
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towards the knowledge economy. Lastly, Nord-Pas-de-Calais shifted from a dual strategy 
based on infrastructure and business support in 1989-1993 to an increasing emphasis on 
social issues and a wider ‘image’ change for the region, to allow it to grasp new economic 
opportunities. On the whole, the strategy of this region was constantly informed by the 
difficult trade-off between industrial reconversion and support to existing firms (and the 
jobs that they provided), i.e. between an economic and a social rationale. 
The Objective 2/RCE regions also had diversified strategies. Nordrhein-Westfalen 
consistently focused on a dual strategy aimed at diversifying the industrial structure 
alongside environmental reclamation, the former with an increasing emphasis over time on 
entrepreneurial support (SMEs, start-ups, clusters and entrepreneurship) and innovation. 
North East England focused initially very strongly on infrastructure to support FDI, 
progressively shifting to enterprise and innovation support and softer investments, such as 
community development and transformational tourism projects; whereas Aquitaine focused 
especially on economic development and diversification in rural areas, entrepreneurship 
and infra-regional territorial integration, with broad continuity across the periods.  
Overall trends, insofar as they can be identified for 15 regions are: a greater emphasis on 
R&D&I, particularly from 2000 onwards;  the inclusion over time of support to integrated 
urban and community development (initially piloted through the URBAN Community 
Initiative and subsequently mainstreamed); and a progressive shift in support to tourism. 
Tourism became a mainstay throughout the programme periods of most programme 
strategies as a means for economic diversification and structural adjustment, but 
progressively seen through the lenses of the wider attractiveness of regions, underpinned 
by both cultural and environmental investments.  
The research has also attempted to reconstruct the often implicit development theories 
underlying programme strategies and in so doing to disentangle the difference between the 
explicit strategic choices declared in the programme documents and the implicit strategies 
actually pursued. The difference between the two sets of strategies was particularly 
evident in the earlier programme periods of the 1990s, when programme strategies were 
often not linked to sound analyses of needs or evaluation evidence, and they were often 
generic collections of intervention fields with no clear prioritisation, providing room for 
differing interpretations and operational choices.  
In this respect, two conclusions can be drawn. First, it was not evident that strategies were 
underpinned by theory, with the exception of the Basilicata and Campania in the 2000-
2006 period, North East England in the 2000s and the domestic regional policy focus of 
Nordrhein-Westfalen and Sachsen-Anhalt. Especially in the early programmes, strategies 
were generally drafted as compilations of interventions with no particular overarching 
rationale. Second, and related, there were often divergences between what was stated in 
the programmes and what was actually implemented. Generic programmes accommodated 
diversified local priorities or preferences that were different from what was being 
promoted by the European Commission or national government in the negotiation of 
programmes and within the framework of the CSFs (e.g. in Aquitaine, Basilicata, North 
East England, Norte, Itä-Suomi). Often, though, the differences between the strategies 
stated in the programmes and what was actually implemented derived from the necessity 
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to find pragmatic responses to implementation difficulties, reflected in financial shifts 
between and within priorities (e.g. in Campania in the 2000-2006 ROP in favour of transport 
infrastructure).  
A strategic problem in a number of cases was the lack of integration between national 
Operational Programmes and regional-level programmes, and between national programmes 
implemented by different ministries. Whilst the idea of national programmes for trans-
regional infrastructures makes sense, those countries with a large number of national 
programmes experienced overlaps and duplication with regional programmes, without 
effective coordination (examples are the experiences of Basilicata and Campania). 
EQ1c: What were the priorities and objectives of ERDF programmes of each 
programme period? What has been their evolution?  Were the objectives SMART? 
At the beginning of the study period, the programmes had relatively straightforward 
objectives: (i) Algarve, Andalucía, Dytiki Ellada, Norte focused primarily on infrastructure, 
together with ESF investments in human resources; (ii) Ireland, Campania, Basilicata and 
Galicia had wide-ranging objectives, combined a strong focus on infrastructure endowment 
(transport, environmental, industrial and social infrastructure) with entrepreneurial 
support/structural adjustment measures aimed at developing industry, entrepreneurship, 
conversion, skills, competitiveness and wider quality of life; (iii) Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
Sachsen-Anhalt, Nord-Pas-de-Calais and North East England focused mainly on the 
challenges of structural adjustment, often together with external accessibility, the pursuit 
of intra-regional territorial balance and/or support of marginalised groups; (iv) Aquitaine 
and Itä-Suomi focused predominantly on economic diversification in rural/sparsely 
populated areas; whilst (v) Burgenland targeted especially entrepreneurial development.  
For the most part, the regional objectives were stable over time, tending to evolve 
incrementally. This applied in particular to the 1990s, with the exception of Nordrhein-
Westfalen. More substantial changes were undertaken at the start of the 2000-2006 and 
2007-2013 periods, driven mainly by compliance with EU regulatory requirements, changes 
in the eligibility status of regions (e.g. Ireland in 2000, Basilicata in 2007) or parts of 
regions. The recent economic crisis has led to extensive reprogramming in a number of 
regions – Dytiki Ellada, Campania, Basilicata and Norte. 
As noted above, trends over the period included an increasing emphasis on R&D, often 
matched with a stronger focus on entrepreneurship through more sophisticated approaches 
for the support of SMEs; increased support for urban development projects; and a continued 
emphasis on four key themes: tourism (virtually everywhere), increasingly linked with 
cultural and wider attractiveness measures; nature protection and environmental 
infrastructure (in some of the regions classified in the ‘major underdevelopment’ 
category); cross-border cooperation in selected regions (Galicia, Aquitaine, Norte and Itä-
Suomi); and  improvement of the quality of life. 
The extent to which objectives were SMART – specific, measurable, attainable, relevant 
and timely – varied across regions and especially across the period. Insofar as a general 
trend can be identified, it is that early programmes tended to have generic objectives, that 
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they were not defined and framed in a way that made them measurable, that targets were 
often absent and expectations overestimated (thus attainability was questionable), and 
that objectives were not time-bound in the sense of being linked to a realistic operational 
timetable. Whilst regions were required to set objectives and targets for programmes and 
measures, the experience of doing so was generally poor, with regions struggling to identify 
appropriate indicators and setting targets at levels which were either unrealistic or too 
modest. As a result, targets were frequently revised down in some of the earlier 
programmes as it became clear that they were far higher than could be attained. 
Programme objectives, nevertheless, tended to be relevant from the early days of ERDF 
programming, with the main problem being the prioritisation of efforts, rather than the 
inability of programme authorities to appropriately identify needs. In a few cases, 
programme objectives were considered to be only moderately relevant across the entire 
study period, the examples being Dytiki Ellada, Itä-Suomi, Algarve, Aquitaine and North 
East England. 
The SMARTness of programme objectives improved over time, especially the degree to 
which objectives became more specific and measureable, although progress was 
incremental. The ability of programme authorities to set realistic targets and identify 
timely paths for implementation remains an area for further improvements. A particular 
problem was the difficulty in estimating a sensible target in advance of knowing the types 
of project. A target set in the expectation of a particular mix of projects could become 
unrealistic simply because the projects proposed and selected were of a different character 
to those anticipated – for example if offices were built rather than manufacturing or 
warehouses. But there was also a general difficulty in estimating targets linked to a lack of 
understanding about what had been the actual achievements of programme interventions in 
past periods, due to the variable quality of the information provided by programme 
monitoring systems and the lack of comprehensive, detailed and reliable ex post evaluative 
evidence.  
EQ1d: What has ERDF support been spent on in each programme period? Have there 
been significant transfers from initial allocations of ERDF resources to other priorities 
in any period? 
Over the period 1989-2013, ERDF programmes were designed and funding allocated  periods 
ranging from three to seven years.  The longer periods allowed programme authorities  to 
take a longer perspective on needs and to fund larger, more strategic projects; equally, 
they also need the ability to respond to sudden changes in need and to fit with national 
funding cycles. This flexibility has been particularly important since the global financial 
crisis as the assumptions on which funding were planned changed fundamentally in many 
cases. 
The distribution of expenditure across different themes varied by type of region. The 
Objective 1/Convergence regions tended to focus predominantly on basic and transport 
infrastructure, across all programme periods except for 2007-2013. The proportion ranged 
from 56 percent of total expenditure in 1989-1993, to 31 percent in 1994-1999 and 2000-
2006, falling to a low of 14 percent in 2007-2013. Enterprise support also featured 
prominently, remaining in the 20-27 percent range from 1994-1999 to 2007-2013, compared 
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to only five percent in 1989-1993. The main thematic shift over time was a strengthening of 
support for social cohesion and the labour market, a trend that started in 2000-2006. The 
themes of innovation and environmental sustainability remained broadly stable; innovation 
was allocated 3-4 percent of total expenditure in the 1990s rising slightly to seven percent 
in 2000-2006 and 2007-2013, while environmental sustainability received around 15 percent 
of total expenditure in the first three programme periods, falling to around ten percent in 
2007-2013.  
In the Phasing-in/out regions, the initial programmes also focused predominantly on 
infrastructure, which accounted for almost 60 percent of spend in 1989-1993, but became 
more diversified in subsequent periods. There was a stronger emphasis on enterprise 
support (34 percent, 38 percent and 21 percent respectively in 1994-1999, 2000-2006 and 
2007-2013) and, in the 2007-2013 period, structural adjustment and innovation 
(respectively at 23 and 22 percent of expenditure). 
By contrast, in the Objective 2/RCE regions, expenditure was heavily concentrated on 
enterprise support until 2006 (with this theme accounting for 50 percent of expenditure in 
1989-1993, 30 percent in 1994-1999, 35 percent in 2000-2006, but only 15 percent in 2007-
2013) and a marked shift towards innovation and social cohesion in the 2007-13 period.  In 
this group, two themes received relatively little policy attention throughout the study 
period: territorial cohesion and the environment. However, whilst the former has 
progressively diminished (from ten percent in both 1989-1993 and 1994-1999, to three 
percent in 2000-2006 and no expenditure in 2007-2013), the latter has seen its share double 
from 2000-2006 (from four percent to 11 percent of total expenditure).  
With the exception of Algarve (ROP only), Andalucía, Ireland and Itä-Suomi, there were 
shifts of ERDF resources between priorities in all programme periods up to 2006. The 
content and scale of these shifts varied and no general pattern can be identified. For 
instance, In Nord-Pas-de-Calais significant shifts took place from the innovation and 
entrepreneurship priorities in early programme periods in favour of infrastructure; whilst in 
Burgenland, entrepreneurship priorities gained in all periods. In some cases, such as in the 
Italian programmes, there were also shifts of resources between programmes (from the 
ROPs to the NOPs or vice-versa) within the CSF, with the performance reserve being used to 
reward good use of the funds (for Basilicata). Shifts of resources occurred also within 
priorities, i.e. within measures. These shifts did not always represent a change in strategic 
orientation, but rather reflected operational difficulties and absorption capacity. 
8.3 EQ2: To what extent do ERDF achievements meet regional 
objectives and needs in each programme period and across all 
periods? 
EQ2a: What are the reported achievements of each programme period  
Detailed outputs on the 1989-1993 period were available for only six of the 15 regions 
examined: Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Dytiki Ellada, Ireland, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Algarve and 
Norte. They consist of indicators such as length of road, water and sewage networks built, 
area of land where premises were built or refurbished. Job creation was monitored or 
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appraised by only a few programmes or programme interventions in Ireland, Dytiki Ellada 
and the two German Länder, ranging from a reported 20,000 new net jobs created in 
Ireland and 17,000 jobs created and safeguarded in Nordrhein-Westfalen (plus a further 
likely job creation of a further 7,000 jobs), to the more modest 1,162 new jobs in Dytiki 
Ellada (the majority of which were temporary new jobs linked to the supported 
investments). 
More information on reported outputs is available for the 1994-1999 programmes, as a 
result of improvements in the monitoring systems implemented regionally and/or 
nationally. Additionally, the two ex post evaluations undertaken for the European 
Commission (DG XVI) and evaluations undertaken domestically (e.g. in Ireland), provide 
information on the estimated jobs created and safeguarded by the programmes in the 
various regions. These range from 33,000 net new jobs created in Ireland and c. 28,000 
jobs created and 55,000 safeguarded in Sachsen-Anhalt, to around 2,300 new jobs in 
Burgenland and c. 320 new jobs created by the Algarve ROP. However, these data appear 
to suffer from potential inaccuracies, as noted for instance by the ex post evaluation of the 
Objective 6 programme of Itä-Suomi which indicated that the figure of jobs created and 
reported by the programme (of 21,000 new jobs and 62,000 safeguarded jobs) was very 
substantially over-estimated, with the true figure more like 10-20 percent of this estimate.  
Output data on 2000-2006 are more readily and comprehensively available, reflecting 
further improvements in programme monitoring systems. Partly because of the greater 
sophistication of programmes and the improved administrative capacity within managing 
authorities, the 2000-2006 generation of programmes saw a proliferation in the number of 
indicators. Despite this, the monitoring of results remained a problem in this period also, as 
they were not always appropriately captured by programme monitoring systems (which 
might track jobs created by individual projects but based on aggregation of figures declared 
by project managers), nor did the majority of programmes undertake their own ex post 
evaluations. Even when programme-specific programme evaluations were undertaken, as in 
Campania, these did not always attempt to assess net job creation and focused instead on 
the appraisal of the monitoring data reported for the programme (in itself a useful exercise 
which pointed to clear conclusions on the programme’s effectiveness and recommendations 
for the future programme).  
Information on programme results in the regions – even in aggregate form – is by and large 
also not available from the ex post evaluations of the 2000-2006 ERDF programmes, other 
than on selected themes for the regions covered by case study research. Information on job 
creation is available nevertheless for almost all the regions investigated (12 out of 15), 
ranging from the c. 80,000 new jobs created in Galicia and the 35,000 net new jobs 
generated in North East England, to the more modest c. 17,000 jobs (of which only 2,310 
permanent) in Dytiki Ellada. In no case, across the programme periods, does there appear 
to be a direct correlation between the number of reported jobs created or safeguarded by 
the programmes, and the financial input of the Funds relative to the regional economy. 
It would be premature to appraise the reported achievements of 2007-2013 programmes 
given the delays with implementation and the significant changes introduced to the 
programmes in the light of the effect of the recession in the regional economies.  
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Thematically, across the entire study period, achievements were reported in relation to 
R&D spending relative to GDP or GNP, with upward trends in Campania and Ireland, 
whereas attempts to increase private sector R&D expenditure  were generally less 
successful, with the notable exception of North East England. Reported achievements in 
the enterprise sector were very diverse and did not always translate into increased 
productivity. In the tourism field, reported achievements, such as the increased number of 
beds created and tourists in the regions, were also wide-ranging, but they did not always 
prove to be sustainable, with reversals during the current recession. Detailed output data 
are generally available across all regions in relation to the different types of infrastructure 
built or modernised – i.e. industrial areas, roads and railways, ports, logistical platforms, 
environmental and basic infrastructure (e.g. water and sewage networks, water purification 
plants), social infrastructure such as schools and hospitals, telecommunications (phone lines 
initially and broadband subsequently) – showing the importance of ERDF support in these 
fields in all regions deemed at the beginning of the study period to be characterised by 
major underdevelopment.  
EQ2b: To what extent were objectives achieved in each programme period? 
The main conclusion from the qualitative assessments of achievements in relation to 
programme objectives is that, overall, Cohesion policy intervention over the period 1989-
present was effective, but with variation by programme period, theme and region. Regions 
are considered to have (mostly) improved their attainment of objectives. In 1989-1993, only 
six regions were judged to have met or exceeded programme objectives, for six others it 
was impossible to make a judgement, and three others underperformed. By contrast, in the 
2000-2006 period, the majority of regions  met or exceeded their objectives. However, 
these conclusions need to be read with important caveats in mind. In particular, the 
vagueness of programme objectives in some cases involves considerable subjectivity in 
judging whether they were achieved, and the ‘increased effectiveness’ of 2000-2006 
programmes needs to take account of the frequent reviews of programme targets during 
implementation (increasing the likely match between expectations and reality). 
With respect to specific areas of intervention, effectiveness appears to have been higher 
for large-scale physical infrastructure, environmental improvements and local business and 
innovation infrastructure. Regions had difficulty with areas like structural adjustment, 
business support, innovation and community development, all of which required operational 
strategies, delivery systems and administrative capacity.  
EQ2c: To what extent were needs met in each programme period? To what extent can 
observed changes in regional needs and problems be imputed to ERDF programmes 
over time? 
The utility of programmes is the extent to which they led to impacts that, irrespective of 
whether they were intended or whether they were delivered within the programme 
timeframes, addressed regional needs and solved problems that held back their socio-
economic development. This has been done by comparing achievements with needs, in each 
of the eight thematic axes and overall, and establishing ordinal correlations between the 
two.  
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The main conclusion is that, for all periods and for all the themes taken together, the 
policy has been useful in meeting regional needs over the long run. Interestingly, however, 
utility is assessed as being higher in the first two programme periods and lower in 2000-
2006 (it is too soon to appraise utility for the 2007-2013 programmes), suggesting that the 
increased sophistication of programmes has not meant improved utility or that it is too soon 
to make a judgement. 
The highest utility was found in the regional infrastructure endowment thematic axis 
(which mainly comprises transport and telecommunications infrastructure), notwithstanding 
the lack of resources to fund operational and maintenance costs in some regions, 
exacerbated by the economic crisis, a consequence which diminishes the utility of 
investments. A high degree of utility across the study period as a whole was also reported in 
the fields of enterprise and innovation, whereas only one theme - infra-regional territorial 
cohesion – displays a low long-term utility, with positive assessments only in the first two 
programme periods.  
Utility is assessed as ‘high’ to ‘medium’ in all the regions which were classified as facing 
major underdevelopment at the beginning of the period: the highest in Ireland, also high in 
Algarve, and medium in Andalucía, Basilicata, Campania, Dytiki Ellada, Galicia and Norte, 
as well as in Sachsen-Anhalt which faced somewhat different challenges in its transition 
from central planning. The Irish case is particularly emblematic. Here, the ERDF 
programmes and Cohesion Fund projects allowed the country to undergo both endogenous 
and exogenous development, leveraging-in or providing the conditions for the attraction of 
foreign direct investment whilst at the same time supporting the indigenous economy. In 
Algarve, the ERDF programmes and Cohesion Fund were instrumental in the modernisation 
of the region’s infrastructure and urban network, thus providing a basis for growth based on 
the expansion of the tourism industry, on which the region today remains largely dependent 
however. In the remaining regions, the ERDF programmes (and Cohesion Fund in Andalucía, 
Dytiki Ellada and Norte) delivered important improvements in transport and social 
infrastructure and some environmental improvements, but without being able to ignite a 
process of self-sustaining growth - which has made the economic achievements less 
resilient to the current downturn. This is hindering the overall utility of the investments 
made in those fields where the programmes were successful in meeting regional needs, as 
the lack of growth did not deliver the growth in tax revenues that would have been 
necessary to maintain and run the infrastructure built.  
Utility was on the whole medium to high also in the Objective 2/RCE regions, typically 
characterised by declining heavy industry (Nordrhein-Westfalen, and North East England) 
and in Nord-Pas-de-Calais which faced similar problems. The utility of the ERDF 
programmes in these regions was highest in relation to environmental needs, connected to 
reclamation of abandoned industrial land which was largely completed. The lowest levels of 
utility related to social challenges deriving from the process of deindustrialisation, which 
were not met. The utility of programmes in facilitating economic transition to a different 
economic model was mixed, probably reflecting the difficulty of these regions in 
reconciling long-term and short-term needs within programme strategies. Economic utility 
appears to have been increasing in the 2000s, in parallel with the greater emphasis placed 
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in the strategies on innovation and the increased sophistication in the support provided to 
different types of firms. 
Lastly, in Aquitaine, Burgenland, Itä-Suomi and – more rural regions in the Phasing-on/out 
and RCE groups also hampered by peripherality or limited connectivity - the utility of 
programmes was mixed in meeting the main needs. Progress with improving connectivity 
and diversifying the production base was on the whole not particularly encouraging. 
Aquitaine has experienced more limited success in the transformation of its economy. 
Burgenland continues to have unmet basic needs in all fields except for tourism, especially 
in the south of the region, and Itä-Suomi is still struggling to overcome the growth-
depressing effects of peripherality. All regions faced multiple and complex needs.  
The varied degree to which the 15 regions were successful in addressing the full range of 
development challenges is, in part, a natural outcome of the limited scope of programmes 
and the difficulty of addressing all areas of need. To an extent, the achievements reflect 
the choices made by programme authorities, which in some cases were informed by a 
perception of need calibrated over the short and medium terms, rather than being guided 
by a longer-term vision of how the regions might change. Nevertheless, the conclusion that 
not all needs were addressed should not come as a surprise, nor should it be viewed as a 
strong criticism, given that there is only so much that even the best ERDF programmes can 
do. It does, however, raise questions about the complementarity (and additionality) of the 
programmes and their coherence with wider domestic public policies. 
Lastly, a further dimension of utility is represented by the ‘learning’ that implementing 
multi-annual programmes, with associated monitoring, evaluation, control and reporting 
requirements has entailed for regional and national administrations. 
EQ2d: What have been the complementarities and synergies of ERDF interventions 
with ESF, EAGGF/EAFRD, and with domestic regional policy interventions? 
The ERDF programmes, even when they represent a significant portion of public 
expenditure in a region (as has been the case historically for most regions characterised by 
‘major underdevelopment’), must act synergistically with, and complement, other 
investment programmes, in order to deliver their ambitious development goals. The 
evidence from the case studies suggests that this has been a critical aspect of the ERDF 
programmes, and that complementarities and synergies were often limited to specific fields 
or projects, rather than systematically pursued (with the notable exception of Ireland).  
Until recently, ERDF support was often embedded in multi-fund programmes, i.e. 
programmes that included funding from all Structural Funds applicable to the region 
including ESF, EAGGF (now EAFRD) and FIFG (now EFF). Despite this, and partly due to the 
separation of Fund management, the operation of the programmes tended by and large to 
prioritise efficient delivery over synergies and results-orientation.  
Examples of synergy between Structural Funds include the provision of training courses 
(ESF-funded) together with investments in new machinery or innovation (ERDF-funded), or 
the provision of irrigation infrastructure (ERDF-funded) in parallel with support for 
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agricultural activities (EAGGF funded). In some cases, as in the Italian Integrated Aid 
Packages implemented under the Objective 1 ‘Local Entrepreneurial Development’ 2000-
2006 programme, integration between the funds was incentivised explicitly at project 
level, through the design of application and selection procedures, but this experience was 
an exception. Complementarity and synergy were thus encouraged at intervention or 
project level, but not systematically across all fields of intervention. 
Systematic synergy between the various Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund occurred 
only in Ireland, where good cross-fund coordination was ensured by framing Cohesion policy 
within wider national development policy. Elsewhere, coordination and synergy was 
disappointing, and it was particularly so in Basilicata, Campania, Algarve, Norte and 
Nordrhein-Westfalen. Interestingly, the existence of overarching strategies, such as the 
CSF and NSRF, is not per se a sufficient tool to ensure strategic and operational coherence 
between funds (and indeed, as the case study research has uncovered, between national 
and regional level programmes).  
Synergies with domestic policies tended to be less problematic. This was driven by two, 
closely interlinked factors. First, among the largest regional recipients of EU funding, there 
was strong alignment or integration of ERDF programmes with domestic capital spending 
programmes. For instance, in Greece around 70 percent of the national Public Investments 
Programme for the whole 1989-2013 period was allocated to co-finance the national 
contribution to the Structural Funds; whilst in Ireland, CSFs have been embedded in 
successive National Development Plans, meaning that ERDF expenditure was guided by 
national policy and co-funded as part of national programmes. Second, for all programmes 
the requirement to provide match-funding meant that the ERDF was used to support 
investments undertaken as part of domestic policies, e.g. the Centres of Excellence 
programmes in Itä-Suomi or the domestic regional policy (GRW) in Germany. In a few case 
studies, the research uncovered additionality problems. In Italy, for instance, the declining 
domestic public spending in recent years has meant that ERDF has in some cases ended up 
replacing domestic funding, with negative consequences for additionality and thus on the 
ultimate impact that the programmes will deliver. 
EQ2e: What has been the overall contribution of ERDF programmes to regional 
development? 
What constitutes an important contribution to regional development is generally highly 
context-specific. A key dilemma in most regions was to choose between large, strategic 
projects and distributing funds across a larger number of smaller, perhaps community-
focused projects. It should be noted that the limited size of projects is not per se an 
element of bad practice and, vice versa, that large projects are not necessarily the best 
solution. It is arguable that certain types of interventions, e.g. in the cultural sphere or 
grassroots social cohesion projects, require by nature to be smaller scale. What matters is 
that a degree of critical mass is ensured, in order to achieve the objectives set in 
programme documents, and this might be better achieved by aggregation rather than larger 
project size (e.g. the Phlegrean Fields integrated territorial programme in Campania, 
which was successfully implemented through the integration and coordination of over 100 
projects).  
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Nevertheless, a problem in some regions was the proliferation of small projects which were 
not linked cohesively in an overarching framework of how, together, they would contribute 
to programme objectives, and which in some cases exceeded the administrative capacities 
of regions, resulting in delays or high project mortality. In these cases, there was often a 
view that a focused approach was more likely to be effective. In most regions, there was a 
movement over time towards more strategic use of the funds and in favour of larger 
projects, partly encouraged by the Commission and the pressures of commitment. However, 
problems were also experienced with large projects. Several of the case studies highlighted 
controversial projects where the value-for-money was disputed (Aquitaine, for example), 
the project planning was too ambitious (Itä-Suomi) or there were significant problems with 
completing projects to time and budget (Dytiki-Ellada, Norte).  
ERDF programmes and the investments of the Cohesion Fund have only facilitated a 
transformative effect across the board in Ireland, delivering considerable improvements in 
the main areas of regional need and a matching increase in growth and employment. 
Naturally, the programmes played a role alongside other developments. In Ireland, the 
positive economic transformation was linked to the integration of the country’s economy in 
wider global markets, across both sides of the Atlantic. This might have an impact on the 
resilience of the improvements realised, given the country’s integration in global economic 
networks affected by the economic crisis.  
In a further group of regions – Algarve, Andalucía and Galicia – the ERDF programmes have 
delivered a transformation of the regional economies, which has indeed been reflected in 
GDP convergence with the rest of the EU and improved labour market indicators, but which 
is not proving to have sustainably affected the regions’ longer-term development prospects 
and resilience. In these regions, the ERDF programmes and the Cohesion Fund contributed 
to major improvements in regional infrastructure endowment and the provision of public 
services - across all types of infrastructure and services, from transport to schools and 
hospitals, from water networks and purification plants, to waste collection and recycling 
etc. However, the induced economic transformation was based largely on tourism and 
services, whereas improvements in productivity and in high-added value clusters were 
limited to segments of the regional economies which represent relatively small proportions 
the regional GVA and employment.  
In most of the regions – Aquitaine, Basilicata, Campania, Dytiki Ellada, Norte and 
Sachsen-Anhalt – the ERDF programmes (and Cohesion Fund in the Greek case) facilitated a 
transformation in specific fields, without having a pronounced wider impact on growth and 
employment (except in Basilicata) and leaving major needs still unaddressed. In Aquitaine, 
for instance, improvements were made in developing the image of the regional capital, 
Bordeaux, and in providing services to the rural areas, with the effect of countering 
depopulation trends. But, although the programmes have contributed to avoiding a 
worsening of territorial disparities, they have not been successful at modernising and 
diversifying the region’s productive base which largely remains reliant on the production of 
wine, food and trade activities inherited from the past.  
Similarly, in Sachsen-Anhalt, there were successes in the fields of structural adjustment 
and enterprise development, but significant problems - such as overall low productivity, 
Evaluation of the main achievements of Cohesion policy programmes and projects over the longer term 
in 15 selected regions: Final Report 
EPRC 116 LSE 
high unemployment levels, low entrepreneurial propensity, poor levels of R&D&I and 
underdeveloped network of urban agglomerations – have still to be addressed. In similar 
vein, Basilicata saw major improvements in the provision of basic public services, which 
were pivotal to develop certain sectors, but without solving the fundamental isolation of 
the region and altering the overall economic model based largely on agriculture and 
(increasingly, thanks to the programmes), tourism. Arguably, in regions such as Dytiki 
Ellada, Campania and Norte, the fact that the transformation achieved was substantial, 
but limited to specific fields (basic and transport infrastructure and services, quality of life, 
environmental sustainability) derives from the sheer scale and diversity of the needs to be 
addressed, and the overall limited scale of the resources mobilised.  
In the remaining regions – Burgenland, Nordrhein-Westfalen, North East England, Itä-
Suomi and Nord-Pas-de-Calais – the ERDF programmes have had a positive influence on 
wider development factors, supporting change in specific fields, but were unable 
(understandably, given their moderate scale of intervention) to make a decisive difference 
to the problems of the regions, and they did not induce a wider transformation of their 
economies (except to a degree in Burgenland). For instance, in Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
important achievements were realised in the fields of enterprise and structural adjustment, 
but unemployment is still high. In Itä-Suomi, the ERDF  supported existing domestic policies 
in the fields of enterprise and innovation, but without facilitating an economic 
configuration of the region, which remains fundamentally hampered by its isolation within 
Finland. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the programmes enabled a modernisation of certain 
traditional economic sectors (e.g. transport), promoted new specialisations (ICT) and 
attracted new investors to the region, but with effects concentrated in the main urban 
areas of Lille and Arras, thus reinforcing existing infra-regional territorial disparities. In 
North East England, the programmes successfully promoted a new approach to economic 
development based on culture and tourism, and improved quality of life through community 
regeneration projects, but without being able to affect the fundamental shortcomings of 
the regional economy: low productivity, low entrepreneurship and innovation, high 
unemployment and worklessness. Lastly, in Burgenland, the ERDF contributed to advances 
in GDP per capita and economic performance (although needs persist in most fields except 
tourism, especially in the south of the region) and the Land also benefited from the 
economic performance of Austria, the positive impact of development trends such as the 
suburbanisation of Vienna, and the effect of domestic interventions in public transport 
networks.  
If there have been marked differences across the 15 regions in the extent to which the 
ERDF programmes delivered true and long-lasting socio-economic transformation, the 
institutional achievements have been both wide-ranging and widespread, ranging from the 
introduction of strategic multi-annual planning, to the introduction or  improvement of 
monitoring, reporting and evaluation practices, to a general increase in the level of 
technical capacity and skills within regional and national administrations. 
In most cases, programme resources were not sufficient to address all areas of need. Even 
so, the fact that in most cases there was only a partial transformation should not be viewed 
as a criticism: in most if not all case studies, the perception of stakeholders is that the 
regions would have been worse-off had the programmes not occurred, and that the ERDF 
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programmes determined or facilitated a change which saw the regions become better 
places in which to live, invest or visit. ERDF programmes generally had a transformative 
effect, but one which has not resulted in growth, productivity and employment, or affected 
the regions’ longer-term resilience. In this sense, the ability of the programmes to 
stimulate entrepreneurship, induce innovation and support competitiveness appears to have 
been rather disappointing. 
8.4 EQ3: What are the main lessons learnt on the effectiveness and 
utility of ERDF interventions in each region? 
EQ3a: What are the main good/bad practices? 
The research has found both good and bad practices in relation to various aspects of 
programme management and implementation: identification of need; strategic planning; 
institutional capacity; setting SMART objectives; evolution of programmes; allocation and 
flexibility of funding; scale and nature of strategic projects; and evaluation.  
In relation to the identification of need, a good practice which has emerged from the 
research is the regional foresight exercise undertaken in North East England ahead of the 
2007-2013 programme period. More generally, the improvements realised in many regions 
over time in the use and quality of information for needs assessment, are also considered 
good practices. The other side of the coin is that in the early programmes, particularly at 
the beginning of the study period, there was very little effort to undertake regional 
analyses based on data and evaluative evidence.  
Good practices in strategic planning were found in Burgenland and Andalucía:  Burgenland 
for the mobilisation of different bodies to discuss and inform strategies when the region 
first started implementing the policy (in 1995) and Andalucía for the creation of new 
competences which would subsequently prove fundamental to implementation. The fact 
that early strategies were not driven by need, were excessively focused on infrastructure 
and derived with little or no involvement of stakeholders beyond the administration was 
seen as a bad practice in Dytiki Ellada. Another bad practice has been the limited 
prioritisation of efforts (in 2000-2006) and competence subdivision with domestic policies 
and between NOPs and ROP in Campania, which resulted in overly ambitious targets and 
limited effectiveness.  
With respect to institutional capacity and leadership - good practices included the 
involvement of secondees from local authorities in the managing authority in North East 
England and the appointment of a high-profile academic as regional minister for transport 
in Campania. The latter provided strong expertise, leadership and coalesced technical 
expertise, allowing for better planning, coordination of different funding sources and 
synergy with national policy. Bad practices include problems with R&D interventions in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, poor support to beneficiaries in rural areas in Aquitaine, difficulties 
with organising expertise, raise capacities, sustain the improvements made and continuity 
after political change in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Basilicata and Campania. 
Setting SMART objectives is an area which has been characterised by bad, rather than good, 
practice. The measurability and attainability of objectives, in particular, have been a 
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constant problem in many regions, requiring expectations to be scaled down during 
implementation. This was linked in earlier periods to the deficiency of reliable information 
and data, which meant that the information on what did and did not work in earlier 
programmes could not be integrated in the strategic thinking of the next. Ireland perhaps 
experienced fewest problems with this, but partly because the ERDF programmes were 
embedded in a single national strategy making measurement easier. However, while this 
integrated approach eased monitoring difficulties when EU co-financed expenditure 
constituted all or most of the national investment, as its share fell after 2000 attribution of 
national programme achievements to the reduced EU contribution became more 
problematic. 
Evolution of programmes across the study period - bad practices include the tendency to 
replicate the same mix of interventions for cost-efficiency reasons, instead of appraising 
their effectiveness (Dytiki Ellada), and the interruption of certain types of interventions in 
the transition from the 2000-2006 to the 2007-2013 period in Campania, which arguably 
hindered the longer-term achievements that could be delivered by already implemented 
measures (in the R&D field).  
Allocation and flexibility of funding - the programmes have not always been able to react 
quickly to changing contexts and needs. Nevertheless, there are examples of good 
practices, such as the successful adaptation of the Galicia ROP in order to tackle the 
environmental damage of the Prestige oil tank spill. More recently, many regions have been 
able to modify their programmes in order to address social and economic needs associated 
with the economic crisis. Bad practices were found in Campania, in relation to the inability 
of ROPs to accommodate the difficulty of tourist firms in keeping up with the investment 
and employment plans anticipated in funding applications. The result was withdrawals, 
with negative consequences for the beneficiaries, the programme and wider tourist industry 
and economy of the region.  
Scale and nature of project - Programmes often faced trade-offs between achieving critical 
mass and accommodating different stakeholder interests and local demands. The 
proliferation of small projects was viewed as a critical aspect of programmes in many 
regions (e.g. Aquitaine, Basilicata, Dytiki Ellada, Norte and North East England until the 
early 2000s). The focus on a limited set of large-scale strategic projects in key fields was 
considered a good practice in North East England. Nevertheless, in this area more so than 
in others, what constitutes a good and a bad practice needs to be viewed within the 
specific context of each region.  
Evaluation - Good practices include the ex post evaluation of the 2000-2006 ROP 
undertaken in Campania which provided accountability and lessons for the next programme 
and the spillover effect on domestic policy in Aquitaine. The lack of comprehensive 
programme and multi-programme ex post evaluations (comprising ROPs and NOPs 
implemented in a given region) is a bad practice. As the case studies uncovered, there is 
little evidence on the achievements of programmes and on the extent to which they 
contributed to change the reality of regions. 
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Many examples of good practice projects were reported in the case study research, a 
sample of which is shown in Table 17, based on the judgements of case study teams. These 
are not necessarily the best projects in their regions but are examples which were 
examined and had some good practice characteristics. In a number of cases, the good 
practice relates to a group of projects or a sub-programme where it is the collective effect 
that makes a difference. What made for a good practice project was attributed to various 
factors: suitability for local needs and conditions; good planning and management; 
innovative project design; commitment from project participants; attention to quality; and 
learning from experience. Bad practices were likely to arise from projects that were not 
well thought through, from ‘me-too’ projects copied from other regions, and where local 
organisations or businesses were more focused on drawing down funding than designing 
effective projects, sometimes investing because funding was available, rather than to 
implement necessary changes, or acquiring funding for investments that they would have 
realised anyway also in the absence of support. 
Good projects were based on an understanding of local needs but also with innovation to go 
beyond normal expectations. Quality was a key element, either in design and management 
or in the nature of what was delivered, such as the design and technical standards of a road 
building or service to increase aspirations, or the nature of research projects undertaken (a 
full review of these projects, with detailed examination of why they are considered good 
practices is provided in annex to each of the case study reports).  
Changes at the national level should also be mentioned. For example, Italy introduced 
performance reserve systems (in both 2000-06 and 2007-13, with lessons from 2000-06 
feeding-in to the framing of the 2007-13 performance reserve). It also pioneered an 
extensive system of additionality accounting (Conti Pubblici Territoriali, used for the two 
Italian case studies), opening up of data from the monitoring system (opencoesione.gov), 
and improvements in evaluation through the setting up of Evaluation Units. The 
establishment of an Evaluation Unit was particularly successful in Campania as part of the 
regional strategy to improve the governance of structural funds programmes. Even so, in 
Campania, the direction of policy was reported to be driven by predominantly politics 
rather than by the evidence from evaluation, even in the presence of internal evaluations, 
with the result that there was a lack of continuity in successful initiatives. 
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Table 18: Examples of good practice projects 
 Good practice projects and sub-programmes 
Algarve  Development of marinas to support and diversify tourism. 
 ‘Cork Route’ to spread tourism into rural interior and connect traditional 
industries 
 Village revitalisation in the interior to enhance  quality of life and reverse the 
process of depopulation 
Andalucía  Andalucía Forest Plan to combat natural hazards such as desertification and 
erosion whilst protecting ecosystems and developing new rural activities. 
Aquitaine  Laser Highway strategy to build a high technology cluster 
 Tourism promotion in Oloron-Sainte-Marie 
 Aquitaine Regional Incubator 
Basilicata  Basilicata Sviluppo development agency promoting entrepreneurship and SMEs 
 Scheme to promote a computer in every home to encourage internet use 
Burgenland  Tourism projects especially spa resorts and a focus on wellness tourism 
 Integrated development of renewable energy and biomass in a peripheral 
location linked to university knowledge. 
Campania  ‘Il Tari’ service and production centre to support the goldsmiths cluster 
 Naples metropolitan transport system 
 Phlegraean Fields Integrated Territorial Project 
Dytiki Ellada  Rion-Atirion Bridge, linking two halves of the region and replacing a ferry 
crossing 
 Patras Science Park 
 Tourism and cultural development projects at Ancient Olympia. 
 Integrated programmes in selected mountainous areas 
Galicia  Rural telephone plan 
 SOGAMA environmental management company to manage waste 
transportation and treatment 
 PIMEGA programme to develop entrepreneurial skills and provide SME support 
Ireland  Tourism development initiatives improved the quality of the tourism product 
in Ireland and allowed a better exploitation of resources and opportunities. 
 National roads programme 
Itä-Suomi  Institutionalised cooperation networks between universities, polytechnics & 
firms 
 EASTWOOD growth and development programme for wood based 
manufacturing and construction companies 
Nord-Pas de 
Calais 
 Protection and management of the Two Capes coastline area, to restore the 
natural environment and provide better tourist facilities.  
 Development of the Dourges multimodal logistical hub on derelict land. 
 New Museum of Art and Industry in former Art Deco swimming baths, Roubaix 
Nordrhein-
Westfalen 
 Logport Logistics Centre in Duisberg, creating the world’s biggest inland port 
on a derelict and contaminated site. 
 Conversion of the Zeche Zollverein former coal mine and coking plant to a 
design and culture centre, museum and tourist attraction. 
 Integrated urban regeneration in the Dortmund Nordstadt area 
Norte  Leixões port developments 
 Development strategy for the footwear industry with associated cluster 
initiatives 
 Ermida Bridge across the river Duoro 
North East 
England 
 Iconic cultural projects linked to urban regeneration have been successful in 
generating cultural employment as well as promoting tourism and boosting 
regional confidence 
 Centres of excellence in renewable energy and process industries, supporting 
local industries and becoming national institutions 
Sachsen-
Anhalt 
 Technology and Founders’ Centre Halle with three core technology centres 
encouraging start-ups and innovation 
 Establishment of the Zellstoff Stendal wood pulp plant employing 600 people 
on the site of a cancelled nuclear power station  
 Community Initiative URBAN Halle supporting SME through urban regeneration 
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Identifying bad projects is easy in most regions as there are projects which failed or were 
well known as a waste of money, although given the large numbers of projects in a typical 
region, it is inevitable that there will be some failures. In many cases this was down to bad 
project design and management, but it is also important to note that where projects are 
experimental, some failure is to be expected and should be regarded as normal.  
EQ3b: What conclusions can be drawn for improving ERDF programme design, 
implementation, results-based management, achievements? 
The research provides several suggestions for improving the ability of future programmes to 
deliver the intended achievements and to address regional needs effectively. This section 
examines the potential lessons from the evaluation for the principal elements of Cohesion 
policy. 
Programme design 
All case studies highlighted the value of developing a strategy, involving – to different 
degrees – the analysis of regional needs and challenges, a vision for the future, and the 
articulation of a multiannual development plan with clear objectives to which relevant 
partners subscribed. Specific lessons include the following, 
 Introduce scenario-thinking - Regions need to invest in professionalised strategic 
planning and to carry out research on the current and future needs of the region, 
intended to identify the potential opportunities that can be realised through 
targeted support. The development of the regional strategy should be underpinned 
by scenario building - as proposed for smart specialisation strategies - and ensure 
that projected scenarios are exposed to external challenge over their relevance 
and feasibility. 
 Build in contingency plans - Strategies need to be flexible to cope with changes of 
needs arising from external shocks or unexpected opportunities. Strategic planning 
needs to incorporate some sensitivity analysis to factors such as economic change 
and anticipate contingency plans associated with the main potential challenges 
detected at planning stage. 
 A long-term approach to competitiveness to ensure resilience - Critical for many 
regions is support for changes in the economic base of the region to render it more 
resilient to economic shocks. Whilst infrastructure may still be needed in some 
regions and the support to economic diversification through tourism has been a 
useful medium-term response for lagging regions, regions should be encouraged to 
focus more on projects that enhance entrepreneurship and innovation.  
 Plan in detail to ensure that expectations are realistic - Regions need to be 
realistic about timescales in their strategies, recognising that change may take 
place over more than one programme cycle (and hence there is a need for 
continuity), and they should not be overambitious about what can be achieved 
within a seven-year programme, especially with limited resources. Strategic 
planning has to be explicit about the timescales associated with objectives. 
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Regions should also recognise the often small relative financial scale of ERDF 
programmes, and frame expectations and targets accordingly.   
 Recognise the constraints represented by the local context - Regional strategies 
need to take into account that structural adjustment is a societal as well as an 
economic process. This requires the process of strategy development 
systematically to take account of the influence on performance of relevant 
societal or cultural constraints, and to build in institutional and social measures to 
address cultural, political or institutional conservatism and culture change. In 
some cases, affecting the background cultural and societal context of regions 
would be beyond the scope of the programmes: where this is the case, the 
programmes strategies should explicitly acknowledge the factors constraining 
future implementation and adapt strategies accordingly. 
 Plan with the knowledge of what other investment programmes are being 
implemented in the region – Regional authorities do not always have a vision of 
the full range of investments that are realised in the region by the national 
government and, vice versa, national ministries and government authorities tend 
to view their investments from a sectoral rather than territorial perspective. To 
ensure that the ERDF programmes are complementary and synergic with each other 
(e.g. where both ROPs and NOPs invest in a given region), and with domestic 
spending programmes, existing multi-level dialogue and monitoring systems will 
have to be improved to ensure effective coordination of that the diverse 
investment flows to a given region. ERDF programmes should describe how existing 
systems meet this need and what will be done to ensure that synergy is achieved 
where current systems are not adequate.  
Strategic planning  
Regional authorities and Member States should invest in generating capacity for strategy 
development, such that programme authorities are able to: (i) think long term, for instance 
with structured scenario-planning;  (ii) communicate and debate openly strategic options 
with stakeholders, to achieve a more transparent and effective synthesis between evidence 
and political mediation; (iii) recognise that policy efforts need to be long-term and thus 
frame the seven-year planning of ERDF within a wider programming effort (for instance 
within wider regional strategies); and at the same time (iv) accept that regional conditions 
and need can change abruptly, requiring programmes to be able to respond to change (this 
can be achieved via the existing monitoring and reporting practices, shifting their focus 
from financial management to results); (v) capture the different societal and institutional 
facets of economic development, interacting synergetically with other policies and 
spending programmes, in acknowledgement of the limited scale and scope of the ERDF and 
Cohesion Fund.   
There is sometimes a temptation to think that economic or regional development is a task 
for one or two programme periods. More realistically, 20-30 years are likely to be needed 
for successful restructuring processes, with the implication that strategic plans need to 
extend beyond the time-span of a Cohesion policy programme. Given the time horizons 
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dictated by the seven-year period of the EU Financial Framework and the corresponding 
regulations, a longer time-span is politically difficult. But the advantages of continuity in 
strategy (for example in Basilicata, at least during the first two programme periods which, 
in turn, drew on strategic orientations already in place from the 1980s), point to the need 
for a longer-term perspective. Moreover, ‘regional development’ is a permanent challenge, 
because of the enduring locational disadvantages of certain regions, whereas favoured 
agglomerations usually have a more dynamic and self-sustained economic development 
process 
Implementation  
The rapid creation and availability of administrative expertise for managing EU funding was 
particularly important in less-developed regions (e.g. Algarve, Dytiki Ellada, Galicia) and 
for major projects. It had the side-effect of increasing training and exposure to 
international practice. However, deficits in expertise were encountered in regions of all 
types, notably among implementing bodies such as municipalities and socio-economic 
partners, and a shortage of technical skills for specialized measures and projects. 
The ability of programmes to deliver the intended achievements could be improved through 
the use of technical expertise from outside the administration in the appraisal and 
selection of projects. This will be particularly critical in the 2014-20 programme period 
given the emphasis on specialist areas, such as research and innovation or the green 
economy. Further, strategic decisions on investment choices and assessment of likely 
achievements need explicitly to: (i) recognise the need to budget for maintenance of 
infrastructure and activities funded and to ascertain whether the necessary operational 
costs can be met; (ii) avoid overprovision of certain forms of intervention, either through 
building in excessive capacity or a proliferation of developments across a region; (iii) 
accompany investment in innovation with assessment of the appropriate balance of public 
and private sector support; (iv) ensure that effective support for enterprise embodies and a 
systemic approach, combining finance capital, incubation, business advice, and culture 
change, and, crucially, ensuring that the different needs of different types of firms are met 
(via different combinations of tools); (v) be explicit about the fact that intervention in 
more innovative fields, present an inevitable degree of likely failure, but estimate this at 
the outset;  and, lastly, integrate community development activities within place-based 
regeneration strategies. Two specific lessons are to: 
 Utilise technical expertise to appraise the worthiness of projects - For project 
selection processes relating to calls for proposals, regions should explicitly 
consider a range of options and be aware of ‘good practice’ scoring systems, 
drawing on experts in the relevant field. Managing authorities or implementing 
bodies should have access to experts able to give advice to projects on how to 
improve project design and ensure results are met. This will be more critical in the 
2014-20 period given the specialist interventions in areas such as research and 
innovation, the green economy and financial instruments. 
 Ensure that projects are sustainable long-term via cost-benefit analyses, risk 
assessment and contingency planning - Regions should invest in and use cost-
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benefit analysis more systematically for projects which are strategic, with full 
life-cycle costs, including operational running and maintenance costs, being 
considered, risk assessment and contingency planning. 
A major difficulty, reported in almost all regions was the fragmentation of funding across 
too many types of interventions or projects. Especially in the early periods, programmes 
were characterised by too many projects targeted at local needs; decisions were governed 
by political interests with insufficient regard to value-for-money or overall programme 
effectiveness. Over time, in some regions, there was recognition of the need to 
concentrate funding on fewer and larger projects, driven by more effective project 
selection that emphasised quality, together with and monitoring systems to ensure that the 
expected outcomes were achieved. Flagship or ‘spearhead’ projects also allowed critical 
mass to be achieved in making changes (Itä-Suomi, North-East England). Specific lessons 
are: 
 Where resources are minor, focus on game-changing projects - Particularly 
where the ERDF resources are minor compared with wider public spending 
programmes implemented in the region, at least a large part of the available 
resources should be assigned to major, well-justified, strategic projects which 
have the potential to be game-changing, and should be selective about the kinds of 
projects to be implemented in particular localities. The European Commission, as 
well as national authorities, have an important role in ‘protecting’ regional 
authorities from the pressure to support large numbers of local projects that may 
be politically desirable to municipalities, but have limited strategic economic 
rationale.  
 Plan and monitor closely composite territorial projects - Elsewhere, care should 
be taken to ensure that the size of projects fits with the aims of the interventions 
funded, and that where achievements are to be realised through the joint effect 
of aggregations of projects that there are adequate project design, delivery and 
monitoring capabilities, to ensure that the projects or their portions are 
implemented as planned and with the sequencing foreseen (notably where the 
likelihood of a project to achieve its goals are linked to other projects doing so). 
Continuity of the key players in a development effort can also be an important success 
factor, as was the case in Burgenland and, at least during the first two programme periods, 
in Basilicata. This enables the build-up of tacit knowledge and communication via short 
routes, and is particularly important where funding packages are more complex, as is often 
the case with EU funding. There are bound to be associated risks of lock-in and limited 
receptiveness to policy innovation. Here, however, a task for the Commission is to 
champion and stimulate ‘innovative measures’, including by exchange of experience. 
Results-orientation and achievements  
Over successive programme periods, programmes have often been assembled as vehicles to 
draw down funding for specific projects or types of projects. They were frequently only 
loosely connected with a high-level vision relating to growth or regional convergence 
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and/or were unclear about how objectives were to be realised. There is clearly a need for 
objective-setting to establish the logic for intervention with reference to outcomes. More 
fundamentally, however, this needs to be embedded in a development model 
demonstrating an understanding of how the regional economy functions and how EU-funded 
interventions ‘fit’ with development patterns, trends and factors. 
To improve the results-orientation of programmes, regions should develop programming 
approaches underpinned explicitly by underlying development theories. This requires a new 
way of thinking about policy and thus targeted capacity building. Such approaches should 
identify and address necessary conditions and the time-bound targets to be achieved. More 
emphasis should also be placed on evaluation, including more fieldwork-based, grass-roots 
evaluation to supplement and improve the quality of programme monitoring. Monitoring 
systems have improved over time in their ability to track outputs (less so results, such as 
jobs created), but the information is still mixed across policy areas and themes both in 
availability and quality. For key policy areas, monitoring information should be 
supplemented with ad hoc surveys carried out at periodic time intervals.  
Ex post evaluation should become a routine activity of programme authorities (to be 
supported by ad hoc regulatory provisions), in addition to the evaluative work undertaken 
by the Commission which, by nature, cannot provide detailed and specific territorial 
assessments. In addition, the emphasis of evaluation work should shift from financial and 
procedural aspects, to effectiveness and utility. Particularly for infrastructure projects, in 
order to ensure that projects continue to deliver dividends years after they have been 
realised and that the infrastructure is maintained, programme authorities should carry out 
or commission cost-benefit analysis of projects embracing their full life-cycle. 
Investment choices and achievements 
The lessons from investment choices and the associated achievements were fivefold. First, 
in a number of regions, ERDF was used to support capital investments even though there 
were insufficient funds available for their effective maintenance. Consequently facilities 
were left unused, or remedial work needed to be undertaken at a later date. Examples 
include water purification plants in Andalucía and Campania where operational or 
maintenance costs were not budgeted for, and transport infrastructures in Campania which 
are being utilised below capacity, although they are now more fully used and contribute to 
easing congestion elsewhere. Cultural facilities also presented problems unless operating 
budgets were identified at the outset. It is worth noting that not every region can sustain 
an airport or can justify extensive connections to central areas, and that it is therefore 
incumbent on those planning programmes to concentrate resources on other investment 
that fit the region more closely.  
Second, the scale of achievements was influenced by regional investment choices involving 
overprovision, usually in forms of infrastructure, with the result that output achievements 
are good, but usage and hence the results are low. Reasons include an airport that is much 
bigger than needed (Malaga in Andalucía), dual-carriageway roads that are underused 
(Norte), or innovation centres in every town when the demand is not apparent in all places. 
The rationale might be that these developments are future-proofed, in the sense that the 
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airport will be able to absorb growth for the next twenty years, but this choice has an 
opportunity cost and implies less funding for other measures such as support for 
entrepreneurship or innovation. Ireland devoted some of its ERDF to the development of 
regional airports, but acknowledged in 2011 that there was over-provision and insufficient 
resources to maintain all eight.  Two of them (Galway and Sligo) have effectively since 
been closed to commercial aviation by the withdrawal of government subsidy. 
Third, in many regions, particularly where R&D is low, regions have devoted the majority of 
their innovation support to building up research capacity in the universities and public 
sector. This is an essential part of the development of an effective regional innovation 
system, but without parallel effort devoted to private sector innovation capacity there is 
the risk that impact is limited and the higher levels of public R&D can only be supported by 
continued ERDF subsidy. Expectations that investment in universities will automatically lead 
to spin-offs are too often disappointed.  
Fourth, as with innovation, regions experienced more success at promoting enterprise 
where integrated strategies were developed that addressed all the barriers and problems 
experienced by different types of entrepreneurs, including the cultural attitudes towards 
entrepreneurship, especially among young people. Schemes that provided multiple forms of 
capital for different niches, training alongside incubator facilities etc were more successful. 
However, in some cases, entrepreneurship measures could not deliver the intended results, 
without the support of other policies (e.g. labour market reform, legality and public order) 
Such complementary measures would have been expected to affect some of the underlying 
factors affecting the performance of entrepreneurial support measures, such as the weight 
of the hidden economy, of illegal activities, or of an inefficient credit market etc.. 
Lastly, regions experienced difficulties reaching targets for achievements with community 
development activities, especially where such activities were small and fragmented, even if 
they were beneficial to the community concerned. Faced with limited resources, the 
concentration of community development in integrated programmes for target communities 
or places produced better results. 
8.5 Implications for the future development of Cohesion policy 
The study provides clear evidence to support the direction of Cohesion policy in 2014-20, 
specifically with respect to the emphasis on conditionalities, the new results-orientation, 
the enhanced performance framework and the promotion of capacity-building both as a 
thematic priority and the creation of administrative capacity units in DG Regio and DG 
EMPL. These are areas where our findings show successive generations of programmes to 
have been deficient. However, while the principles of these changes are supported by the 
research, the practical obstacles are significant.  
First, the study demonstrates that changing policy priorities and management practices 
takes a long time, certainly more than one programme period. The resistance by some 
Member States to the new regulations for 2014-20 as part of the negotiations, and the 
caution on the part of programme authorities in responding to the Commission’s 
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expectations suggests that achieving the necessary revolutionary change in performance 
under the new programmes will be difficult. 
Second, the study has identified a long list of lessons that apply to every stage of the 
programme cycle. They imply deficits in the conceptual approach to programming, 
strategic planning techniques, analytical methods to support project selection, and the 
quality or focus of monitoring and evaluation. This implies a major effort to build 
administrative capacity and promote learning. 
Of all the changes required, perhaps the most important is to encourage and support a 
more sophisticated approach to long-term strategic analysis and planning, drawing on 
theory and practice in ways that challenge conventional thinking and rooted in a detailed 
understanding of the distinctive strengths and weaknesses of individual regions. The 
recommended approach to smart specialisation for post-2014 programming is a good start, 
but it presupposes a level of competence and experience that (this study suggests) does not 
exist everywhere. While the current programming phase should take at least some steps 
forward in improving the performance of programmes, a more realistic timescale for 
implementing the lessons of this study is to look forward to the post-2020 programme 
period and a strategy to raise awareness and invest in knowledge, skills and expertise. 
Carrying out this kind of long-term study in each Member State could provide a road-map on 
what Cohesion policy has achieved (or not) in individual countries and regions, where the 
problems lie and how specific improvements might be achieved.  
Evaluation of the main achievements of Cohesion policy programmes and projects over the longer term 
in 15 selected regions: Final Report 
EPRC 128 LSE 
 
Evaluation of the main achievements of Cohesion policy programmes and projects over the longer term 
in 15 selected regions: Final Report 
EPRC 129 LSE 
9. ANNEX 1: SUMMARIES OF REGIONAL NEEDS 
9.1 Regions facing major underdevelopment and endowment 
deficiencies 
Dytiki Ellada was and to a large extent remains a dual region: the urbanised, high 
population density core has for years suffered problems of deindustrialisation and economic 
decline, while the periphery (predominantly agricultural and sparsely populated areas) has 
experienced more fundamental problems of development, with limited economic and 
population dynamism and a weak industrial and infrastructure base. In the early 1980s, the 
region’s economy was mainly based on low productivity agricultural activities (almost 30 
percent of the regional GDP) and manufacturing (25 percent), disparities and inequalities 
between the region’s areas (rural and urban), low per-capita income, low employment 
rates in high added-value sectors, low-skilled workforce, strong signs of deindustrialisation, 
inadequate infrastructure for industrial development, small size of enterprises, lack of 
basic services (e.g. primary infrastructure), absence of entrepreneurial culture and 
innovation, lack of motorway and basic infrastructure, reduced intra- and inter-regional 
connectivity, lack of railway and airport systems, insufficient water supply – sewerage 
networks, lack of solid waste management infrastructure and significant shortcomings in 
school and health infrastructure. Recent years have seen a significant improvement in 
transport infrastructure and connectivity, although the wider social, economic and 
demographic problems associated with the region in past decades largely persist today – 
and have been intensified with the financial and fiscal crisis of the last five years. Today 
Dytiki Ellada remains one of the most undeveloped regions of Greece. 
Campania has traditionally lagged behind the Centre-North of Italy, with one of the lowest 
rates of GDP per capita in the country. Demographic disequilibria between the main urban 
conurbation of Naples and the coastal areas and the more rural hinterland have widened 
over the study period. Territorial disequilibria continue to affect other phenomena: 
accessibility from outside and mobility within the region; availability of social and health 
services, with congestion in coastal areas and deficiencies in internal areas; and 
environmental deterioration and risks, with different problems affecting different areas 
(e.g. urban waste emergencies in Naples and Caserta only). Throughout the study period, 
the region has consistently experienced high rates of poverty, unemployment and 
worklessness, especially among women and young people, with a high rate of young people 
not in employment, education or training. Serious social problems have historically affected 
and continue to affect the region, particularly organised crime in some parts of the regional 
territory. Environmental issues - soil erosion along coasts and rivers, industrial site 
contamination, water body quality, and urban and industrial waste management – have 
remained severe throughout the period reviewed. Over the study period, the gap between 
the GDP per capita of the region and of Italy has widened as the region has grown even 
more slowly than the country as a whole, with only marginal improvements in its GDP, 
production base and employment, resulting from diverging trends during the sub-periods. At 
the end of a decade of growth, the crisis of the early 1990s compounded the effects of the 
closing-down of large (especially public) industrial firms and the end of the Special 
Intervention. The region fully recovered during the second half of the 1990s, when small 
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firms localised in industrial clusters showed a potential for growth, export and 
employment. However, this potential was eroded during the 2000s, especially in traditional 
industries (e.g. garment, footwear), due to competition from East Asia, and regional GDP 
stagnated even before the recent economic crisis hit (with severe consequences). 
Norte at the end of the 1980s lacked basic infrastructures and social amenities, a situation 
exacerbated by strong internal territorial disparities (east/west) and a situation of 
peripherality compared to the core of Europe. This meant external diseconomies and a 
limited quality of life. The most critical situation in terms of development opportunities lay 
in human resource capabilities: the lowest level of schooling in the country, high drop-out 
levels, incipient professional training, the lowest rates in terms of secondary and university 
attendance and low R&D investment. Economically, the region was facing a number of 
challenges – such as the textile trade liberalisation in the WTO, the increased competition 
of the Single Market, and later, EU eastern enlargement and change of monetary policy. 
These challenges meant that the region had to face a considerable need for restructuring of 
an economic fabric largely dominated by the agricultural sector and small and micro firms. 
Today Norte has made significant progress in relation to basic infrastructure endowment 
(environmental and social infrastructure), education levels, overall accessibility and infra-
regional connectivity, but fundamental weaknesses in the economy remain, as shown by the 
poor resilience to the joint effects of globalisation, the effects of the adoption of the Euro 
and the recent financial crisis, which have caused the region to regress. 
In the late 1980s, Andalucía was one of the poorest regions in Spain with high 
unemployment levels, low education levels, and a lack of efficient transport and 
environmental infrastructure (regarding water supply, distribution and purification). Today, 
a large part of these needs have been met. Andalucía possesses transport infrastructures 
comparable to those in many regions of the most developed European countries. The main 
remaining needs in the environmental field are those related to wastewater treatment and 
purification in small and medium-sized municipalities. But on the whole, deficiencies have 
been reduced in the last decades and Andalucía has embraced a convergence process with 
European standards (GDP pc increased from 59 percent of the EU15 average in 1996 to 66 
percent in 2007) and experienced unprecedented employment creation (unemployment 
decreased from 32 percent in 1993 to 12.7 percent in 2007). However, since 2007 the 
Andalucía economy has been adversely affected by a serious financial and real estate crisis, 
and the unemployment rate has again grown to over 30 percent. Nevertheless, important 
weaknesses remain, such as the lack of an entrepreneurial culture, the small average 
business size, underinvestment in R&D and innovation in the private sector. In spite of some 
interesting industrial developments (agri-food, aeronautical, ITC, renewable energy), the 
industrial base of the Andalucía economy remains limited.  
Basilicata - In 1988, Basilicata was the poorest region in Italy, with a GDP per head of just 
over 63 percent of the national average.  It faced particular structural challenges due to 
geological instability, mountainous terrain and geographic peripherality, and a relatively 
small population dispersed over many small towns and villages. The region was 
economically peripheral, with poor road, rail and airport connections to the rest of Italy 
and abroad. It also lacked urban or industrial agglomerations. With the highest proportion 
of employment in agriculture and the lowest proportion of services, the employment rate 
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was one of the lowest in the country, especially among women; the unemployment rate was 
almost 19 percent, and educational attainment was below the national average. The region 
was heavily dependent on external subsidies, had major deficiencies in entrepreneurship 
and the skills necessary for sustainable industrial development, and was not adequately 
exploiting its natural and cultural assets. Parts of the region were still underdeveloped, 
lacking basic infrastructures and services. At the time of the first Structural Funds 
programme in 1989, Basilicata was embarking on a period of economic growth, stimulated 
by massive reconstruction aid following the 1980 earthquake, as well as other special 
interventions by the national government, contributing to the attraction of major firms 
(e.g. Fiat and Barilla). However, while the region made some progress in addressing its 
structural problems – notably with the provision of basic services and development of 
tourism – its performance according to indicators such as new firm formation, SME 
development and innovation has been weak. The 2000s was generally a period of relative 
slowdown and declining competitiveness; industrial production declined by almost 12 
percent between 2002 and 2004 due particularly to the crisis in Fiat and the stuffed 
furniture districts. The current economic crisis has imposed renewed pressure on the 
region, and it has suffered badly due to lack of its dependence a limited number of sectors, 
and outmigration of the young and skilled. Overall, thus, even though during the period 
since 1989 the region has converged economically, many of the key structural problems 
remain, notably under-representation in high-added value industrial sectors, and (despite 
progress) infrastructure deficits (particularly transport and social infrastructure). 
In 1989, Ireland still had one of the lowest per capita incomes in the EU. Major challenges 
at that time included the need to modernise infrastructure, develop indigenous industry 
and support market diversification, and tackle endemic unemployment. The country had 
very low per-capita income and output levels relative to other European countries, 
reflective of low productivity, high population dependency (in effect a low employment 
rate) and a weak industrial base; a very low labour demand, resulting in high short- and 
long-term unemployment and substantial emigration; a legacy of stark budgetary 
imbalances resulting in a high national debt; weak physical infrastructure in need of 
substantial upgrade and improvement, but with little prospect of such investment in the 
prevailing budgetary context; a weak indigenous industrial structure constrained by 
geographical peripherality from large international markets, underdeveloped human 
resources, skills and capabilities, and focused in low-value sectors with limited inherent 
international competitive advantages; and low levels of investment in R&D and innovation. 
Over the subsequent programme periods, the Irish economy grew rapidly, although not 
consistently, experienced substantial sectoral and structural change, addressed long-
standing infrastructural deficits, transformed its labour market and saw very substantial 
increases in living standards. Before the present crisis took hold in 2008, Ireland’s GDP per 
capita was among the highest levels in the EU. 
9.2 Region facing transition or structural adjustment 
Since the German unification Sachsen-Anhalt has been dealing with the implications of the 
transition to the market economy. This has caused a number of structural peculiarities 
which have had an impact on the region’s development prospects and potential: a legacy of 
large uncompetitive industrial trusts (oriented to the COMECON market, with low levels and 
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productivity, obsolete fixed assets and scarce R&D propensity), a marginalised SME sector, 
sectoral specialisation on the chemical industry and mining (with the consequent 
environmental implications), and a vastly neglected infrastructure. The fall of the 
communist regime led to de-industrialisation and massive layoffs, which were tackled with 
job creation, retirement and flexible labour schemes, social security, whilst at the same 
time investing in infrastructures and industrial assets. Whilst the social security and job 
schemes prevented large-scale social problems, and notwithstanding the considerable 
improvements in the region’s environmental situation, external image and connectivity, 
Sachsen-Anhalt remains hampered in its development by fundamental shortcomings, such as 
a lack of entrepreneurial culture, low R&D and innovation propensity, poverty and 
outmigration. 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais is one of the European regions that contributed substantially to the 
industrial revolution and experienced a strong industrial development until the middle of 
the 20th century. This development was mainly based on mining, steel, metallurgy and 
textile industries and was accompanied by a dynamic demographic and urban growth. In the 
1970s, the region was strongly hit by the then economic crisis, resulting in the decline of all 
mining activities and a major recession in other industries. This led to the closure of 
hundreds of enterprises and extensive layoffs. As in other European regions facing a 
conversion process, Nord-Pas-de-Calais  had to accommodate major structural difficulties 
including the concentration of activities on a few economic sectors, limited development of 
services, a workforce and training system focused on industrial activities, strong 
dependence of SMEs on large companies, and a limited entrepreneurship and innovation 
culture. From an environmental perspective, the region also suffered from pollution and/or 
declining industries that had a significant impact on the land and on the urban fabric.  
In Nordrhein-Westfalen, ERDF interventions have been concentrated on the Ruhrgebiet 
area for most of the period since 1989. Strongly dominated by coal and steel industries, the 
Ruhrgebiet suffered from the acceleration in the decline of these industries in the 1970s. 
One of the main consequences was rising unemployment rates, but the legacy of the old 
industries included large areas of derelict land in cities and associated environmental risks. 
Today, the Ruhrgebiet has undergone fundamental structural change, but the old industries 
have not only become much smaller, but also competitive again. SMEs and business-
oriented services have developed dynamically, and the structure has shifted towards more 
innovative and technology-intensive sectors. Productivity has developed well, but 
unemployment rates remain high. R&D performance is improving, the environmental 
situation has improved, and the problem of wasteland has been significantly reduced. 
However, the educational endowment is below national levels, and the concentration of 
several overlapping problems in specific parts of the cities has increasingly become a 
problem. Unemployment and specifically long-term unemployment remain problematic. 
North East England has suffered from a low level of output for many decades and has 
consistently lagged behind the UK average in gross value added, as well as the EU GDP 
average. Employment in the region fell dramatically in the early 1980s as manufacturing 
shrank in the recession. There was slow recovery from the late 1980s, followed by another 
dip in the early 1990s recession. From 2000 the North East saw modest employment growth 
but overall has performed worse than the UK since 1985. The narrowing of the gap with the 
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rest of the UK between 2000 and 2005 gave some confidence to the region, but the 
situation has deteriorated again since then. Overall activity rates at 74.7 percent (of 16-64 
year olds) remain well below the UK average. Sectorally, the primary industries and most 
manufacturing sectors have continued to decline during the period, the main exceptions 
during the 1990s being motor vehicles and rubber and plastic products. Core industries such 
as metal fabrication, machinery, chemicals, and clothing all declined. The main growth 
opportunities were in consumer services, public services and business services, although the 
latter grew more slowly than the national picture. Knowledge intensive business services 
grew by 38% in the 1990s whereas the national growth in the same period was 79%. The 
North East had the slowest rate of growth of any UK region at that time. Productivity levels 
in 2002 were also lower than the national level for almost all industries. The region’s 
history in large scale mining and manufacturing, followed by decades of encouragement of 
branch plants led to a low proportion of employment in small firms. Firm formation rates 
have been kept low by low levels of capital availability, low proportions of managerial and 
highly educated people, limited local markets for business services and a lagging economy. 
Birth rates of businesses remained low through the 2000s, mainly below 70% of the national 
average, although with a spike upwards in 2007. However, recent research suggests that 
the formation rate of high-growth firms during the early 2000s was similar to the national 
average. It is the lower birth rate among the mass of firms which has had the greatest 
impact on employment levels. The region has also lagged badly on measures of innovation, 
notably in the level of R&D activity. One consequence of the industrial restructuring away 
from traditional heavy industry has been a high level of derelict land needing reclamation, 
some of which in central urban locations offered good locations for future industrial 
development. In 1988, central government estimated there were around 5,900 hectares of 
derelict land in the North East of which 4,700 justified reclamation. This amounted to 
14.6% of the estimated total for England. By 1993 that total had fallen to 5,100 hectares 
after 1,600 hectares had been reclaimed, but more had been added. Using a potentially 
different definition in 2002 the North East had 3,800 hectares of derelict land which fell 
further to 2,660 hectares in 2007, by which time the North East only accounted for 7.9% of 
all the derelict land in England.  This set of issues has been the focus of recent 
programmes: low GVA; low productivity; low activity rates and high unemployment; poor 
performance in growth sectors; low firm formation rates; and low levels of innovation. The 
region also scores badly on wider indicators of social deprivation, and a need for 
regeneration, but these have been less emphasised in the current programme. These 
problems still exist though, especially in areas such as South East Northumberland, East 
Durham and Teesside. 
9.3 Rural or peripheral regions facing reconversion, agricultural 
modernisation and economic diversification 
Two decades ago, Galicia was a peripheral region with poor external accessibility and 
internal connectivity, strongly dependent on low productivity primary sectors (agriculture 
and fishing) and was one of the poorest regions in Spain. A large proportion of the 
population lived scattered in rural areas without basic services (communications, phone 
lines, etc.). The region lacked efficient transport and environmental infrastructure and had 
low levels of educational attainment and technological knowledge, high unemployment and 
a fragmented entrepreneurial system based on small family-owned companies. On top of 
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this, a process of adjustment in traditional activities such as shipbuilding and the chemical 
industry raised serious concerns about the future. These deficiencies have been reduced 
over the last twenty years. Galicia has converged with the EU-15, reducing its GDP per 
capita gap by 8.7 percentage points from 50 to 59.5 percent (73.8 per cent if compensating 
for the differences in prices between countries with purchasing power standards). 
Burgenland, on the other hand, whilst compared with other regions it lies at the heart of 
Europe, it has struggled historically with the typical problems of a rural agrarian region, 
exacerbated by its location at the eastern periphery of Austria and by the absence of 
conurbations. Due to the lack of employment opportunities, the participation rates 
remained well below the already-low average in Austria throughout the period observed, 
resulting in migration from the region. At the outset of Austria’s accession to the EU, the 
region had deficiencies in modern business infrastructure, considerable internal disparities, 
accessibility deficiencies (particularly from the southern part of the province to the capital 
and poor connections to the national transport network). From the opening up of Eastern 
Europe and the forthcoming EU enlargement, Burgenland experienced increased pressure 
on innovation and the internationalisation of the economy. Following Austria’s EU-accession 
and in the wake of Austria's good overall economic performance, which allowed a relatively 
stable development in the period of financial crisis from 2008, a process of catch-up 
actually took place compared to the EU15. Burgenland closed the gap, moving from 71 
percent (1995) to 81 percent (2008) of the EU15 GDP per head. On a national level, 
Burgenland kept pace with Austrian national growth rates. Today, investment levels in 
Burgenland are well above average, as are the business start-up rates. It has been possible 
to develop a number of strengths, particularly in the renewable energy sector and in 
specific niches such as optoelectronics. It has been possible to revive tourism and reduce 
the dependency on employment in agriculture. The manufacturing sector, however, is 
marked by a lack of R&D thrust. R&D and innovation still represents a major challenge as 
the combination of EU-enlargement, internationalisation and technological change have 
increased the need in companies for capability and improved absorptive capacity in R&D. 
Overall, an economic transformation has occurred. Nevertheless, the basic needs of the 
region to create new jobs and reduce the number of commuters still exist. They are 
essentially permanent challenges that should be regarded in the context of missing 
agglomeration advantages. With increasing demand for innovative regional capacities and 
the trend of urbanisation, Burgenland is at risk of remaining ‘the region in between’ - 
between the cities of Vienna, Graz and western Hungarian cities. This requires more 
strategies directed at developing functional regions that extend beyond administrative 
boundaries and make greater use of the opportunities of urban areas for Burgenland. The 
whole economic fabric is still fragile. 
Lastly, Itä-Suomi has for a long time been an archetypical example of a problem region in 
the Finnish and Nordic context. This region has lost population as a result of ongoing out-
migration, and at the same time it has lagged behind the national averages in terms of 
conventional indicators of socio-economic development such as GDP per capita and 
unemployment rate. These problems reflect the region’s peripherality: weak accessibility in 
both Finnish and EU contexts, low population density, a non-diversified production 
structure still highly reliant on the primary sector, territorial specificities (such as vast 
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forests, peripheral location at the external border of the European Union, sparse 
population, and long distances between its few and small urban centres), a productive 
fabric characterised by small companies, generally oriented towards the domestic markets. 
All these characteristics meant that Itä-Suomi has not been able to participate in and 
benefit from the wider Finnish movement towards knowledge-based industrial restructuring 
and growth during the ‘boom years’ of the 1990s. Although performing relatively well in a 
European context, economic performance in Itä-Suomi has continuously lagged behind the 
Finnish average, resulting in GDP per capita divergence between Itä-Suomi and Finland as a 
whole, which is now greater than at the beginning of the 1990s. Over the years, the region 
has experienced an ongoing spatial concentration of economic activities and population in 
the largest centres, which has also meant a progressive thinning-out of population in rural 
areas. Since 1995, these processes have not changed to any significant extent.  
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10. ANNEX 2: METHODS AND DATA 
The methodology and data sources utilised for the research are explained in detail in the 
project’s Inception and First Intermediate Reports, but a summary illustration of the main 
methodological and data aspects of the research is provided below.  
Desk-research  
The study has relied on extensive desk-research of primary and secondary sources, 
including programme documentation such as: programme documents (and where applicable 
complements); annual and final implementation reports; evaluation documents; monitoring 
data held in different programme/public investment databases; independent studies and 
academic sources. The full list of sources utilised for each case study can be found in the 
case study reports, notably in the Annexes V (overview of sources used) and VI (references) 
at the end of each report. Data on the evolution of needs in the regions and for the 
econometric analysis was also drawn from Cambridge Econometrics’ European Regional 
database, as well as from Eurostat and national statistics institutes’ databases. 
Interviews  
Each case study comprised the undertaking of in-depth, mainly face-to-face, semis-
structured interviews with a wide range of privileged observers, notably: strategic and 
operational actors actively involved in the policy (programme and measure managers), 
external observers such as academics and evaluators, and a sample group of policy 
recipients and other stakeholders (such as environmental groups or other associations). 
Interviewees typically represented regional, local, but also national and European levels. 
The full list of interviewees is reported in each case study report in the reports’ Annex IV 
(list of interviewees), but numbers ranged from a minimum of 20 in Burgenland, to a 
maximum of circa 70 in Campania (see table below for more detail). The minimum number 
of interviews to be undertaken was calibrated based on the number of programme periods 
and programmes to be covered (whether also national or only regional), as well as in 
consideration of whether the case study also required coverage of Cohesion Fund 
investments and of the institutional setting of each region.  
Objective 1 / Convergence Phasing–in/out Objective 2 / RCE 
 Burgenland (20)  
 Itä-Suomi (27)  
 Nord-Pas-de-Calais (38) Aquitaine (33) 
Sachsen-Anhalt (37)  Nordrhein-Westfalen (25) 
Dytiki Ellada (48)   
 Ireland (31)  
Campania (73) Basilicata (38)  
Norte (36) Algarve (29)  
Andalucía (36), Galicia (38)   
  North-East England (35) 
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Online survey  
An online questionnaire was administered to a selected group of recipients for each case 
study. This included the interviewees, plus: local authority contacts; firms; regional and 
local social partners, and third-sector organisations; trade unions; and other interest 
groups.  The number of people invited to the survey varied across case studies - ranging 
from c. 170 North-East England to c. 800 in Campania (see table below) – as did the 
response rates, across both case studies and questions (as the survey covered all 
programme periods, and not all actors were involved in all periods, not all questions were 
applicable to all respondents and not all respondents answered all questions). A summary of 
the metrics and main messages emerged from the online survey is provided in the Annex VII 
of each case study. 
Objective 1 / Convergence Phasing–in/out Objective 2 / RCE 
 Burgenland (241)  
 Itä-Suomi (374)  
 Nord-Pas-de-Calais (339) Aquitaine (308) 
Sachsen-Anhalt (314)  Nordrhein-Westfalen (247) 
Dytiki Ellada (253)   
 Ireland (450)  
Campania (806) Basilicata (270)  
Norte (528) Algarve (354)  
Andalucía (499) 
 Galicia (518) 
  
  North-East England (171) 
 
Regional Workshop 
Each regional team organised a workshop to disseminate and discuss the preliminary 
findings of the case study research, validate these and obtain further insights. Workshops 
were held in the 15 regions during the summer/autumn 2012. The list of participants is 
provided in Annex VIII of case study reports. 
Expenditure analysis 
The analysis presented in Chapter 4 and also parts of the analysis included in Chapter 7, 
draws from an exercise of gathering and reclassification of expenditure data undertaken by 
the regional teams. Reclassified date was analysed by the core team (LSE), who produced 
the diagrams and figures presented in the Chapters 4 (analysis of expenditure) of the 
current Final Report and case study reports. 
The classification of expenditure was undertaken based on a set of seventeen categories of 
expenditure, comprising: innovation, entrepreneurship and industrial development, 
information society, transport, energy, environmental protection and risk prevention, 
tourism, culture, urban and rural regeneration, increasing the adaptability of workers and 
firms, enterprises and entrepreneurs, improving access to employment and sustainability, 
improving the social inclusion of less-favoured persons, improving human capital, 
investment in social infrastructure, mobilisation for reforms in the fields of employment 
and inclusion, strengthening institutional capacity at national, regional and local level, 
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reduction of additional costs hindering the outermost regions development and technical 
assistance. These categories could then be aggregated under the 8 themes utilised as the 
main analytical thread for the research. 
Data on expenditure were collected for each region from their respective date of EU 
accession, with the limitations illustrated in the table below. In some cases, for instance in 
relation to the expenditure in the regions of multi-regional and national OPs, it has not 
been possible to acquire actual expenditure data. In such cases, the regional teams 
provided estimates of expenditure based on financial allocations and population shares or 
other criteria. 
Case Study Programmes  
covered  
Information gaps 
 
Additional info Last year 
tracked (for 
2007-2013) 
Austria - 
Burgenland 
ROPs only 
 
No gaps - 2010 
Finland - 
Itä-Suomi 
ROPs only 
 
No gaps - 2011 
France - 
Aquitaine 
ROPs only 
 
Few 1989-1993 ROP 
measures missing data. 
Partial data only on 
expenditure in 2000-
2006. ERDF data only for 
2007-2013. 
Total expenditure for 
2000-2006 includes 
also other 
programmes (some 
Community 
Initiatives). 
Unknown 
France - 
Nord-Pas-
de-Calais 
ROPs only 
 
No gaps. ERDF data only 
for 2007-2013. 
 
- 2010 
Germany - 
Nordrhein-
Westfalen 
ROPs only 
 
ERDF data only. - 2010 
Germany - 
Sachsen-
Anhalt 
1989-1993 and 
1994-1999 ROPs; 
2000-2006 and 
2007-2013: ROPs 
and NOPs 
Transport. 
 
Expenditure data in the 
region from the NOPs not 
available for 1989-1993 
and 1994-1999. Partial 
NOPs data for 2000-2006 
and 2007-2013. 
- 2011 
Greece - 
Dytiki-
Ellada 
ROPs and NOPs + 
Cohesion Fund  
No information on 1989-
1993 NOP expenditure in 
the region.  Cohesion 
Fund data missing. 
Total expenditure 
includes:  1989-1993  
ROP; for the 
remaining periods, 
ROPs, NOPs and 
Cohesion Fund. 
2012 
Ireland  CF for 89-93, 
NOPs for 94-
99,and, since 
2000-2006, ROPs  
1989-1993: data on 
Cohesion Fund 
allocations missing. 
2000-2006: Data on NOPs 
allocations partly missing 
and data on NOPs 
expenditure entirely 
missing. No expenditure 
or allocation data for the 
2000-2006 Southern and 
Eastern ROP. 
2007-2013: ROPs 
allocations missing. 
 
 
Total expenditure 
includes the 
following 
programmes/funds: 
Cohesion Fund (1989-
1993), NOPs in 1994-
99, ROPs in BMW 
region in 2000-06, 
ROPs in 2007-13. 
 
2010 
Evaluation of the main achievements of Cohesion policy programmes and projects over the longer term 
in 15 selected regions: Final Report 
EPRC 140 LSE 
Case Study Programmes  
covered  
Information gaps 
 
Additional info Last year 
tracked (for 
2007-2013) 
Italy - 
Basilicata 
ROPs and NOPs in 
all periods except 
for 2007-2013 
(ROP only) 
No data for 1989-1993. 
ERDF data only. 
- 2011 
Italy - 
Campania 
ROPs and NOPs 
 
No regionalised 
expenditure data for 
1989-1993 NOPs; for the 
1994-1999 period, data 
on NOPs and ROPs 
expenditure is missing 
for a few measures. 
- 2012 
Portugal - 
Algarve 
ROPs and NOPs in 
all periods + 
Cohesion Fund 
 
Information for some 
NOPs for 1994-1999 
missing. 
- 2010 
Portugal - 
Norte 
ROPs and NOPs in 
all periods + 
Cohesion Fund 
 
-  - Unknown 
Spain - 
Andalucía 
ROPs for 89-93. 
ROPs and NOPs in 
rest of periods 
1989-1993: no 
information on NOPs 
allocations. and 
expenditure; no data on 
ROP allocations. 
1994-1999: NOPs and 
ROPs allocations missing 
for some measures. 
2000-2006: NOPs 
allocations missing for 
some measures. 
2007-2013: information 
on NOPs allocations 
missing for some 
measures. 
Cohesion Fund 
allocations not available. 
Total expenditure for 
1994-1999 also 
includes some 
Community 
Initiatives. 
2011 
Spain - 
Galicia 
ROPs and NOPs in 
all periods + 
Cohesion Fund 
1989-1993: No data on 
ROP allocations and 
MOPs allocations and 
expenditure. 
1994-1999: no data on 
NOPs allocations. 
2000-2006 no data on 
NOPs allocations. 
Cohesion Fund 
allocations not available.  
- 2011 
UK - North 
East 
England 
ROPs only in all 
periods 
 
No data for 1989-1993. - 2010 
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